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ABSTRACT	  
 
This thesis examines the manner in which some environments, such as ‘ethnic’ conflict 
situations, provide fertile ground for securitization process to develop into a more 
institutionalized form. Once institutionalized, securitization is no longer limited to the 
typical unidirectional top-down (i.e. elite-driven) path, but rather it becomes subject to 
bottom-up and horizontal forces, creating what is termed in this thesis ‘horizontal’ and 
‘bottom-up’ securitization. These horizontal and bottom-up forces lead to ‘involuntary’ 
acts at the actor and audience levels, which in turn contribute to the perpetuation and 
further institutionalization of an already securitized environment. Within this framework 
the audiences have a much more active role in the development and perpetuation of 
security narratives and threats than they do in the ‘mainstream’ reading of the theory. 
 
The Cyprus conflict, as an intractable ‘ethnic’ conflict, is used to test the abovementioned 
arguments. Empirical evidence from the case study demonstrates that the social context 
dominating such environments contributes significantly to the development of 
institutionalized, horizontal and bottom-up securitization, obstructing desecuritization 
and subsequently also the prospects for conflict resolution.  
 
Key words: securitization, ethnic conflicts, Cyprus conflict, institutionalization, 
Copenhagen School 
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Chapter	  1:	  Introduction	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
Waiting for the Barbarians 
 
What are we waiting for, assembled in the forum? 
 
The barbarians are due here today. 
 
Why isn't anything happening in the senate? 
Why do the senators sit there without legislating? 
 
Because the barbarians are coming today. 
What laws can the senators make now? 
Once the barbarians are here, they'll do the legislating. 
 
Why did our emperor get up so early, 
and why is he sitting at the city's main gate 
on his throne, in state, wearing the crown? 
 
Because the barbarians are coming today 
and the emperor is waiting to receive their leader. 
He has even prepared a scroll to give him, 
replete with titles, with imposing names. 
 
Why have our two consuls and praetors come out today 
wearing their embroidered, their scarlet togas? 
Why have they put on bracelets with so many amethysts, 
and rings sparkling with magnificent emeralds? 
Why are they carrying elegant canes 
beautifully worked in silver and gold? 
 
Because the barbarians are coming today 
 and things like that dazzle the barbarians. 
 
Why don't our distinguished orators come forward as usual 
to make their speeches, say what they have to say? 
 
Because the barbarians are coming today 
and they're bored by rhetoric and public speaking. 
 
Why this sudden restlessness, this confusion? 
(How serious people's faces have become.) 
Why are the streets and squares emptying so rapidly,  
everyone going home so lost in thought? 
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Because night has fallen and the barbarians have not come. 
And some who have just returned from the border say 
there are no barbarians any longer. 
 
And now, what's going to happen to us without barbarians? 
They were, those people, a kind of solution. 
       Constantinos Kavafys, 1904  
(Translated by Edmund Keely) 
   
1.1. Thesis overview  
 
Kavafys wonders: what do we do without the barbarians and who are ‘we’ without them? 
Why does the absence of the barbarians create such anxiety? As discussed in this thesis, 
the prospects of losing the enemy ‘other’ does not necessarily create comfort for ‘us’, as 
one would assume; rather it could create anxiety as it jeopardizes the existence of ‘our’ 
identity. As the poem suggests, the enemy and the associated threats therefore can 
potentially create ‘a kind of solution’ for ‘us’; they can provide the justifications to 
sustain ‘our’ routines – even conflict-perpetuating ones – which in turn help sustain ‘our’ 
identity. 
 
This thesis argues that in ‘protracted ethnic conflict’ environments perceived threats are 
routinely securitized, leading inevitably to the perpetuation of the conflict and to the 
reiteration of the negative perceptions of the ‘enemy other’.1 The thesis also explores how 
in such environments the processes of securitization are considerably different. At the 
core of this argument is the premise that under certain conditions the securitization 
process itself could change from ad hoc to an institutionalized and routinized form. 
Institutionalization then leads to different ‘modes’ of securitization namely horizontal, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 It is acknowledged that the term ‘ethnic conflict’, especially in its primordial connotation, is a contested 
term with empirical and conceptual problems (Gilley 2004). That said, the term is still useful not least 
because it allows for a broad and easy categorization of different kinds of conflicts. In this thesis the term 
‘ethnic conflict’ refers to cases where the conflict – which is defined as ‘a social situation involving 
perceived incompatibilities in goals or values between two or more parties’ – is perceived by at least one 
side in ethnic terms and the confrontation is due to ethnic distinctions (Cordell and Wolff 2009: 4-5; 
Kaufmann 1996: 138). 
6	  	  
bottom-up and involuntary that exist along with the ‘mainstream’ top-down elite-driven 
processes. 
 
Securitization is a process or mechanism that helps us analyze political practice and more 
specifically, as Buzan et al. (1998: 27) state, ‘[w]ho can “do” or “speak” security 
successfully, on what issues, under what conditions, and with what effects’. Security, 
therefore, in the securitization context is a speech act;  ‘by saying it something is done’ 
(Wæver 1995: 55). Successful securitization occurs when the audience accepts the 
securitizing actors’ claims that a referent object is under existential threat. This means 
that Buzan et al.’s ‘definition and criteria of securitization is constituted by the 
intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have 
substantial political effects’ (1998: 25, emphasis in original). More sociologically-
influenced approaches view the securitization process in terms of practices, context and 
power relations. Securitization, when viewed this way, is defined as ‘a set of interrelated 
practices, and the processes of their production, diffusion, and reception/translation that 
bring threats into being’ (Balzacq 2011: 3, emphasis in original). This thesis follows 
Balzacq’s approach as the incorporation of social context and practices are deemed as 
integral variables for the research questions of this thesis considering that the 
securitization processes are examined within the context of protracted ethnic conflicts.  
 
The three main hypotheses of this thesis are: 
 
I. It is possible, under certain conditions, for the process of securitization to become 
institutionalized; 
II. Once institutionalized, securitization need not be always a top-down process, but 
can also be (a) bottom-up and (b) horizontal; 
III. The institutionalization of securitization induces actors and audience alike to 
engage in ‘involuntary’ actions. 
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The concept of institutionalized securitization remains underdeveloped, especially if one 
follows the theory as originally developed by the so-called Copenhagen School scholars.2 
Buzan et al. point out that the persistence or recurrence of specific threats could lead to 
an institutionalization of the sense of urgency, while issues already defined as security 
threats may not need to be dramatized or prioritized (Buzan et al. 1998: 27-28). The focus 
thus is limited to the existence of recurrent ‘actual’ threats (for example ongoing violence 
between two sides as is the case for instance between Israel and Hamas), and not on the 
perpetuation of perceptions regarding potential threats, or the reasons behind the elite and 
public needs and incentives to maintain a threat-ridden securitized environment. This is 
essentially as far as the idea was developed in the mainstream reading of the theory, 
meaning there is no in-depth analysis of how the entire process, and not just the sense of 
urgency, could become institutionalized or what kind of impact this would have on the 
theory.  
 
It is worth noting that subsequent works, primarily by the so-called Paris School scholars, 
have examined the idea of routinized securitization practices in a more profound way, 
albeit this was done mainly on an empirical level and only for some referent objects, such 
as migration, border controls and policing (see e.g. Bigo 2005; Bigo et al. 2007; Tsoukala 
2005) and always from a ‘domestic’ angle (i.e. intra-state) not an international one. 
Routine securitization as discussed in chapter 3 is part of the institutionalization process 
in the sense that the former (i.e. routines) is a prerequisite for the latter (i.e. 
institutionalization), but they are not one of the same.  
 
Institutionalized securitization in this thesis goes beyond the persistence of threats and the 
sense of urgency that Buzan et al. describe. It also goes beyond the frequent (i.e. routine) 
securitization of specific issues. It refers to instances where the entire process of 
securitization – i.e. referent objects, source of threats, securitizing actors and audiences, 
and even speech acts – evolves into a state of permanency becoming inevitably part of 
the society’s political and social routines; it becomes in other words part of the actors’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The term ‘Copenhagen School’ was coined by Bill McSweeney and refers to the scholars who developed 
the concept of securitization. Most of these scholars worked at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute; 
hence the name ‘Copenhagen School’.  
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and audiences’ identity influencing thus the way they deal with specific security-related 
issues. To use a business term, securitization processes become part of a series of 
Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for elite and audiences that create in a way 
cognitive shortcuts and limitations for the actors involved. These ‘standard’ procedures 
are not created in vacuum; on the contrary they are heavily influenced by the social 
habitus in which the actors and audiences operate. These deeply routinized procedures 
therefore eliminate, to a great degree, the ad hoc part of the securitization process and 
transform it into something more institutionalized. 
  
Institutionalized securitization is not something that could ‘simply take place’ after a 
speech act and a brief intersubjective process, as is the case with the ‘mainstream’ 
reading of securitization. On the contrary, certain conditions must be present and a 
specific process is required. This process is similar to that of the 3-stage life cycle of 
norms: the birth of norms, the growing (i.e. spreading or expanding) stage, and lastly the 
internalization of norms (Kowert and Legro 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). In the 
case of securitization the birth stage commences after a pivotal event – such as armed 
conflict – or the opposite, a potential conflict resolution settlement. A pivotal event is, in 
other words, anything that changes or threatens to change the people’s existing routines 
and could or does create significant anxiety to the society as a whole. This stage is 
followed by an ‘unchallenged period’ where perceived threats are routinely securitized on 
an actor and audience level and frequently remain uncontested by most elite and the 
public. This period leads to the third and final stage, the actual institutionalization phase 
when the perceived threats are internalized and securitization processes become part of 
the political and social routines and mechanisms for dealing with specific security-related 
issues.  
 
Once the securitization processes are institutionalized they become part of the society’s 
every day routines and more importantly part of its norms. Norms in their turn become 
legitimate social variables that are accepted and created by the community (Kowert and 
Legro 1996), while they also create collective expectations and set the ‘rules’ for proper 
behavior for each identity sharing those norms (Katzenstein 1996; Finnemore 1996; 
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Legro 1997). Thus, when securitization processes become part of the society’s norms it 
means that a community may ‘automatically’ accept a specific security discourse and 
even maintain it in its routines. More importantly, specific expectations are formed on 
how actors and audiences should behave; expectations that significantly influence the 
creation and perpetuation of securitization processes. The reason therefore that the study 
of ethnic conflicts is essential for this thesis is precisely because protracted ethnic conflict 
environments are dominated by social contexts with ‘strict’ parameters of accepted and 
expected behavior and norms and specific audience and elite psycho-cultural 
predispositions which support the development of routinized and eventually 
institutionalized securitization.  
 
How securitization processes evolve and reflect the aforementioned different stages is 
examined theoretically in chapter 3 and tested empirically in chapter 6, using the Cyprus 
conflict as a case study. In brief, the main argument is that the social context in ethnic 
conflicts and the unchanging threat-perpetuating routines influence the relationship 
between audiences and securitizing actors. The speech acts in those environments change 
format and scope; dramatization is less necessary and the actors’ goal is not so much to 
convince the audiences of an existential threat, but rather to remind them of their 
presence. Actors do, however, try to convince the audiences that they are the most 
appropriate agents to handle these threats, meaning that securitization may not revolve 
around the perceived threats per se, but rather around the more or least suitable agents to 
handle them.  
 
The thesis, in line with a growing literature on the role of audiences (Balzacq 2005; 
Stritzel 2007; Huysmans 2006, 2011; Leonard and Kaunert 2011), argues that the 
audience should receive more attention in the theory as it has a much more important role 
to play in the securitization process than simply being the ‘judge’ of securitizing acts. 
Several arguments have been developed on how the presence of multiple audiences 
(Salter 2008; Huysmans 2006; Roe 2008; Vuori 2008; Leonard and Kaunert 2011) and 
their distinct psycho-cultural pre-dispositions (Balzacq 2005; Stritzel 2007) influence the 
process of securitization. This thesis accepts these arguments and builds upon them, 
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arguing that the social context and the presence of multiple audiences and their distinct 
psycho-cultural pre-dispositions, coupled with the conflict-perpetuating routines 
frequently found in protracted ethnic conflict environments, open the door for different 
modes of securitization, namely bottom-up, horizontal and ‘involuntary’.  
 
These different forms of securitization – along with the notion of institutionalization of 
the process – constitute the primary theoretical contribution of this thesis. Horizontal 
securitization, as the name suggests, takes place on a horizontal level making the process 
essentially ‘peer securitization’. Bottom-up securitization refers to cases where the 
audiences either become securitizing actors themselves or they apply so much pressure to 
the ‘mainstream’ actors (for example political elite and media) that the latter are ‘forced’ 
to engage in securitizing acts. The impact of the bottom-up pressure depends on how 
powerful the horizontal processes are, therefore making the two forms of securitization 
inter-wined. The outcome of these two processes could lead to ‘involuntary’ 
securitization on an actor and audience level. If the pressures are significant enough, 
actors are ‘forced’ to engage in securitizing acts and audiences are ‘forced’ to accept 
them. The degree of pressure varies and is subject to the social context and the existing 
conflict norms and routines. It must be noted that the term ‘involuntary’ is not used here 
in a strict sense; it does not connote the absence of choice per se. Rather it refers to either 
the possibility that some individuals (elite and public) may be conditioned to see routine 
securitization as the only available and rational path to follow, or they can contemplate 
that there are alternative options (e.g. desecuritization), but given the social context those 
options become unviable due to their high cost and are thus abandoned. What is argued in 
this thesis is that the degree of institutionalization determines the degree of 
‘involuntariness’ 
1.2. Case study: the Cyprus conflict 	  
 
In chapter 5 the thesis examines the characteristics of ethnic conflicts and the variables 
found in such environments that increase the likelihood for institutionalization and the 
different forms of securitization to occur. In the same chapter the hypotheses of the thesis 
11	  	  
are tested using the Cyprus problem as a case study, given that the latter is a conflict that 
shares all the attributes of protracted ethnic conflicts. The fact that the Cyprus problem 
has the characteristics of intractable ethnic conflicts makes it a suitable case study as it 
provides a clear social context and distinct sets of identities that support the perpetuation 
of conflict routines and the development of institutionalized, horizontal, bottom-up and 
involuntary securitization processes. It must be noted that while the Cyprus conflict 
clearly involves both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, the empirical focus is 
limited to the former for methodological purposes. The reasoning behind this choice is 
explained in detail in chapter 4. 
 
Like most conflict cases the Cyprus conflict has some peculiarities that are worth noting. 
One of the thorniest issues of the Cyprus problem is that of recognition: Turkish Cypriots 
struggle to gain international recognition for the area north of the Buffer Zone and Greek 
Cypriots struggle to prevent them from doing so. Subsequently, Greek Cypriots are 
particularly careful with the terminology they use so as not to connote, or be accused of 
connoting, direct or indirect recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
(TRNC).3 As a result, any reference to people, institutions or organizations in the areas 
not controlled by the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) – that is in the TRNC – is accompanied 
and prefaced with the word ‘pseudo’ (in Greek ‘ψευδό’) as in pseudo-police, pseudo-state, 
pseudo-ministry of interior, or they are enclosed in inverted commas (e.g. ‘TRNC’, 
‘president’, etc.). The word ‘pseudo’ allows for a direct delegitimization of any entity 
north of the Buffer Zone by indicating that it is not something real (e.g. a fake state, or a 
fake president), as opposed to the areas controlled by the RoC that are perceived as 
legitimate and ‘real’. The same applies to the use of inverted commas, albeit in this case 
the connotation is more indirect and subtle.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was created after a Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence (UDI) in 1983. The United Nations Security Council called the declaration ‘legally invalid’ 
and called ‘upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment 
of the Republic of Cyprus’ and for ‘all States not to recognise any Cypriot state other than the Republic of 
Cyprus’ (UNSC 541, 1983, available at http://www.un.int/cyprus/scr541.htm). As a result the TRNC 
remains internationally unrecognized with the sole exception being Turkey, which also does not recognize 
the Republic of Cyprus. 
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In this thesis there is no use of either the word ‘pseudo’ or the inverted commas when 
referring to TRNC. Sharing Constantinou (2010) argument, in non-official documents 
(e.g. scholarly work), the non-usage of inverted commas does not and cannot elevate the 
status of a de facto state to a de jure one, nor does it connote directly or indirectly 
acceptance of the specific regime’s positions and policies. 4 Similarly, the thesis uses less 
‘loaded’ and in general internationally accepted terms to describe the geographical 
distinctions of the island.5 For instance, the term ‘government-controlled areas’ is used to 
describe the areas south of the Buffer Zone where the RoC has control, as opposed to the 
term ‘free areas’, which is used in most of the official Greek Cypriot narratives. Similarly, 
terms such as ‘areas not controlled by the RoC’, the ‘area north of the buffer zone’, ‘the 
area north of the Green Line’ are preferred to terms such as ‘North’ or ‘occupied areas’. 
 
Another terminological issue worth noting is the interchangeable use of the terms 
‘conflict’, ‘problem’ and ‘question’. The terms ‘Cyprus conflict’ and ‘Cyprus problem’, 
and even ‘Cyprus question’, have all been adopted in the literature and the official 
discourses and are many times used interchangeable. As is the case with most scholarly 
works the use of any of the terms mentioned above in this thesis refers to the same thing, 
namely the situation in Cyprus.  
1.3. Methodological approaches 
 
 
The thesis uses a mixed-method approach, collecting and analyzing both quantitative and 
qualitative data using five different kinds of sources. For qualitative data the author 
conducted twenty-five semi-structured interviews with potential securitizing actors and 
indicative members of the audience, and organized five bi-communal focus groups with 
individuals from different sectors of the society: artists, academics, students, NGOs and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 That said, it must still be stated explicitly that the author’s choice not to use inverted commas in this 
thesis does not connote in any way direct or indirect recognition of TRNC or its institutions. 
5 The EU for instance refers to the areas south of the Buffer Zone as ‘area controlled by the Republic of 
Cyprus’ (http://ec.europa.eu/languages/documents/cy_en.pdf_ and the areas north of the Zone as ‘areas 
which the Government of Cyprus does not exercise effective control’ 
(http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/turkish_cypriot_community/index_en.htm).	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civil servants. Both approaches were used to examine the impact of institutionalized 
securitization on the society and whether and how horizontal processes develop. 
 
For the quantitative data the thesis utilizes several surveys conducted by bi-communal 
NGOs and major television stations, as well as one designed and implemented by the 
author for the purpose of this thesis; the latter focuses explicitly on the Greek Cypriot 
academic community, which is one of the numerous distinct sets of audiences that exists 
in Cyprus. Both were used to identify the overall audience perceptions regarding 
potential threats and to quantify – to the degree this is possible – the impact 
institutionalized securitization has on the society.  
 
The most elaborate approach used for empirical data collection is the daily press analysis 
of the three most widely circulated Greek Cypriot newspapers for a period of 2,356 days 
(2003-2009). The data collected was used in a quantitative and qualitative manner to test 
the centrality of the conflict and its importance to the Greek Cypriot identity as well as 
the specific phrasing used to constantly securitize a number of different referent objects. 
Several images from newspapers and political advertising billboards were also collected 
and incorporated in the aforementioned analysis.  
1.4. Thesis plan 
 
The thesis is separated into seven chapters, including this introductory one. The second 
chapter provides an extended review of the securitization literature, focusing on the 
development of the theory, the link to J.L. Austin’s (1962) speech acts concept and the 
five securitization sectors. It then explores the under-examined areas of the theory and the 
relevant criticisms leveled against it, paying particular attention to the absence of social 
context and the prospect of multiple audiences in the mainstream reading of securitization. 
Chapter 3, starting with the under-examined areas identified in the previous chapter, 
elaborates on the thesis hypotheses and research questions and develops the conceptual 
model of institutionalized securitization and the subsequent forms, namely horizontal, 
bottom-up and involuntary securitization. Following that is the methodology chapter; in 
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chapter 4 I firstly explain the reasoning behind my choice of the Cyprus conflict as a case 
study and then proceed with a detailed description on the different qualitative and 
quantitative approaches used to gather and analyze the empirical data. Chapter 5 starts 
with a brief introduction of the different forms of ethnic conflicts, their characteristics 
and the impact they have on conflict-ridden societies. It then continues with an analysis 
of the case study, the Cyprus conflict, making the argument that the Cyprus situation is 
indeed a ‘protracted ethnic conflict’. The case study analysis commences with a historical 
timeline of the conflict and proceeds with an examination of the causes of the conflict as 
understood by the two sides, as well as the multiple resolution efforts that took place over 
the five-decade period. The next chapter provides empirical evidence for the theoretical 
claims made throughout the thesis. Chapter 6 commences with evidence on how the 
securitization process could indeed become institutionalized, and then proceeds to present 
why ethnic conflicts provide a social context that supports conflict-perpetuating actions 
and routinized securitizing acts. The final parts of the chapter provide evidence of 
bottom-up, involuntary and horizontal securitization. 
 
The final chapter briefly summarizes the overall theoretical and empirical contribution 
made by the thesis to the literature on securitization and the Cyprus conflict. It also 
examines how the thesis’ contribution could be a stepping-stone for the further 
advancement of securitization theory and security studies in general. 
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Chapter	  2:	  Review	  of	  the	  securitization	  literature	  	  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 
Towards the end of the Cold War and soon afterwards, the realist and rationalist-based 
approaches to security studies were being challenged and new concepts and ideas were 
introduced, including among other critical security studies (Booth 1991; Krause and 
Williams 1997; Jones 1999), sociological approaches (e.g. Der Derian 1995) and those 
approaches which focus on securitization. The focus of this the chapter is on the latter 
and has a twofold aim: (i) to examine the literature on securitization and more 
specifically the main premises of the theory and how they developed over time and (ii) to 
identify the theoretical gaps and the subsequent criticisms leveled against the theory.  
 
Particular attention is given to the ‘constructivist’ nature of the theory. Buzan’s and 
Wæver’s view that securitization is ‘constructivist all the way down’ (1997: 245) is 
perhaps exaggerated, as the authors do not take into sufficient consideration either the 
social context in which securitizing acts take place or the prospect for multiple audiences, 
each with its own specific identity and psycho-cultural pre-dispositions. These two 
elements are at the core of the criticisms examined in this chapter, while they also form 
the basis for the conceptual framework of the thesis. 
 
The chapter is separated into three broad sections. Following this brief introduction, 
section 2.2. examines the development of the theory, explaining, inter alia, how 
securitization works and how it is ‘used’ in different fields. Section 2.3. is a brief analysis 
of the five securitization sectors that form the foundation for the widening security 
agenda, elucidating why security is no longer limited to the military and the state and 
how it is extended to other sectors and referent objects. The last section deals with the 
theoretical gaps as portrayed in the literature and the criticisms leveled against the theory. 
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The last part forms the basis for the thesis’ research questions and sets the ground for the 
thesis’ hypotheses and conceptual framework that are outlined in detail in chapter 3. 
2.2. Securitization 
 
2.2.1 Developing the theory 
 
Securitization is about processing a threat through a specific security format; hence ‘a 
discussion of security is a discussion of threat’ (Wæver 2011: 472-3, emphasis in 
original). Given that ‘discussions of threats’ could be very broad and potentially vague, 
the Copenhagen School scholars clarified from the outset that securitization provides a 
clear sense ‘of what security is’, rejecting the traditionalist concerns of ‘everything 
becoming security’ (Wæver 1994). Specifically, within the securitization framework 
threat-arguments justifying the use of extraordinary measures must i) establish that there 
is indeed a threat, ii) that the threat is potentially existential and iii) establish the relative 
advantages of security handling as opposed to non-securitized handling (Wæver 2011: 
473).  
 
The notion of securitization emerged with Ole Wæver’s 1995 Securitization and 
Desecuritization, even though there has been earlier work on the subject in unpublished 
manuscripts such as Wæver’s 1989 article Security, the Speech Act. The development of 
securitization, as with most theories, was influenced by the work of other scholars in 
tangential areas such as (but not exclusively) Kenneth Waltz’s (1979) definition of 
security as an issue of survival, J.L. Austin’s speech act theory (1962) and Jacques 
Derrida’s work on how text matters for what it does rather than for what it says. But, as 
Williams (2003: 514) points out, the ‘baptism’ of issues as ‘existential threats’ and their 
subsequent ‘upgrade’ into security issues reflects a Schmittian influence.  
 
While securitization explores security in a widened multi-sector approach, originally –
discounting the societal sector – the theory was relatively state-centric and opposed the 
excessive widening of security along the referent object axis, (Wæver 1995: 48). As 
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Wæver argued, ‘[t]he concept of security belongs to the state’ (ibid: 49, emphasis in 
original). At a later stage, after the end of the Cold War, the securitization scholars 
revised their work arguing that security should no longer be limited only to the state, 
broadening thus the security agenda to other sectors, namely societal, economic, political, 
military and environmental (Buzan et al. 1998; Buzan and Little 2000). While each of 
these sectors identifies distinct patterns of security discourses, each one is still part of a 
‘complex whole’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 8). What exactly a ‘whole’ means however remains 
unclear (Albert and Buzan 2011: 415). This ambiguity coupled with the possibility for the 
securitization of numerous referent objects in several sectors gave rise to debates 
regarding a potential expansion of the list or the disassociation of some issues from 
specific sectors (Bagge Laustsen and Wæver 2000). 
 
Since its conception securitization has been used to study security-related issues and 
processes in several areas including terrorism (Buzan 2006), immigration (Bigo 2002; 
2005, Bigo and Walker 2002; Alexseev 2011), human security (Floyd 2007), 
environment (Wishnick 2010) and women’s rights (Hansen 2000). Securitization is also 
used to explain inter-state security relationships. Specifically, it has a central role in the 
literature of Regional Security Complexes (RSC), which are defined as ‘a set of units 
whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization or both, are so interlinked that 
their security problems cannot be reasonably analyzed or resolved apart from one another 
(Buzan et al. 1998: 201)’.  
 
How does securitization ‘work’?  
Securitization is essentially a mechanism of political practice; the study of securitization 
considers ‘who can “do” or “speak” security successfully, on what issues, under what 
conditions, and with what effects’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 27). The essence of securitization 
therefore lies in the idea that security is a speech act: by labeling something as a security 
issue, something is done. ‘The utterance itself is the act’; ‘the word “security” is the act’ 
(Wæver 1995: 55, emphasis in original). That said, it should be noted that the actual 
utterance of the word security is not a necessary a prerequisite for a security speech act. 
Security and the need for emergency measures (i.e. appeal for urgency) could be 
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connoted or inferred with the use of other words or terms (Buzan et al. 1998: 27). As 
demonstrated later, inference could also be achieved even without the use of any words 
with the use of images. 
 
A securitizing actor performs the securitizing act by claiming that a particular referent 
object faces an existential threat. According to the Copenhagen School, the actor is a 
specific someone, or a group, who performs the security speech acts; some of the most 
obvious actors are political elites, bureaucrats, lobbyists and pressure groups (ibid: 40). 
With the speech act, the actor claims the right to use extraordinary measures (i.e. break 
free of normal rules) to handle the existential threat and maintain the referent object’s 
survival (Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 1998). The ‘handling’ of the issue, according to the 
Copenhagen School, no longer takes place in the sphere of normal politics as it is moved 
in the realm of emergency politics. As the argument goes, if these (alleged) threats are 
not dealt with immediately then everything else will become irrelevant (Wæver 1996: 
104), meaning that the situation can no longer be handled by normal politics and 
extraordinary measures are therefore required. The securitizing move – that is, the 
labeling of an issue as an existential threat for a specific referent object – does not 
necessarily constitute securitization. For the latter to happen the audience must accept the 
securitizing move, or at least tolerate it (Buzan et al. 1998: 25). Thus, the securitizing act 
is a negotiation between the securitizing actor and the audience (ibid: 26) and security, in 
the securitization theory, is the derivative of a discursive process where ‘threats are 
represented and recognized’ (Williams 2003: 513). It is important to note that the 
Copenhagen School scholars do not always consider the process of securitization to be a 
positive development even if the goal of this process is to achieve more security. The aim, 
they argue, should be towards desecuritization, or ‘the shifting of issues out of emergency 
mode and into the normal bargaining process of the political sphere’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 
4). That said, they also point out that desecuritization is not always better than 
securitization as the latter is preferable in the abstract, but some concrete situations may 
call for securitization instead (Buzan et al. 1998; Wæver 2011). 
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What constitutes acceptance of a securitizing act is not entirely clear in the mainstream 
reading of the theory. Given that there are no referenda after every securitizing act, it 
cannot definitively be determined if the audience indeed accepted a specific act. Buzan et 
al. (1998) argue that if an act gains enough ‘resonance’ it should be seen as a form of 
acceptance. But as the authors admit even resonance is difficult to assess (ibid: 25). An 
equally important shortcoming of the theory is the ambiguity of who the audience 
actually is. According to Buzan et al (1998: 41) the audience is ‘those the securitizing act 
attempts to convince to accept exceptional procedures because of the specific security 
nature of some issues’. But as Leonard and Kaunert (2011: 59) point out there is no 
criteria to ‘identify who exactly constitutes the audience in practice’. Perhaps a more 
important gap, which is discussed in greater detail later, is that theory does not recognize 
the presence of multiple audiences. The mainstream reading of the theory implicitly 
assumes there is only one audience, which leads to some of the aforementioned 
shortcomings. The role of audience(s) in the theory is an issue that receives growing 
attention in the literature and is discussed in detail later in this chapter.   
 
Not all securitizing acts are successful and, not surprisingly, unsuccessful cases are very 
rarely analyzed in the literature and inevitably they are almost never theorized. A notable 
exception is Salter (2011) who used counter-terrorism programs in the US as a case study 
to offer three theories of failure: normal failures; internal failures; and external failures. 
Normal failures are the outcome of ‘non-purposive results of complex, interdependent 
systems’ (ibid: 122), or in simple words they are the outcome of competing bureaucracies 
in a complex society and that of accidents that could occur in such societies.6 Internal 
failures refer to moves that fail to meet the grammatical conditions of the act, namely to 
portray the threat as political and as existential. Lastly, the external failures are those that 
meet the grammatical conditions, but are rejected by the audience (ibid: 123-126). 
 
Security as a self-referential practice: If security in the securitization theory is seen as a 
speech act, it means that it is the securitizing actors that define security, which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The idea of failed securitizing acts because of accidents is based on the Normal Accident Theory (NAT), 
as originally framed by Perrow (1984). 
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subsequently means that ‘security is what actors make of it’ (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 48). 
Security therefore is a self-referential practice as it is the practice of labeling an issue as a 
threat itself that makes something a security issue and not necessarily a real existential 
threat (Buzan et al. 1998: 24). Therefore, the construction of security is all about being 
able to successfully produce a ‘security label’ (Wæver 1995: 50). This means that if an 
actor manages to produce such a security label successfully (i.e. convince the necessary 
audience of the threat’s validity), the threat need not be ‘real’; the impact this labeling has 
could be sufficiently real, as it either provides the actor the necessary audience tolerance 
to take certain actions or it provides him with access to extraordinary measures to handle 
this (perceived) threat. Similarly, a real threat does not guarantee that actors will acquire 
access to extraordinary measures if they do not successfully process the threat through a 
specific security format; as Wæver notes there are many real threats, but they do not all 
come with a ‘label’ (2011: 472).  
 
In the securitization framework, therefore, there is a de-contextualization of the meaning 
of security for the actor (e.g. national security), as well as of his intentions (e.g. 
militarization). The only thing that really matters is the practices followed – e.g. breaking 
free of rules. The meaning of security subsequently is perceived as fixed by each 
securitization sector (and the relevant audience); it is thus a self-referential practice since 
security has meaning only within the securitization framework. This approach, however, 
given that it focuses on the process of securitization – i.e. ‘making’ something a security 
issue – ignores the intentions of the securitizing actors. It also ignores the context in 
which the process occurs, despite the possibility that the former could influence the latter. 
The mainstream reading of the theory therefore ignores that security is entrenched in a 
symbolic and cultural order, which influences the actors as well as the audiences in the 
way security is practiced (Huysmans 2002).  
 
Securitization as a political practice analysis tool: The study of securitization is 
essentially a mechanism to help us analyze political practice. Vuori’s (2008) work helps 
elucidate why this is the case by separating securitization into four strands. According to 
Vuori securitization is used in order to achieve one of the following four goals: 
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a. To raise an issue on the agenda. 
b. To act as deterrence. 
c. To legitimize past acts or reproduce existing securitization. 
d. To acquire more control. 
 
In the first case – raising an issue on the agenda – the aim is to use securitization as a 
warning mechanism so as to bring an issue to the attention of decision-makers who are in 
a position to take the appropriate measures to handle a specific perceived threat. In this 
case therefore, the actors who initiate the process (e.g. scholars, journalists, politicians, 
media, etc.) are not the ones asking for access to, or tolerance for, extraordinary measures. 
Their goal is to get the appropriate agents (e.g. political elite) to do something about a 
potential threat (ibid: 77).  
 
The second strand – deterrence – refers to securitizing acts aimed at legitimizing 
activities that have not yet occurred but are likely to occur in the future. The goal 
therefore is to ‘justify actions that would otherwise be judged illegitimate by the 
evaluators of legitimacy’ (ibid: 79-80). The evaluators of legitimacy in this case are 
specific audiences such as journalists and voters, while the actors are the decision-makers 
and elites who can take action but require the necessary legitimacy, which essentially 
guarantees them tolerance or access to measures. 
 
The third strand – legitimization of past actions and reproduction of ongoing 
securitization – is not about the future but about the past and the present. The goal in this 
case is to legitimize past actions that were deemed as illegitimate by the ‘evaluators’ 
(ibid: 84-5). This is particularly useful for securitizing actors who, as discussed in the 
next chapter, would like to portray themselves as the most ‘suitable agents’ to handle a 
particular kind of threats. This is even more important in cases where threats are part of 
the people’s routines and are thus constantly repeated.  
 
The final strand – acquisition of control – refers to securitizing acts aimed at granting the 
actor more control. In this case the audience is under the ‘authority of the actor’, as is the 
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case for instance of members of political parties, while the actor is someone in a formal 
position with the ability to ‘authorize compelling directives’ (ibid: 88). The aim of the 
actor in this case is ‘to get the audience to do the acts required by the actor or to forbid 
them from doing certain acts’ (ibid). 
 
The four strands analyzed above provide a clearer picture of the motivations behind the 
different ‘kinds’ of securitizing actors (e.g. elite, scholars, journalists, etc.), and also how 
analysts can use securitization as a mechanism to analyze political practices.  More 
importantly however, and even though it is not explicitly stated, the four strands refer to 
multiple audiences. By incorporating several different audiences in the analysis the 
theory becomes much more lucid when it comes to identifying ‘who’ the specific 
audience is and whether or not an act has been successful. 
 
2.2.2. Speech Acts  
 
As mentioned above, security in securitization theory is not viewed as an objective 
condition but rather as the outcome of a social process, meaning that ‘the social 
construction of security issues (who or what is being secured and from what) is analyzed 
by examining the “securitizing speech-acts” through which threats become represented 
and recognized’ (Williams 2003: 513). In other words, the use of speech acts turns non-
security issues into security issues by representing them as such, hence the self-referential 
nature of security. It is worth citing Wæver in length here to clarify this very important 
issue. 
 
What then is security? With the help of language theory, we can regard 
“security” as a speech act. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign 
that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying 
it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By 
uttering “security” a state representative moves a particular development 
into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever 
means are necessary to block it (1995: 55) 
 
The theory of speech acts was developed by John L. Austin in his 1955 work, How to do 
things with words. According to Austin, statements that are not part of the true or false 
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dichotomy are statements that perform actions and thus he calls them performative 
utterances or performative speech acts (1962: 6-7). They are performative because by 
saying something, something is done, as is the case, for example, of marriage, where with 
the groom’s and bride’s ‘I do’, something is done (i.e. a marriage). Thus, ‘[t]he utterance 
of the sentence is, or is part of, the doing of an action (ibid: 5).’7 Speech acts, to have the 
wanted impact, must meet some specific conditions that Austin calls ‘felicity 
conditions’.8  
 
Speech acts in securitization frameworks have similar ‘felicity’ conditions. Not being part 
of the original securitization work they were incorporated at a later stage primarily to deal 
with criticism that the theory is not applicable to the real world. They also contributed 
towards incorporating – albeit insufficiently – a social context dimension in the theory. 
Specifically, there are three ‘facilitating conditions’ that are separated into internal and 
external. The internal condition dictates that it is necessary ‘to follow the security form, 
the grammar of security, and construct a plot that includes existential threat, point of no 
return, and a possible way out’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 32-33). The focus is thus solely on 
how the act is articulated.  
  
The external aspect of securitizing speech acts incorporates the remaining two conditions, 
namely the social capital of the enunciator (i.e. securitizing actor) and the threat per se 
(ibid). The former condition notes that the enunciator must be in a position of authority, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 There are, according to Austin, three different types of speech acts: the locutionary, the illocutionary and 
the perlocutionary. In the first type, meaning is given to an utterance. For instance: ‘He said to me ‘Shoot 
her! meaning by ‘shoot’, shoot and by referring by ‘her’ to her’ (Austin 1962: 5). The second type adds to 
the meaning of the utterance a performative aspect as well. For example ‘He urged (or advised, ordered) me 
to shoot her’ (ibid). The third, perlocutionary, act incorporates the characteristics of the first two (i.e. 
meaning and performative force), but also includes an effect. For instance, ‘He persuaded me to shoot her’ 
(ibid). Securitization is based on the second type, the illocutionary aspect of the speech acts. 
8 The six conditions would make speech acts felicitous (the alternative being infelicitous, as speech acts 
cannot be right, or false, but rather infelicitous). In brief these six conditions are: 
(1) The utterance of a speech act must follow the ‘accepted conventional procedure’ (ibid: 14); (2) ‘the 
particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular 
procedure invoked’ (ibid: 15); (3) ‘the procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly’ […] 
and […] (4) and completely’ (ibid); (5) the actor performing the speech act must indeed mean it (be 
sincere) (ibid); and (6) the actor performing the speech act ‘must actually so conduct themselves 
subsequently’. 
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albeit not necessary official authority, since it is the position a person holds rather than 
the person per se that could potentially influence a significant audience. For instance, a 
state president or a party leader has more chances of persuading a given audience that an 
issue is an existential security threat, than say a bank teller. This facilitating condition is 
certainly useful in making the theory more applicable to real world situations, but it still 
remains underdeveloped, as it does not sufficiently incorporate the social context in the 
theory (McDonald 2008: 565).  
 
The second external facilitating condition has to do with the threat per se. As Buzan et al. 
(1998: 33) note, ‘it is more likely that one can conjure a security threat if certain objects 
can be referred to that are generally held to be threatening – be they tanks, hostile 
sentiments, or polluted waters’. Thus, ‘real’ threats per se cannot make securitization, but 
they are facilitating conditions into making a speech act appear credible. This condition, 
straight forward as it may be, is still underdeveloped. Specifically, ‘real threats’ (e.g. 
armies and hostile sentiments) could have a much more significant impact if they are 
incorporated into a specific social context (e.g. ethnic conflict environments) and tailored 
to the perceptions of specific audiences (e.g. ethnic groups) that have associated or 
developed their identities with the specific realities. For instance the presence of the 
French army at the borders of Switzerland is not perceived as a threat for the Swiss, but 
the presence of the Turkish army is for Greek Cypriots given the specific social context 
of the area. 
 
As discussed in detail in the next chapter the role of speech acts in environments where 
securitization is institutionalized is significantly different. What is argued specifically is 
that the social contexts in which speech acts take place significantly influence the impact 
the latter have on the securitization process. In some cases speech acts become 
completely unnecessary for a securitizing act to be successful, while in others they have a 
different scope: not to construct a security threat but rather to remind the audiences of the 
existence of one.  
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2.3. Securitization sectors 
 
The introduction of new security ‘sectors’ led to a widened security agenda and 
subsequently a major deviation from the ‘strict’ view of security studies where only one 
referent object (i.e. the state) exists. According to Buzan the security of human 
collectivities could occur in a number of different sectors, namely political, military, 
societal, economic and environmental (Buzan 1991: 19), with each one having specific 
referent objects, such as identity, economic viability and sovereignty. This means, 
according to Buzan, that the focus of security studies should not be on just one sector (i.e. 
military) and on just one referent object (i.e. the state), but rather on all sectors, 
individually and across the board (Buzan et al. 1998: 168).9  
 
The proposal for a widened security agenda has not been unchallenged. Critics pointed 
out that despite the widening security agenda the focus still remained on the state and 
Buzan’s work did not really differ significantly from the conventional (Realist) security 
analysis (Booth 1991, Wyn Jones 1999). This criticism was to a degree valid as Buzan’s 
earlier work on the sectors did indeed revolve, to a significant degree, around the state. 
However, the criticism was also to a degree unfair since Buzan’s view of states was 
different from those of ‘traditionalists’ who view threats as objective facts. As Buzan 
argues, states are ideational constructs and the construction of any issue as a threat is ‘a 
political choice rather than objective facts’ (Buzan 1991: 115). At a later stage and in 
response to such criticisms there was a significant shift from the state-centric approach 
and the state was no longer the only referent object in any of the sectors. Even with this 
shift however the Copenhagen School scholars do acknowledge that states are the most 
important referent object and they still have an integral role to play in the securitizing 
process given that they are the ideal securitizing actors (Buzan et al. 1998: 37).  
 
Military Sector: Military security deals with the ‘offensive and defensive capabilities of 
states, and the states’ perceptions of each other’s intentions’ (Buzan 1991: 19; Buzan et al. 
1998: 51). The main referent object in this sector is still the state, even though it is not the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9  It is for this reason that Buzan and the Copenhagen School scholars in general are frequently 
characterized as ‘wideners’; they have widened the security agenda. 
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only one (Buzan et al. 1998: 49); non-state referent objects such tribes (e.g. in 
Afghanistan and Somalia), private armies and warlords, or even religion (e.g. in former 
Yugoslavia and the Middle East) could also become the referent objects (ibid: 52-53). 
The military issues revolve around the traditional ‘national security concerns’ (Buzan 
1991: 116) that threaten the ‘distortion or destruction of institutions’ and subsequently the 
‘idea of the state’ (ibid: 117). As Buzan notes, military threats usually enjoy a top spot in 
a nation’s security concerns as military actions against a state could also lead to the 
destruction of other sectors (e.g. societal, political and economic) (ibid). In extreme cases, 
therefore, the impact on a state would be total (i.e. on all sectors) as was the case for 
instance with the Nazi threat towards France. Threats in the military sector are not limited 
to inter-state wars and total destruction in one or more sectors; there are also military 
related threats but with a smaller impact on any of the aforementioned sectors. Similarly, 
military threats could be indirect, as they may not be addressed directly towards a state, 
but rather towards a state’s interest (e.g. threats to allies or shipping lanes) (ibid). Military 
threats therefore could vary from ‘harassment of fishing boats, through punishment raids 
[…] to full invasions’ and territorial seizures (Buzan 1991: 118).  
 
Political Sector: The political sector is concerned with issues that threaten the state’s 
ability to maintain its organizational stability. The threats could ‘range from pressuring 
the government on a particular policy, through overthrowing the government, to 
fomenting secessionism, and disrupting the political fabric of the state so as to weaken it 
prior to military attack’ (Buzan 1991: 119). The latter is obviously the worst-case 
scenario as it is the one that links political threats to military ones. In addition, ‘political 
threats are [also] about giving or denying recognition, support or legitimacy’ (Buzan et al. 
1998: 142) to other states or units within a state. Especially in ethnic conflict 
environments, such as the one in Cyprus, these forms of threats are not only possible but 
also frequent; they are also usually linked with other sectors including the military.  
 
According to Buzan it is the rivalry among the different ideas and traditions that 
primarily leads to the emergence of political threats (1991: 70). Identifying such threats 
however is particularly complex as it is difficult to ‘rate’ the seriousness of each issue so 
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as to decide whether it qualifies as a threat. Making the distinction between normal 
political/ideological rivalry and threats that qualify as ‘issues of national security’ is not 
straightforward and usually there is no universal understanding among actors and 
audience(s). In addition to the ideational rivalries, political threats could also revolve 
around the survival of the nation, meaning that the national identity is the referent object 
facing an existential threat. In such cases the construction of such threats aim to ‘heighten 
the separate ethno-cultural identities of groups within the target state’ (ibid: 120). Both 
kinds of threats (ideational or national) could be either intentional or non-intentional 
(Buzan 1991: 120, Buzan et al. 1998: 155-159). The intentional threats are ‘action-
specific’, meaning they depend on particular actions from one party to another and could 
range from direct actions (e.g. US embargo against Cuba) to denial of diplomatic 
recognition (e.g. Taiwan). The unintentional ones are structural political threats and arise 
from the nature of the situation rather than from specific actions and intentions. In Buzan 
(1991: 121) words’: 
Structural political threats arise when the organizing principles of two 
states contradict each other in a context where the states cannot ignore each 
other’s existence. Their political systems thus play a zero-sum game with 
each other whether they will it or not. 
 
There are also threats that are geared towards the internal legitimacy of the political unit 
and towards the external recognition of the state (Buzan et al. 1998: 144). Threats 
towards the internal legitimacy of the political unit revolve around issues of ideologies 
and ideas that define the state. Threats regarding the external recognition of states revolve 
around the issue of sovereignty and the state’s external legitimacy (ibid). What is argued 
in this thesis is that protracted ethnic conflict environments are susceptible to all forms of 
threats: intentional and structural threats as well as internal and external ones. Most of 
these threats are not ad hoc in the sense that they do not just emerge out of thin air. On 
the contrary, they are usually institutionalized as there are conscious and repeated efforts 
from the securitizing actors to establish that the ethnically distinct ‘other’ poses a threat 
to ‘us’ on all levels and in all sectors.  
 
Societal Sector: Buzan, during his earlier work on societal sectors, defined societal 
security as ‘the sustainability within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional 
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patterns of language, culture and religious and ethnic identity and custom (1991: 19, 
123)’. Societal threats, when defined in this way, could thus emerge from outside the 
state as well as from within; indeed they come more frequently from within than from the 
outside (ibid: 123). In later work (e.g. Buzan et al. 1998) the focus on security within the 
societal sector changed and the referent object of societal security changed from the state 
to that of identity.  
 
According to Buzan et al. (1998: 121) there are essentially three kinds of issues that could 
be threats to societal security: 
i. Migration:  When a community with X people are overrun or diluted by a 
large number of Y people. In such a case, the community of X will change 
significantly (due to demographic shifts), and the identity of X is thus 
threatened.  
ii. Horizontal Competition: The population of X is dominant but is influenced 
significantly (culturally, linguistically, etc.) from the neighboring Y (e.g. as 
the Quebecois are influenced by the Anglophone Canadians). The threats in 
such cases are thus more indirect and inadvertent, and any potential impact 
will most likely develop at a slow rate.  
iii. Vertical Competition: In such scenarios, population X stops considering itself 
as being X. This could be because they are pulled towards a wider identity 
(due to integrating projects such as the EU) or towards a narrower one (due to 
secessionist projects, e.g. Quebec, Catalonia) (ibid).  
iv. Depopulation. As the name suggests, the identity of X no longer exists 
because the population X is eliminated or has severely diminished. This could 
occur in cases of war, diseases, natural catastrophes or extermination policies.  
 
There could be another reason that Buzan et al. do not explore, namely the possibility of 
voluntary emigration and thus voluntary depopulation. For example, in the northern part 
of Cyprus a significant percentage of the Turkish-Cypriot population migrated to the UK 
and other countries during the 1960’s and after the de facto 1974 partition of the island to 
seek better economic and social conditions, while many more are expected to leave if 
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there is no settlement to the Problem.10 As a result there was a case of voluntary Turkish-
Cypriot depopulation of Cyprus.11  
 
Societal threats that fall in the first two categories – migration and horizontal competition 
– are of particular importance in protracted ethnic conflicts as they could become deeply 
internalized and easily securitized in a routine-institutionalized manner.  
 
Economic Sector: Security in the economic sector revolves around the state’s ability to 
have access to sufficient recourses, finance and markets to sustain ‘acceptable levels of 
welfare and state power’ (Buzan 1991: 19). This sector is particularly broad as referent 
objects could range ‘from the individuals through classes and states to the abstract and 
complex system of the global market itself’ (ibid: 100). According to Buzan, the 
strongest securitization attempts in the economic sector are those that do not place the 
emphasis on the economic losses, but rather on the possible collapse of welfare (ibid: 
102). This way the referent objects are either entire states or groups of individuals, but 
not just individuals. The problem with defining economic existential threats is that there 
are several economic threats that could be attributed to the market system (global or 
local) and thus cannot be interpreted as national security threats (ibid: 125). However, 
when economic threats influence the political and military power of a state and its social 
stability, then they could be classified as national security issues (ibid: 126). It is 
therefore difficult to argue the logic of survival within the economic sector alone; it is 
usually linked to referent objects in other sectors (ibid: 115). As is the case with the 
aforementioned sector, in ethnic conflict environments the economic survival of one or 
both sides is frequently directly linked to the conflict and the ‘enemy other’, while it is 
almost always linked to other sectors such as societal and political.  
 
Environmental Sector: According to Buzan ‘environmental security concerns the 
maintenance of the local and planetary biosphere as the essential support system on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 http://www.cyprus-mail.com/cyprus/young-turkish-cypriots-will-leave-if-there-no-solution 
11 With the term ‘voluntary’ I do not argue that there were no pressures within the Turkish Cypriot 
community (e.g. economic hardships, social problems, isolation, etc.) that led to emigration waves. I refer 
to the fact that Turkish Cypriots were not forcefully (e.g. violently) driven away. 
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which all other human enterprises depend’ (1991: 19-20). These threats go beyond the 
natural and uncontrolled conditions, such as earthquakes, tsunamis and hurricanes, and 
include ecological threats that derive from human activities, such as river or atmospheric 
pollution that leads, inter alia, to the depletion of the ozone layer and the greenhouse 
warming. Some of the major issues in the environmental sector are: disruption of the 
ecosystem; energy problems; population problems (e.g. epidemics, declining literacy 
rates, uncontrollable migrations) and food problems (Buzan et al. 1998: 74-5).  
 
As with the economic sector, the problem with this sector is that such global and macro-
level threats cannot easily fit in a national security framework (Buzan 1991: 132). This 
does not apply to some (primarily) small island-states that are severely influenced by 
ecological changes; they could classify ecological changes as issues of national security – 
as is the case for instance with the small Lohachara island (of the coast of India), which 
was the first inhabited island to disappear under the rising sea level.12  
2.4. Criticisms and under-examined areas of securitization 
 
The theory of securitization has made a significant contribution to the field of security 
studies but it is certainly not problem-free and as is the case with almost all theories it is 
not universally accepted. This section highlights the most important challenges leveled 
against the theory, paying particular attention to the ones that are relevant to the thesis 
research questions, namely those revolving around the absence of social context and 
multiple audiences. 
 
2.4.1. Security threats everywhere 
 
Given that the Copenhagen School widened the security agenda it is not surprising that 
one of the first criticisms revolved around the notion of security. Traditionalists, such as 
Stephen Walt (1991: 213), argue that the broadening of the security agenda and the 
introduction of non-military issues undermines the field’s ‘intellectual coherence’, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate-change/disappearing-world-global-warming-claims-
tropical-island-429764.html [accessed December 10, 2010]. 
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the focus should be instead on a stricter meaning of security and the conditions that make 
the use of force more likely. Similarly, Huysmans (1998; 2002) argues that there is a 
danger of not being able to differentiate between existential and ordinary risks; in his 
words ‘securitization loses its element of prioritizing and hierarchizing risks in societies’ 
(Huysmans 1998: 500). Therefore, if no such differentiation is possible there will be 
security questions everywhere that would subsequently undermine the securitization logic 
of security as seen in the theory’s framework (given that threats are singled out as 
existential). Thus, if there is an ‘equalization of risks’ then the distinction between 
existential security challenges and those that are not existential would be impossible and 
the security logic itself would be challenged (ibid). Wæver (2011) responds to this 
criticism pointing out that the theory escapes the ‘everything-becomes-a-security’ trap by 
tying security in a specific figure, that of securitization. As he argues the problem was 
resolved by ‘fixing form’. Specifically he points out that: 
‘When something took the form of a particular speech of securitization. 
When a securitizing actor claims there is an existential threat to a valued 
referent object in order to make the audience tolerate extraordinary 
measures that otherwise would not have been acceptable, this is a case of 
securitization; this way therefore one could ‘throw the net’ across all 
sectors and actors and still not drag everything with the catch, only the 
security part’ (Wæver 2011: 469, emphasis in original). 
 
Huysmans’ argument is interesting and particularly relevant for protracted ethnic 
conflicts, like the one in Cyprus, where there is an abundance of threats. In such cases, 
where there are multiple threats, there is indeed the risk of ‘diluting’ the meaning of 
existential threat if one sees constantly security threats everywhere. As discussed in detail 
in chapter 6, this became evident during the bi-communal focus groups observations 
when NGO participants noted that both Greek and Turkish Cypriots (but especially the 
former) ‘see threats and conspiracies everywhere and all the time’.13 Thus, if one 
constantly sees security threats everywhere and all the time, how can one distinguish the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 In chapter 4 I describe in detail the structure of the bi-communal focus groups, conducted for the purpose 
of this thesis.  
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existential from the non-existential ones? According to the aforementioned response by 
Wæver, an argument could be made that only the successfully securitized issues would 
qualify as security (and existential) issues and not everything across the board. This 
means that only the ones for which the audience is willing to tolerate extraordinary 
measures can ‘qualify’ as existential threats. What is argued in this thesis is that under 
certain conditions (found in protracted conflicts) some issues once successfully 
securitized they become part of an institutionalized process and cannot be desecuritized. 
Threats therefore remain securitized (i.e. qualify as existential threats) not because they 
are necessarily perceived as an existential threat, but rather because the social context 
does not allow for their desecuritization; indeed, desecuritization attempts may be 
securitized.14 More importantly however such environments allow for the effortless and 
‘automatic’ securitization of other new tangential issues that could be potentially 
perceived as threats as long as they are linked to the ‘other’ and the already deeply 
securitized objects. This leads to an environment that everything related to the ‘other’ is a 
threat; there are in other words security threats everywhere. The social context of 
protracted conflicts therefore could have a significant impact on securitization in this 
respect as ‘qualified’ existential threats may not be determined on their own merit, but 
rather on how routinely they (or other objects) have been securitized in the past.  
 
A tangential question emerges here, namely how the audience(s) and elites function in an 
environment where there are multiple and ongoing (perceived) threats. Specifically, how 
do actors engage in constant securitization without diluting their power and thus their 
ability to successfully securitize specific referent objects? Similarly, do the audiences 
constantly accept all securitizing acts as valid, despite the high frequency and duration of 
such acts and frequently the absence of ‘objective’ threat indicators (e.g. violence)? Have 
the audiences conditioned themselves not to distinguish between existential and non-
existential threats and accept automatically everything related to the ‘other’ as 
‘existential’? The thesis’ conceptual framework (chapter 3) offers a recommendation on 
how the securitization process changes in such environments and specifically how actors 
and audiences alike behave.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See chapter 3 and 6 for more on the argument of securitizing desecuritization. 
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2.4.2. Context, audiences and the not-so-constructivist approach  
 
Critics such as McSweeney (1996) and Huysmans (1998) question the theory’s 
constructivist approach to security arguing that the Copenhagen School’s work is not 
truly or completely constructivist in nature, but rather ‘swings’ somewhere between 
realism and constructivism. This criticism is grounded on a number of different areas 
with one of the most important ones being how the theory deals with the issue of identity. 
Specifically, the argument is that the securitization scholars do not really adopt a 
constructivist approach to identity, i.e. that identity is not ‘fixed and incorrigible’, but 
rather ‘fluid’, where each subject could have multiple identities (McSweeny 1996: 87). 
Buzan and Wæver (1997: 243) responded to McSweeny’s criticisms by arguing that they 
do not oppose the notion that identity is ‘fluid’, but at the same time they argue that 
identity can take a more stable form (‘become a thing’) and as such it can be examined 
and become a security referent object.  
 
Along the same lines, the Copenhagen School does not profoundly examine another 
identity-related issue, namely the existence of nested identities within a society. For 
instance in Cyprus there are not just Greek and Turkish Cypriots, but also (for example) 
leftist and rightist Greek Cypriots. When attempting to securitize the Greek Cypriot 
identity therefore, one should consider the impact on the leftist Greek Cypriot identity 
and vice versa: how the latter sub-identity (i.e. leftist) influences the securitization 
outcome of the overall Greek Cypriot identity. This gap is part of a wider omission from 
the original work on securitization, namely that of the absence of multiple audiences from 
the analysis.  
 
The role of the audience in the theory still remains very underdeveloped (e.g. Balzacq 
2005; McDonald 2008; Williams 2011), especially when compared to the attention 
securitizing actors and the process (i.e. speech acts) received in the literature. The biggest 
gap is that of ‘multiple audiences’, or rather their absence from the securitization analysis 
(Balzacq 2005, Stritzel 2007, Salter 2008, Roe 2008; Huysmans 2006). Identifying this 
gap, Roe (2008) offers an interesting suggestion and ‘splits’ potential audiences into 
those who can provide formal support and those that can provide informal support. As he 
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points out, the public – as one potential audience – could provide moral and informal 
support for the use of extraordinary measures, while the policy-makers, such as MPs – 
which is another set of audience – could offer formal support for the use of necessary 
measures to deal with a security issue. Huysmans (2006) makes a case for two broad sets 
of audiences: popular and technocratic, whereas Salter (2008; 2011) breaks down these 
two into four settings: elite, technocratic, scientific and popular. As the arguments go, 
securitization could occur in any of the different sets of audiences and success in one or 
more setting, such as scientific and technocratic, does not necessarily mean that there will 
be success in another setting such as the general public (Salter 2008). Similarly, the 
presence of an external audience, namely the public, is not a prerequisite for successful 
securitization in a specific setting as he convincingly demonstrated using the Canadian air 
transport security authority (ibid).  
 
The presence of multiple audiences and the fact that the audience need not always be the 
general public is indeed of particular importance and at the heart of this thesis, as it 
allows for a more flexible use of securitization. Specifically, it opens the door for 
horizontal and bottom-up processes, not least because the securitizing actors need 
sufficient social capital only within their social settings and in the eyes of a specific 
audience who can either grant them access to measures or tolerate their actions. In 
addition, the existence of multiple audiences allows for the prospect of successful 
bottom-up pressures and securitization, as the aim of each audience is to influence their 
respective relevant decision-makers and not necessarily all decision-makers. 
 
Incorporating multiple audiences in the theory also eliminates another obstacle, that of 
identifying ‘who’ the audience is. With the mainstream reading of the theory, identifying 
the audience is essentially impossible. An audience, according to Vuori (2008: 72), 
qualifies as ‘audience’ only if it is in a position to provide access to what the actor wants. 
The flip side of this idea is that a securitizing actor could be anyone as long as he has the 
necessary audience that would grant him his demands. This opens the door to multiple 
actors, with limited social capital, who could engage in ‘micro-securitization’ in order to 
influence only small but specific audiences, thus widening the pool of potential 
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securitizing actors, which in the mainstream reading of the theory are usually limited to 
political elite, bureaucrats and influential lobbyists. An indicative example of such 
candidates with narrow audiences could be a Dean or Head of Departments in academic 
institutions. Indeed, as demonstrated in chapter 6, actors with relatively small social 
capital can be very successful within their respective environment and audiences.  
 
The idea that securitizing actors may choose their target-audiences is relatively old. 
Schneider and Ingram (1993: 336) point out that actors create ‘maps of targeted 
populations’ based on one hand on their own perceptions on which referent objects are 
indeed important, and on the other based on what they believe is (or will be) important 
for the public. Balzacq (2005: 173) also points towards this direction as he argues that the 
success or failure of the securitizing actor to persuade a significant audience is based, 
inter alia, on the latter’s point of reference (i.e. what it knows about the world). Actors 
not only consciously choose specific audiences but also, as Vaughn (2009: 275) argues, 
they ‘behave differently in different settings according to the audience expectations and 
norms of different audiences’. The different audiences’ expectations in turn depend, to a 
degree at least, on the audiences’ social environments. As Wendt (1999: 330) points out, 
the meaning one gives to objects and actors depends on his understanding of the situation. 
The ‘social context’ therefore is closely linked to the idea of multiple audiences and is 
indeed a particularly important variable in the securitization analysis not least because it 
helps elucidate why certain acts are accepted while others are not. Similarly, it elucidates 
why certain actors engage in constant securitization even in the absence of ‘real’ threats.  
 
The social context, and more specifically its absence from the mainstream reading, has 
also been receiving growing attention. Stritzel (2007) argues that the Copenhagen School 
has a static approach, which does not examine how the relational dynamics of social and 
political processes generate meaning for actors and audiences alike. As the argument 
goes, ‘an actor cannot be significant as a social actor and a speech act cannot have an 
impact on social relations without a situation that constitutes them as significant. It is 
their embeddedness in social relations of meaning and power that constitutes both actors 
and speech acts (Stritzel 2007: 367)’. Similarly, Balzacq (2005: 171-172) argues that to 
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understand securitization better it is vital to examine the objective context in which the 
security agents operate, as well as the psycho-cultural predisposition of the audience. 
Salter (2011: 118) explains further this view, pointing out that securitization is indeed a 
dialogical or relational process (as the Copenhagen School argues), but not one that takes 
place in a vacuum; it is one that ‘takes place within existing bureaucratic, social, 
economic and political structures’. If this is indeed the case then there is a need for a 
complex sociological method of analysis for the securitization process; one that takes into 
consideration the different cultures, linguistic, historical and affective context (ibid). 
 
Incorporating social context into the theory is also useful in explaining why securitization 
could become part of the elites’ and audiences’ political and social routines and 
subsequently why the process could become institutionalized. As elaborated in chapter 3, 
the social context and the specific audiences’ identities are utilized as tools to promote 
securitization and hinder desecuritization. That is actors use the audiences’ identities to 
maintain some issues constantly securitized. This is not surprising though; what is more 
interesting and less intuitive is that the existing identities (perhaps) inadvertently promote 
the institutionalization of threat discourses and hinder those of desecuritization. 
Specifically, the psycho-cultural pre-disposition of the audience and the audience’s 
understanding of the situation may not allow for desecuritizing acts or may even expect 
and demand the perpetuation of a securitized environment. This is a view that is not 
explored at all in the literature, as the focus is primarily on how the social context may 
influence the ‘acceptance’ of an act.  
 
2.4.3. Social processes and the notion of intersubjectivity 
 
Securitization is a conscious political choice made by the securitizing actors as they know 
that if they are successful they will be able to ‘break free of the rules’ and suspend 
normal politics (Williams 2003: 518). Actors are allowed to do that because the 
articulation of a security threat does not just describe an environment but also creates a 
reality. As mentioned already security – or insecurity for that matter – is not necessarily 
an objective condition, but is rather the outcome of a specific social process and the 
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social construction of security issues (Williams 2003: 513). This social process is 
essentially an intersubjective process, or in other words, the negotiation between the 
actors and the audiences. 
 
The intersubjectivity of the theory lies in the fact that the representation and recognition 
of any (proposed) threat is ‘“negotiated” between an actor and the relevant audience’, 
with the latter being the final decision-makers on whether the threat is accepted or not  
(Stritzel 2007: 363). This means that both ‘negotiation’ and ‘intersubjectivity’ are 
inevitably part of a social process. Stritzel makes an interesting argument that if this is 
indeed the case, then this process goes contra to the Copenhagen School’s argument that 
‘it is the utterance itself that is the act’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 26) and that by saying 
‘security’ something is done. The creation of a threat cannot be both a process (i.e. 
intersubjective) and ‘just an utterance’ (Stritzel 2007: 364). The underlying argument is 
that anything that is subject to intersubjective processes takes time to become accepted. 
Therefore, any outcome that occurs immediately after a simple ‘utterance’ cannot be part 
of an intersubjective process. Stritzel (2007: 365) thus suggests that the performativity of 
security utterances and the social process of securitization, with the pre-existing actors, 
audiences and contexts, form two different centers of gravity: the internalist and the 
externalist positions. 
 
The internalist position holds, inter alia, that there is no social process involved but rather 
just the text. Thus the actors have no power position that could contribute towards 
privileging one text over another. Moreover, there is no historical path dependency or 
intensification over time (ibid: 376). An externalist position on the other hand argues 
among other things that texts are always ‘interwoven with relational dynamics of power 
and meaning’ and are frequently ‘historically intertextual’ meaning that they could 
transform past meaning structures into the present (ibid). Texts are thus incorporated in 
the social context that influences their meaning and the subsequent impact they have on 
the process. 
 
The Copenhagen School has an internalist position, as it does not consider securitizing 
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acts or securitizing actors as being embedded in ‘broader social and linguistic structures’ 
(ibid: 368). While this is a very important criticism, it would be unfair to argue that the 
social sphere is completely excluded from the their work. On the contrary, the facilitating 
conditions – and especially the two that deal with the enunciator’s social capital and the 
‘kind’ of threat in question (Buzan et al. 1998: 32-3) – aim specifically to tackle this 
problem. However, this is as far as the Copenhagen School scholars developed their 
position and thus the incorporation of the social sphere in the theory still remains very 
underdeveloped.  
 
Stritzel’s argument that securitization cannot be ‘just an utterance’ and an intersubjective 
process at the same time is also particularly interesting and to a certain degree valid. As 
discussed in detail in the next chapter, it is possible that a simple utterance may actually 
be enough to convince an audience without much intersubjective process. This however 
could occur only under certain conditions, namely in environments where securitization 
is institutionalized. In such environments, it is possible for a ‘simple utterance’ to be 
accepted by specific audiences without any significant negotiation period, as the social 
context and the internalized beliefs regarding potential threats reduce the need for 
constant actor-audience negotiations. Precisely because the same threats are frequently 
securitized and have become part of the audiences’ routines, sometimes all that is 
required is the speech act, which could be accepted without much negotiation. The end 
result however appears to be the outcome of an intersubjective process as the actors 
engaged in a securitizing act (speech act) and the audience accepted it, either by actively 
endorsing it or by silently tolerating (i.e. by not raising objections). This occurs either 
because the audience expects some threats to be securitized – and thus the act per se is 
expected and unquestionably accepted – or because the same threat has been negotiated 
in the past and any re-securitizing acts aim to ‘remind’ the audiences of the specific 
threats rather than to ‘convince’ them of their validity. 
  
The Copenhagen School’s internalist approach, or essentially the reliance solely on 
speech acts is, as Williams (2011: 212) argues, too constrained and very thin to capture 
the dynamics, strategies and forms that securitization acts take place.  The mainstream 
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reading of the theory ignores the possibility that actors could and do engage in long-term 
strategic processes to increase their chances for successful securitization. This problem 
too is part of the aforementioned issue, namely the absence of social context.  
 
Balzacq offers an alternative reading, arguing that securitization could be better 
understood not as the ‘conventional procedure’ of the speech act – which depends on the 
full prevalence of the ‘felicity conditions’ to work – but as ‘a strategic (pragmatic) 
practice that occurs within, and as part of, a configuration of circumstances, including the 
context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power that both speaker 
and listener bring to their attention’ (Balzacq 2005: 172); this is essentially an externalist 
approach as defined above. Strategic practice essentially refers to the way issues are 
framed and in what context they are framed. It is not just the content of the speech act – 
what is being secured – that matters, but also the way the issue at hand is framed and how 
much the words and images resonate within the existing culture and how much they 
support or oppose existing norms and personal belief systems. As Entman (2004: 6) notes, 
words and images that are ‘highly salient in the culture’ – meaning they are 
understandable, memorable and emotionally charged – are considered to have more 
cultural resonance and thus have a greater potential for influence. Strategic practices are 
conscious and long-term decisions on behalf of the securitizing actors, aiming at specific 
targeted audiences and within a specific context, increasing therefore the chances for 
successful acts. In addition, these practices do not necessarily rely on ad hoc verbal 
speech acts that occasionally take place, but rather on routine actions regarding specific 
issues, such as for instance immigration policies. This way, as Bigo (2002) points out, the 
securitizing acts have more chances of being successful as they are more likely to remain 
unquestioned by the specific audiences.  
 
Strategic practices therefore essentially refer to a ‘narrow’ form of institutionalized 
securitization. What is argued in the next chapter is that in protracted conflicts 
securitization is more commonly practiced as part of a long-term strategy to establish and 
handle threats. Similarly, any new potential security threats are usually linked to ones that 
are already routinely securitized. They become, in other words, part of a macro-
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securitization framework, as was the case for instance the Mohammad cartoon crisis, 
which was not a stand-alone event but rather part of the overall macro-securitization 
environments that involve the ‘clash of civilizations’ (e.g. Islam and the West) and the 
‘war on terror’ (Hansen 2011). 
 
The challenges outlined above allow for a more inclusive approach that extends beyond 
the use of speech acts as the only mechanisms for successful securitization. The 
externalist approach – with more emphasis on the audiences and the social context in 
which securitization takes place – can make the theory more comprehensive and more 
useful in analyzing political practice. The next chapter builds upon the aforementioned 
challenges and refines the theory with the advancement of the idea of institutionalized 
securitization, exploring at the same time the ideas of bottom-up and horizontal processes.  
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Chapter	  3:	  Conceptual	  Framework	  
3.1. Introduction 
 
Chapter 2 provided a review of the securitization literature focusing, inter alia, on the 
criticisms leveled against the theory and the relevant challenges, such as the absence of 
context and multiple audiences and more specifically the under-theorized role of the latter. 
This chapter, using the identified challenges as a starting point, introduces the thesis 
research questions in greater detail, as well as the conceptual framework of the thesis. 
The proposed framework aims to contribute to the theoretical debates by exploring the 
idea of institutionalized securitization and the different forms of the process in a specific 
social context, namely that of protracted ethnic conflicts. This way the thesis makes a 
direct contribution to the theory of securitization, but also to the literature on ethnic 
conflicts and on the Cyprus conflict specifically.  
 
In the existing scholarship there is no profound link between protracted conflicts (ethnic 
or otherwise) and securitization. Similarly, in the Cyprus conflict literature it is assumed 
that Cyprus is a securitized environment (Demetriou 2004a, 2004b, Diez et al. 2002, 
2006) and even though this is a valid assumption, these arguments are not supported by 
substantive empirical evidence that examine i) why this is the case, ii) the frequency and 
breadth of securitization, or iii) the actual impact it has on the conflict and the resolution 
efforts. In addition the focus in much of the literature tends to be on the impact that 
securitization has upon the conflict, but not the other way around: the impact conflict 
environments have on the securitization processes; it is perhaps assumed that protracted 
conflicts are by definition securitized. This chapter aims to fill these gaps by examining 
the link between protracted conflicts and securitization on a theoretical level, which is 
then used as a foundation for the empirical analysis of the case study, namely the Cyprus 
conflict.  
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The chapter is split into three broad sections. The first part, the introduction, presents the 
thesis’ main research questions and hypotheses and defines the key terms, namely 
institutionalized, horizontal, bottom-up and involuntary securitization. The second 
section elaborates on the arguments made in the second chapter and focuses on the 
importance of social context and the role of conflict-perpetuating routines. The third and 
most important part of this chapter engages in a detailed analysis of how the process of 
institutionalization takes place, as well as the subsequent impact this has on the theory, by 
introducing a framework in which the process of securitization is no longer unidirectional 
but rather multidirectional. The first part of this section explains the institutionalization 
process by introducing the three steps: ‘birth’, ‘unchallenged period’ and 
‘institutionalization’. The second and third parts explain how and why horizontal and 
bottom-up securitization is possible and the way these different modes have an impact on 
the theory as a whole. Following that is a brief analysis on the different role speech acts 
have in an institutionalized environment and more specifically how they may no longer 
be used to convince the audiences but rather to remind them of specific existential threats. 
The final section provides a brief summary of the chapter’s main arguments, highlighting 
the theoretical contribution of the thesis in the literature of securitization, conflict and 
security studies, and links them to the other chapters of this thesis. 
 
3.1.1. The thesis’ hypotheses 
 
The thesis’ research questions are based on the idea that under certain conditions 
securitization could and does become institutionalized. Once institutionalized there are 
possibilities for new forms of securitization and an expanded view of the process, as it is 
no longer limited to the typical unidirectional top-down (i.e. elite-driven) path, but rather 
it becomes subject to bottom-up and horizontal forces as well. It is these forces that lead 
the different modes of securitization, termed in this work as ‘horizontal’, ‘bottom-up’ and 
‘involuntary’ securitization. The main hypotheses of the thesis are outlined and defined 
below: 
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H.I: It is possible that securitization becomes an institutionalized process. 
 
H.II: Once institutionalized, securitization need not always be a top-down 
process, but could also be (a) bottom-up and (b) horizontal 
 
H.III: The institutionalization of securitization coupled with the horizontal 
and bottom forces induces securitizing actors and audiences alike to engage 
in ‘involuntary’ actions. 
 
 
It is obvious from the description above that Hypotheses II and III are essentially 
contingent on the first one. In other words, bottom-up, horizontal and involuntary, 
securitization (i.e. Hypotheses II and III) could occur only if there is first an environment 
where securitization is institutionalized (i.e. Hypothesis I). The following sections of the 
chapter elucidate why this is the case by explaining how institutionalization occurs and 
the impact this has on the securitization processes. This section continues with more 
elaborate definitions of the three hypotheses. 
 
H(I): It is possible that securitization becomes an institutionalized process.  
 
As mentioned in chapter 1, Buzan et al. observe that ‘securitization can be either ad hoc 
or institutionalized. If a given type of threat is persistent or recurrent, it is no surprise to 
find that the response and sense of urgency become institutionalized’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 
27). They also acknowledge that issues that are already defined as security issues need 
not be dramatized or prioritized (ibid: 28). This is how the Copenhagen School scholars 
see the notion of institutionalized securitization. As also mentioned, their focus remains 
under-theorized and limited to the possibility of institutionalization if there are recurrent 
(‘real’) threats.15 Even in that case, the reference to institutionalization is in regards to an 
institutionalized ‘sense of urgency’ (ibid), but does not focus on the securitization process 
per se. The focus therefore remains almost exclusively on the need for dramatization, but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The term ‘real’ refers to the distinction between threats based on actual events as opposed to issues that 
are perceived as threats but are not based on ongoing actual events. For instance, a protracted war with 
violent acts would create ‘real’ threats for the people. Potential terrorist attacks on the other hand create 
‘perceived’ threats, but not necessarily ‘real’ ones; the latter could be either based on a one-time event (e.g. 
September 11 attacks) or even on simply the possibility of an event happening in the future (e.g. Iranian 
nuclear attack). 
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it ignores the overall changes on the securitization process. Similarly, there is no 
examination of the underlying factors that play a role in the development of this 
institutionalization, or why certain issues are persistently defined as security issues. It 
also does not examine the role of speech acts once processes are institutionalized or how 
actors and audiences behave in such environments.  
 
Institutionalized securitization in this thesis goes beyond the persistence of threats as 
Buzan et al. argue, as it also refers to cases where the entire process of securitization – 
including the behavior of securitizing actors, the audience, and even the role of speech 
acts – evolves into something diachronic, or almost permanent, and becomes part of the 
society’s political and social routines. As already mentioned in chapter 1, 
institutionalization is also different from routine securitization. Routine securitization 
could refer to simply the frequency of acts. Institutionalization on the other hands refers 
to cases where securitization acquires a state of permanency and becomes part of the 
actors’ and audiences’ identities. This in turn creates shortcuts, conscious and 
subconscious, that dictate to a significant degree behavior, including what needs to be 
securitized and what needs to be accepted as an existential threat. Once institutionalized 
the question is not just how routinely certain things are securitized but also the way they 
are. What is claimed in this work is that institutionalization leads to a specific ‘format’ 
(i.e. use of specific expressions, images, links to past events, etc.) that all actors are 
expected to follow in a routine manner and all audiences are expected to accept and even 
reiterate. This understanding of institutionalized securitization is clearly different and 
more comprehensive than Buzan et al.’s position that issues may not need to be 
dramatized.  
 
It is also argued that institutionalization occurs only under certain conditions and in some 
contexts, such as the ones found in protracted ethnic conflicts. The context fosters 
internalized perceptions of ‘enemy others’ and zero-sum mentalities, which in turn 
influence significantly prospects for successful and repeated securitization.16 It is worth 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The characteristics of ethnic conflicts that open the door for institutionalized securitization are discussed 
in detail in chapter 5. 
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noting that ethnic conflicts environments are not the only contexts in which some of form 
of institutionalized securitization could take place. There is evidence that specific referent 
objects, such as immigration and border controls, became subject to institutionalized 
securitization (Bigo 2005; Bigo et al. 2007, Tsoukala 2005). However, these are cases 
where elites managed to securitize a specific referent object and thus routinize specific 
processes to deal with the issues at hand without the need to constantly dramatize the 
potential threats. This approach useful as it may be, it still remains bounded by the 
mainstream reading of the theory, namely that securitization occurs in a top-down 
manner and routines are only limited to one specific referent object. What this thesis 
identifies and conceptualizes is the institutionalization of the process on an ‘across the 
board’ way and not always in a top-down manner, but also in a bottom-up and/or 
horizontal one. 
 
H.II: Once institutionalized, securitization need not always be a top-down process; it 
can also be (a) bottom-up and (b) horizontal. 
 
Scholars dealing with the theory always assume that securitization is a top-down process. 
This is not surprising as the theory suggests that the first step of the process is the speech 
act, which is assumed to be the outcome of a conscious political choice of the securitizing 
actor (e.g. political elite, influential organizations, media, etc.). These actors are always 
assumed to be at the ‘top’ and their acts aim at influencing the ‘bottom’ (i.e. audience) 
and not the other way around. Thus, the process is perceived to be unidirectional: from 
top to bottom. While I agree with the assessment that influential actors such as political 
elites and media agents are still the primary securitizing actors, in this thesis an argument 
is made that the audiences themselves could also become securitizing actors in two ways. 
The first way is through a ‘role reversal’, where the traditional audiences become the 
actors and the elite and decision-makers who are the traditional actors become the 
audience. The second way is peer-to-peer securitization, where (parts of) the audiences 
are both the actors and audience at the same time. 
 
The bottom-up and horizontal modes of securitization are possible because, as discussed 
in chapter 2, in any environment there may be multiple audiences and not just one as the 
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Copenhagen School suggests. This means that the audience need not always be the 
general public but also specific groups that could give the securitizing actor the validation 
he or she requires. This also means that actors may only need sufficient social capital 
within their specific environment so as to influence their targeted audience – and not 
necessarily social capital to influence the entire public – thus creating multiple 
securitizing actors who under the mainstream reading of the theory would not qualify as 
such. The presence of multiple audiences could also lead to small-scale top-down 
securitization processes, as well as horizontal peer-to-peer ones. It could also however 
create bottom-up processes as specific audiences may be in a position to more easily 
influence the decision-makers in their respective settings; indeed, the audience in the 
setting could securitize an issue in an attempt to influence their decision-makers into 
taking specific actions to deal with a given problem. In this case therefore there is a role 
reversal where the audiences become the actors and the latter become the audiences. This 
argument is discussed in greater detail in section 3.3.2. 
 
The second part of this hypothesis, namely horizontal securitization, introduces an 
argument that challenges to a degree the mainstream reading of the theory, as the ‘top’ 
(e.g. political elite) is excluded from the process. As the argument goes, securitization 
could take place on a micro-level, where the securitizing actors are individuals without 
any significant social capital and their aim is not to influence the masses (i.e. the wider 
audience), but rather their immediate periphery (peers, family, colleagues, etc.). This is a 
form of ‘horizontal securitization’; a peer-to-peer process and not one that is either actor-
to-audience or audience-to-actor. The horizontal mode of securitization is discussed in 
detail in Section 3.3.1.  
 
H.III: The institutionalization of securitization coupled with the horizontal and 
bottom forces induces securitizing actors and audiences alike to engage in 
‘involuntary’ actions. 
 
Buzan argues that when the importance of some threats is not self-sustained and when 
those threats are beneficial to some actors’ aims, the latter – who are described as ‘agent 
provocateurs’ – will seek to exacerbate the situation on purpose to achieve their goals 
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(Buzan 2006: 1107). What Buzan describes is the reasoning why some agents might seek 
to maintain a security threat by convincing the necessary agents that the threat is as 
important as it used to be. While I agree that such cases are indeed possible, what is 
argued here is the opposite: the audiences will sometimes seek to perpetuate a threat 
regardless of what the agents want.  
 
Thus, the bottom-up and horizontal forces in some environments are such that they 
influence the mainstream top-down process. Specifically, they limit the options 
securitizing actors have in not engaging in securitizing acts, and they limit the audiences’ 
options of not accepting them. The first case occurs through bottom-up forces, when the 
audiences apply pressure on their respective elites and decision-makers to keep specific 
referent objects securitized. In such cases the audiences expect that certain issues should 
become or remain securitized; there is therefore, on an audience-level, what is termed 
here ‘expected securitization’.17 The audiences in these cases may either securitize the 
issues themselves trying to convince their respective elite to do the same, or apply 
pressure to them by expressing their views and preferences (but not in a securitization 
manner). These audience expectations may leave few options to potential securitizing 
actors, creating thus in a sense ‘involuntary’ securitization on an elite level. In these cases 
therefore the securitization is still top-down and the outcome of a conscious political 
choice, albeit an ‘involuntary’ one.18 Volition for elites in these cases is therefore limited 
because the alternative options – i.e. of not securitizing – are too costly and not because 
they do not exist.  
 
These bottom-up pressures do not influence only the securitizing actors, but also the 
audiences. Specifically, in the same way that actors may not have an option but to 
securitize an issue, part of the audience may have no choice but to accept some acts. The 
cost in this case for those who do not ‘cooperate’ could be peer pressure, social exclusion 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Why the audience may want things to remain securitized is subject to a number of factors, including the 
social context, past experiences and internalized perceived threats. These conditions are discussed later in 
this chapter and tested empirically in chapter 6.  
18 It is worth reiterating that the word involuntary here is not used in a strict sense – e.g. actors are under 
physical threat and thus have no choice but to cooperate - but in a loose way – failure to satisfy the public 
demand will lead to significant costs, political, financial or otherwise. I do not argue, therefore that a 
securitizing act is not a conscious choice.  
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or penalties at the work place. Thus, securitization could be ‘involuntary’ both at the top 
as well as at the bottom.  
 
All three of the aforementioned forms of securitization do not take place in vacuum, but 
are rather within specific social contexts that provide the necessary conditions for such 
forms of securitization to occur. Specifically, what is argued is that bottom-up, horizontal 
and involuntary securitization take place in environments where the audiences have 
internalized threats and have zero-sum mentalities. It is for this reason that the presence 
of social context is considered in this thesis to be an integral part of the theory. Even 
more specifically, what is argued is that protracted social conflicts, such as the one in 
Cyprus, provide the most suitable environments for institutionalized securitization and 
the subsequent different modes as outlined in the three hypotheses above. The next 
section examines the role of social context in the development of institutionalized, 
horizontal and bottom-up securitization. 
3.2. Securitization in a social context 
 
3.2.1. Incorporating the social context: securitization within a habitus 
  
Chapter 2 discussed the absence of context from the theory and the need to take the latter 
into consideration; this section discusses why this is the case. In every social context 
there are unwritten rules that securitizing actors and audiences tend to follow. These rules, 
just like in games, do not determine the outcome but they do create expectations on how 
the game will be played out. These expectations also apply in cases of securitization 
where the social environment creates rules that limit how players could behave if they 
want to be successful. Specifically, on an actor level there are expectations, or ‘rules’, on 
what issues must be securitized and by whom, while on an audience level there are 
expectations on how receptive the audiences should be to certain acts. The social 
constraints therefore essentially set the boundaries of what securitizing actors should 
securitize. In the case of Cyprus for instance the settlers, the army, or even specific 
people such as the UN Special Envoy in Cyprus Alexander Downer, are issues that actors 
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are expected to securitize and audiences are expected to accept them as threats. 
Subsequently, if players, actors and audiences alike, follow the same rules it means that 
the process of securitization is to a great degree predictable if not pre-determined. 
 
The game analogy has a flaw, namely that in any game the rules must be followed; the 
social context rules however are expected to be followed, but it is not mandatory. In cases 
of securitization therefore actors and audiences are not forced by anyone to either 
securitize or accept anything, but are rather expected to do it. While the choice to follow 
or not to follow the ‘rules’ is theoretically voluntary, in reality (as discussed earlier) there 
is little flexibility for either the securitizing actors or the audiences not to follow them. As 
demonstrated later players who do not follow these rules are likely to ‘lose’ (i.e. occur 
heavy costs), just like players in a game would.  
 
It is useful to understand the impact of social context using Bourdieu’s (1991) concept of 
habitus that elucidates why players are inclined to follow rules, official or unofficial. A 
habitus is a sociological concept designed to capture the dimension of practice and links 
structure and agency. Agents are influenced by the rules of social life but at the same 
time they retain their ability to move creatively. It provides individuals, according to 
Bourdieu (1991), with guidelines, or a sense of how to act and respond in the course of 
their daily lives, without however strict restrictions; it gives a sense of what is appropriate 
in the circumstances and what is not. Thus, as Thompson (1991: 12) notes, a habitus is ‘a 
set of dispositions which incline agents to act and react in certain ways’. These 
dispositions become internalized to a degree that they become ‘second nature’, which 
subsequently means that they are also durable and resistant to change (ibid: 13). 
 
What does this mean for securitization? Securitization takes place within a habitus, which 
means that actors’ and audiences’ securitizing choices are influenced by the specific set 
of dispositions of the social context. Specifically, the context sets guidelines (even 
without strict restrictions) of how actors and audiences should behave and dictates in a 
sense what the appropriate behavior is, which could be the perpetuation of a securitized 
environment. If the expected proper behavior is internalized then actions could become 
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‘second nature’ or essentially institutionalized and inevitably part of the actors’ identities. 
The social context therefore does not take away the choices from (securitizing) actors, but 
rather limits them to a significant degree; indeed choices could be limited to a degree that 
their actions become in a sense ‘involuntary’. This ‘involuntariness’ therefore could 
derive either from the social constraints – meaning that agents may want to choose 
something else but might not do so because it is not ‘proper’ or expected – or from the 
actors’ identity that does not ‘allow’ them to see alternative options (e.g. desecuritization 
instead of securitization). 
 
Social contexts and internalized habitus, is argued in this thesis, influence directly the 
chances for successful securitizing acts. Specifically, for any securitizing actor to 
convince any audience that a particular issue is an existential threat is not an easy task if 
that audience does not already believe, at least partly, that the particular issue could 
indeed be a threat. For instance, it will be very difficult to convince a Cypriot audience 
that it could be a victim of a terrorist act, regardless of who the securitizing actor is and 
how much his social capital is. How and why securitized issues are recognized and 
accepted as threats is thus just as important as the actual process of presenting them as 
threats (i.e. speech acts). Balzacq points towards this direction as he argues that the 
success or failure of the securitizing actor to persuade a significant audience is based, 
inter alia, on the latter’s point of reference (i.e. what it knows about the world) (2005: 
173; see also Wendt 1999: 330 for a similar argument). Thus, it is the identity and the 
internalized beliefs of both the actors and the audiences that essentially have the deciding 
role on how the process develops (Sheehan 2005: 142). If the acts are in line with the 
audiences’ internalized beliefs, or what Balzacq (2005) calls their psycho-cultural pre-
disposition then securitization is more likely to be successful. 
 
Not surprisingly the focus in the literature is how the psycho-cultural predisposition of 
the audience and the social context in general has an impact on securitizing acts, but not 
on desecuritizing ones. Specifically, there is a theoretical and empirical gap on i) whether 
and how the social context influences the acceptance or rejection of desecuritizing acts, 
and ii) how the social context poses restrictions to the development of desecuritization in 
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general. It is this idea that forms the basis that habitus can and do create environments 
where not only is desecuritization improbable, but securitization is rather ‘mandatory’ (i.e. 
involuntary).  
 
3.2.1.1.	  Effective	  social	  capital	  as	  part	  of	  the	  social	  context	  
 
The closest the Copenhagen School has come to incorporating social context into 
securitization theory is with the introduction of the facilitating conditions and specifically 
the actor’s social capital. While it is indeed a vital addition to the theory, the context is 
still an under-examined variable. The major assumption is that the bigger the actor’s 
social capital, the bigger the influence on the audience will be. This however is a 
problematic assumption as it is seen in absolute terms – i.e. as if social capital is a 
quantifiable variable – and not in a relative sense. In addition, it is assumed that social 
capital is important for convincing the audience, ignoring as mentioned the prospects for 
the presence of multiple audiences. What is argued here is that social capital should be 
examined relative to each specific audience and always within the context in which 
securitization takes place. 
 
In any given social context securitizing actors develop ‘roles’ and perceived 
competencies, which are supported by specific political routines and re-iterated 
discourses. This is especially the case in protracted ethnic conflicts where the context is 
dominated by internalized threats and perceptions of the ‘enemy other’. In these 
environments, where threats are already established and are part of the audiences’ 
identities, it becomes particularly important for securitizing actors to cultivate the 
perception that they are indeed capable of handling specific threats. Subsequently, we 
tend to see actors engaging in a securitization bidding battles with other potential actors 
to prove not necessarily that something is a threat – as that may already be taken for 
granted – but rather that they are the most suitable agents to handle the threat. Successful 
actors are those who manage to be more in line with the audiences’ psycho-cultural pre-
dispositions vis-à-vis perceived security issues. Their success derives from the increased 
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possibility that the audiences will be keener to accept, almost automatically, those actors’ 
securitizing acts.  
 
With this in mind the size of the securitizing actors’ social capital is subject to i) how 
successful they are in the outbidding struggles with other actors and ii) how much in line 
their discourse is with the audiences’ pre-dispositions; the latter clearly influences the 
former. The latter condition is linked to the presence of multiple audiences given that 
while an actor’s social capital may be beneficial for one set of audiences it may act as a 
negative factor for other. There are therefore two issues that need to be taken into 
consideration when examining the actors’ social capital: the first concerns the 
securitization competition from other actors and the second with the identity 
compatibility between actors and audiences; both are part of the social context in which 
the process takes place. What follows is a more elaborate demonstration of the two points 
mentioned above. 
 
Condition 1 – securitizing actors’ competition: If actor ‘A’ securitizes a referent object, 
actor ‘B’ is likely to pursue one of the following three options: i) counter-securitization; 
ii) desecuritization; or iii) out-bidding securitization. All three options aim to benefit ‘B’ 
or at least diminish the gains of ‘A’. Counter-securitization refers to the securitization of 
the alternative option.19 In the second case, if ‘A’ attempts to securitize an issue, ‘B’ may 
attempt to desecuritize it, so that all or most audiences reject A’s acts. Again, the aim 
may not be for ‘B’ to gain anything but rather to prevent ‘A’ from benefiting. The last 
case, which is the most interesting scenario, takes place in environments where many 
issues are already securitized. In contexts where the audiences have internalized 
perceptions regarding specific threats and thus expect certain issues to remain securitized, 
actors cannot afford to either engage in counter-securitization or desecuritization for the 
reasons mentioned above. They therefore engage in an outbidding process of constant 
securitization in an attempt not in order to convince the audiences that something is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 For instance, during the Annan Plan period in Cyprus actors were securitizing either the rejection or the 
acceptance of the Plan, creating thus a situation with mutually exclusive positions. Both choices for the 
referendum (accept or reject the Plan) were deeply securitized, creating therefore an environment where the 
same issues were securitized from different angles or essentially counter-securitized.  
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indeed an existential threat, but rather that they are the most suitable to handle the threat. 
In these cases we see routinized securitization of the same issues by multiple actors. If 
this outbidding takes place for a long time it also becomes institutionalized as it becomes 
‘standard’ behavior even when there is no securitization ‘outbidding war’.  
 
Condition 2 – identity compatibility: The Copenhagen School measures the actor’s social 
capital in an absolute way and it is usually linked to the position an individual holds; a 
president for instance has more social capital than a teacher. A more comprehensive view 
would be one that incorporates both the position as well as the ‘identity compatibility’ 
with specific audiences – i.e. how compatible are his/her positions with those of the 
audiences’. The argument is that these views may actually be the determining factor for a 
successful act and not necessarily one’s position or ‘absolute’ social capital. This is 
particularly the case in deeply politicized environments where individual elite and 
political parties have diachronic positions on certain issues, very loyal followers as well 
as very loyal opponents and ‘incompatible audiences’. Thus, an act may fail not 
necessarily because a particular audience does not believe a particular issue is a security 
threat, but rather because it questions the securitizing actor’s ideology or motives.  
 
The actors’ identities are by themselves important and not only in relation to the 
audiences’ identities. According to Hermann and Keggley (1995) there are two kinds of 
elite: crusaders and pragmatists. Crusaders are ideologically driven and interpret their 
environment through a lens that is structured by their attitudes, beliefs and motives’ (ibid: 
521). On the other side there are the more pragmatist leaders who see themselves as 
flexible and try to make their behavior fit the demands of the situation, take into 
consideration the other’s positions, and ‘act how other governments are likely to act’ 
(ibid: 522).  
 
The ‘kind’ of leadership is important in the process of securitization, especially when 
coupled with the social context in which these leaders operate. Specifically, in protracted 
ethnic conflict environments where security threats are already widely accepted, 
crusader-leaders are more likely to build upon these established perceptions and promote 
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their agenda by institutionalizing the securitization process, as that serves their 
ideologically-driven goals more efficiently and effectively. In these cases therefore the 
local social context with the internalized threats becomes part of such elites’ arsenal to 
engage in constant securitization. Such leaders are also unlikely to contemplate 
alternative options to the perpetuation of the existing securitization framework, making 
thus desecuritization a very unlikely option. ‘Crusaders’, given their ideologies and the 
social context in which they operate, may not be in a position to even consider any option 
other than the perpetuation of a routinized security discourse revolving around the same 
threats. Therefore, while the choice to continue securitizing specific referent objects is a 
conscious one, the possibility that there is no alternative path may be an unconscious one 
for some individuals. 
 
Pragmatists on the other hand, who are more flexible and are influenced by the external 
environment, are more likely to ‘float along’ with the dominant views (i.e. social context) 
and give in to domestic and foreign pressures. In ethnic conflict environments this could 
lead to a struggle between internal and external pressures. Internal pressures may demand 
further or constant securitization, while external may seek desecuritization. A 
pragmatist’s approach in such situations is determined by how powerful the domestic 
bottom-up and horizontal pressures are relevant to the external ones. These elites are thus 
likely to engage in ‘involuntary’ acts because of the high costs of the alternative options 
and not because they fail to see the other possible choices that may not include routinized 
securitization.  
 
This struggle, as well as the impact the horizontal and bottom-up forces have on the path 
elites follow, is demonstrated in chapter 6. Specifically, during the period under 
examination (2003-2009) at the top of the Greek Cypriot leadership there were both 
crusaders and pragmatists with clearly different agendas. They both however followed 
the same path. What is argued therefore in this thesis is that once securitization becomes 
an institutionalized process, the bottom-up and horizontal forces become so powerful that 
not even pragmatist leaders can escape from the habitus that asks for constant 
securitization. Thus, if the domestic social context is dominated by conflict-perpetuating 
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social and political routines the external forces that could have potentially influenced 
leaders into a desecuritization path are not sufficiently powerful to have such an impact. 
This is one of the main reasons that protracted ethnic conflicts such as the one in Cyprus 
remain unresolved despite the multiple leadership changes and international efforts to 
settle the conflict. This is also the reason why conflict-perpetuating routines remain 
unchanged despite the changes in leaderships. The next section examines the role of these 
routines.  
 
3.2.2 Conflict-perpetuating routines and the path to institutionalized 
securitization  
 
 
A factor leading to the emergence and perpetuation of conflicts is the lack of credible 
commitment between opposing parties that they will uphold mutually beneficial 
agreements and will not exploit the other party in the future (Lake and Rothchild 1996). 
This is usually the case when there is a shift in the balance of ethnic power; that is when 
one side becomes stronger than the other (Fearon 1995). This fear of exploitation creates 
anxiety as a failed agreement and future exploitation could mean, for the ‘loosing’ side, 
higher costs compared to the status quo (i.e. stalemate). Provided that individuals tend to 
overweigh losses relative comparable gains they are more likely to engage in risk-averse 
behavior (Levy 1992), meaning that in such cases the less risky decision may be the 
perpetuation of the status quo (i.e. the conflict). Individuals therefore may be willing to 
maintain conflict-perpetuating routines because that is the option with the perceived least 
risk. 
 
What makes scenarios where the conflict may be the preferred option particularly 
interesting is how the conflict routines could actually provide individuals with more 
ontological security. Mitzen (2006) argues that people need ontological security as much 
as they need physical security. Ontological security refers not to the security of the body, 
but to the security of the self and to the subjective sense of who one is (Mitzen 2006: 
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344).20 A similar situation could take place on a state level. As Steele explains, ‘nation-
states seek ontological security because they want to maintain consistent self-concepts’ 
(2008: 3, emphasis in original). This sense of identity is sustained through routinized 
actions as the latter regulate social life and eliminate the anxiety of the unexpected, 
creating thus a sense of security regarding the perpetuation of the ‘self’ (Giddens 1991). 
Thus, any disruption of those routines creates anxiety and potentially ontological 
insecurity, which is ‘the deep, incapacitating state of not knowing which dangers to 
confront and which not’ (Mitzen 2006: 345). The counter-measure to avoid this 
uncertainty is the establishment of routines that create cognitive and behavioral certainty 
(ibid: 341). Routines could vary from perpetuating a specific perception about the 
‘enemy-other’ (e.g. Turkey for Greek Cypriots), to how specific issues are portrayed (e.g. 
the settlers as a threat to ‘our’ identity), to how issues should be handled (e.g. accept or 
reject specific proposals dealing with specific issues, report specific activities to the UN, 
negotiate in a given way, etc.).21 These routines therefore create in a sense a habitus 
which, as discussed above, offers guidelines on how people should behave in each 
specific social context.  
 
What makes the study of such routines interesting and relevant is that they promote 
securitization (sometimes inadvertently) and subsequently the perpetuation of the conflict. 
This takes place when identities are sustained through the perpetuation of a conflict and 
the necessary presence of an ‘enemy other’. This means that the continuation of the 
conflict becomes necessary for the perpetuation of specific identities. As a result, a 
conflict may be desired and maintained precisely because it is through its perpetuation 
that ontological security could be achieved. What is worth noting is that this form of 
identity construction is not limited to the individual level. Alexander Wendt explains how 
states need the ‘other’ to play the role of the enemy in order to help ‘us’ define who ‘we’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 See also Wendt (1999): chap. 3 for identity security and for a similar argument on ‘collective needs’ see 
Kelman (1997) and Burton (1990). 21	  These routines could be observed through media analysis – e.g. how frequently the aforementioned 
routines appear in the press and in what ways – as well as through the observation of political discourses – 
e.g. examine the elite positions and official positions. Similarly, by observing opinion polls one can identify 
how important certain issues, that are part of the media and elite routines, are for the public. In chapter 6 I 
examine such routines for the Greek Cypriot community.  	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are (1999: 274). Campbell (1992), using the United States as an example, makes a similar 
argument, namely that states use a ‘discourse of danger’ which is generated and/or 
overstated by elite in order to produce a clear distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’. 
 
It is not unlikely therefore for a society to prefer conflict to cooperation, as people feel 
that it is only through the conflict and the associated routines that they know ‘who they 
are’ (Mitzen 2006: 348-9). Such scenarios could be more possible in cases where the 
conflict is non-violent and the stalemate is not hurtful as the risk for change is even 
higher compared to the potential gains. This is not to say that conflict resolution will 
always lead to insecurity. As Steele points out, routines could be disrupted when a state 
‘realizes that its narrative actions no longer reflect or are reflected by how it sees itself’; 
once one sense of identity is changed the actor will seek to re-establish new routines that 
could again maintain a new identity (Steele 2008: 3). Therefore, if a new set of routines 
could be established that would provide a new sense of identity without the use of the 
enemy-other, then there could be a resolution to a conflict without the risk of ontological 
insecurity. Such conditions however are not easy to develop, especially in protracted 
conflicts, where identities have been formed in or by conflict environments with the 
presence of ‘other-enemies’ for decades or even centuries. In these environments any 
potential disruption of the routines is likely to be securitized, reducing thus the possibility 
for change.  
 
The quest for ontological security does not just create the need for predictability and 
order (i.e. a routinized environment), but also creates specific roles for each set of 
identities, such as ‘enemies’, ‘friends’, ‘protectors’, etc. (Wendt 1999: 339). The 
importance of these roles lies not only in the construction of a ‘self’, but also on the 
understanding of how ‘things are done’. Thus if two sides that consider each other as 
enemies repeatedly engage in practices that ignore each other’s needs or if they practice 
power politics, they will end up creating and internalizing a shared knowledge that they 
are indeed enemies (Wendt 1999: 332), creating in a sense self-fulfilling prophecies. In 
protracted ethnic conflict environments, as discussed in chapter 5, such behavior is 
‘typical’ which subsequently means that the construction and internalization of ‘enemy 
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identities’ is inevitable. It is not surprising therefore that in environments dominated by 
such routines desecuritization is very unlikely. Any act from the ‘enemy other’ is almost 
automatically perceived as negative and could therefore easily be presented as a security 
threat for ‘us’ and thus become securitized. Similarly, desecuritization is highly unlikely 
for as long as the negative perceptions of the ‘other’ remain unchanged. This is because 
there is little or no will to interrupt routines that maintain the negative perceptions about 
the ‘other’ and subsequently there is little hope to perceive any acts from the ‘other’ in 
ways that are not perceived as threatening.  
 
What has been argued so far is that people may be unwilling to disrupt certain routines. 
An argument could also be made that they might also be unable to do that. This ‘inability’ 
is essentially the outcome of institutionalized and ‘involuntary’ securitization as 
described above and could be attributed primarily to the very high political and social 
costs associated with their disruption, but also in some cases with the inability of some 
individuals to see any path other than the one that supports the conflict. Such routines are 
inevitably intertwined with securitization as the latter contributes to the perpetuation of 
the former. The routines themselves are securitized; they become thus a referent object 
that could be under threat.  
 
The disruption of conflict-perpetuating routines and constant securitizing acts could be, 
as explained above, particularly difficult. This raises the question of how change could 
take place. What is argued here is that under certain conditions routine disruptions are 
possible. Disruption in our case is translated into either the desecuritization or the 
discontinuation of frequent securitization of specific referent objects. For either option to 
be possible without significant political cost for the actors and without audience anxiety 
and ontological insecurity, new identity-sustaining routines must be established that 
would replace the old ones. Thus, for the public to accept the elimination of old routines 
the new ones must serve the same purpose, namely sustain the people’s identities.22 
Given that the creation of new routines through desecuritization discourse is particularly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 This is not the same argument mentioned above, namely that a change of self-conception will create new 
routines to sustain this new identity (Steel 2008). The argument here starts from the opposite end, namely 
that it is the change in routines that will change the identity and not the other way around.  
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difficult in some social contexts for the reasons mentioned above, a more plausible 
scenario is the creation of new routines without constant securitizing acts, which would 
lead to ‘less-securitized’ environment. In protracted conflicts environments there is some 
possibility to delink the ‘enemy other’ from some threats, but it is almost impossible to 
‘sell’ an argument that the ‘other’ is not in any way a threat to ‘us’ or is even a friend, (i.e. 
desecuritize the environment completely). For ‘decreased’ securitization to take place 
there must not be severe horizontal pressures and competition on an elite level, namely 
outbidding struggles. In other words, it is very difficult for only one set of elites (e.g. one 
political party or newspaper) to adopt a less securitizing or desecuritizing approach, if the 
opponents (e.g. other political parties and newspapers) continue to engage in frequent 
securitization. It is difficult because of the associated costs deriving from non-
securitization approaches. Specifically, and as demonstrated in chapter 6, any actors who 
adopt such approaches could easily be perceived as ‘soft’ and uninterested to the public 
demands and fears.  
 
An alternative option to interrupt conflict-perpetuating routines is to securitize the impact 
that securitization has on the environment (i.e. society, community, etc.). What is 
securitized is therefore is the perpetuation of the securitized environment. Thus, by 
securitizing the status quo and by emphasizing the missed opportunities of a potential 
change, it could be possible to disrupt the conflict-perpetuating routines. However, as is 
the case above, for this to take place there must little or no horizontal competition among 
securitizing actors. Such a task becomes even more difficult in cases like Cyprus where 
the conflict is ‘comfortable’ and the stalemate is not hurting. The more comfortable a 
conflict is the less likely it is for the public to be convinced of potential benefits (relative 
to the costs) deriving from the any deviation from the status quo.  
 
This chapter has so far introduced the thesis’ hypotheses and defined the relevant terms 
(i.e. horizontal, bottom-up and involuntary securitization) and elaborated on the identified 
gaps (chapter 2), namely why the social context, the idea of multiple audiences and the 
presence of conflict-perpetuating routines are important and should be integrated further 
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into the theory. The next section builds on the previous parts and introduces a framework 
on how institutionalized securitization could take place.   
3.3. Institutionalization: the process 
 
Institutionalized securitization is not something that could ‘simply take place’, that is 
being the outcome of a speech act and a brief intersubjective process, as is the case with 
‘mainstream’ securitization. On the contrary, some conditions must be present and a 
specific process is required. The process introduced here is similar to that of the 3-stage 
life cycle of norms: the birth (i.e. creation) of norms, the growing (i.e. spreading or 
expanding) stage, and lastly the internalization of norms (Kowert and Legro 1996; 
Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). In the case of securitization to reach the third stage (i.e. 
institutionalization), there must also be the birth stage, which takes place (primarily) after 
pivotal events (see Figure 3.1. below). But unlike the case of norms where the ‘birth’ 
takes place mainly because of the role of ‘norm entrepreneurs’ – agents with strong 
beliefs of what is appropriate or desirable within a community (Finnemore and Sikkink 
1998) – the pivotal events could be so dramatizing that no specific actors are required to 
argue what is appropriate, desirable or a threat.  
 
The second stage of institutionalization is the ‘unchallenged period’. This is the period 
during which any perceptions regarding threats that derive directly from the pivotal event 
remain unchallenged for a period of time from either the entire or significant parts of the 
population and the elites (all or most of them). During this period the prospects for 
internalization of specific perceptions is particularly high, not only because they remain 
unchallenged by elite and public alike, but also because after pivotal events these 
perceptions are usually holistic, meaning they affect the entire population and not just 
parts it. At the same time they also shape the community’s identity, especially when it 
comes to perceptions about the enemy and source of potential threats. During this stage 
many conflict-related issues become part of the people’s routines.  
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For institutionalization to fully take place (i.e. 3rd stage) there needs to be an ‘active’ and 
repetitive discourse on security issues on an elite and public level. The key to 
institutionalization is the repetition of securitizing act until the process becomes 
‘formalized’ in terms of content, structure and even frequency. Thus, the way to 
determine whether or not securitization is institutionalized is to examine the political and 
social security discourses and see whether, how and to what degree they are routinely 
repeated. As mentioned, once institutionalized the securitizing acts become part of the 
elite’s political routines and the process of accepting or rejecting them becomes part of 
the audiences’ social routines. In practical terms this means that elite and media, who are 
some of the usual securitizing actors, will routinely repeat the same discourse and focus 
on the same referent objects and source of threats using many times the same phraseology. 
The (majority of the) audiences will then routinely and essentially unquestionably accept 
those acts and even reiterate them in a horizontal manner when and if necessary. Chapter 
6 demonstrates how thousands of daily front-page references in the newspapers regarding 
the Cyprus Problem could be grouped in just 14 categories, which indicates, among other 
things, a repetitive discourse. Similarly, political elites reiterate the same positions 
regarding potential threats since the pivotal event of 1974. The institutionalization impact 
on the audience could be measured through opinion polls where it is demonstrated that 
the public (or parts of the public in case of targeted audiences analysis) internalized the 
same threats reiterated in the press and political discourses. The quantifiable data is 
corroborated by the interviews and focus groups that also indicate the high degree of 
internalization of specific security discourses.  
 
What must be noted is that the routines do not start after the ‘unchallenged period’, but 
rather they emerge during that period. Thus the institutionalization phase is not very 
distinct from the unchallenged phase; on the contrary the two evolve concurrently. That 
said, it is worth reiterating the distinction between routinized securitization and 
institutionalized securitization. The former connotes high frequency of the same or 
similar threat discourses on an elite and audience level. Institutionalization on the other 
hand refers to routinized processes, which however are deeply internalized and 
occasionally even embedded in official processes (e.g. in political parties, government, 
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diplomatic corps, etc.) or official narratives (e.g. in education books, government 
websites, etc.). Once institutionalization occurs then securitization takes the form of a 
standard operating procedure that incorporates pre-determined discourses, approaches to 
potential threats and even phraseology.  
 
When institutionalized, securitization also becomes ‘expected’ in the sense that the 
audiences and even political elite anticipate a specific response for referent objects or 
issues that have been routinely securitized in the past. There are in other words 
expectations that those standard procedures will not be interrupted. On an audience level 
therefore these expectations could easily lead to bottom-up and horizontal forces if there 
is evidence that there might be a deviation from expected behavior. These forces in turn 
contribute to further top-down routinized securitization as they ‘force’ the actors at the 
top to continue securitizing the same objects. This process inevitably leads to an even 
more holistic acceptance of threats (i.e. face II), creating thus a vicious cycle that cannot 
be easily interrupted.  
 
Figure 3. 1: The three stages to institutionalization 
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Stage 1: Pivotal Events 
 
An integral part of the institutionalization process is the presence of conflict-perpetuating 
routines that lead to the creation of bottom-up and horizontal forces, which in turn 
maintain the those routines. This creates a ‘chicken and egg’ dilemma since there is no 
intuitive view on how such routines and unchallenged periods are generated. What is 
argued here is that such developments are the outcome of pivotal events.  
 
Pivotal events could be any events that would create major disruption to the existing 
routines and significantly change the security perceptions of a society. Such events could 
be, for instance, violent acts between states, intra-state actors, or between state and non-
state actors. An indicative example of an intra-state pivotal event would be a civil war or 
a coup d’état or even terrorist attacks from domestic militants. Intra-state cases involve 
invasions (full-scale) or interventions (e.g. harassment of vessels in the open sea). The 
third category could be, for example, terrorist attacks from non-domestic groups, as was 
the September 11, 2011 case in the USA. Thus the duration of the pivotal events could 
range from one day (e.g. 9/11 attacks), a few days (e.g. short war, invasion, or brief 
interventions) or years (e.g. civil wars).  
 
What makes pivotal events so important is that they involve major disruptions of the 
existing routines and major changes in security perceptions. For this to happen the events 
must be very ‘central’ for the society as a whole affecting the entire or significant parts of 
the population. After a pivotal event the public forms strong perceptions about who or 
what the enemy is and which referent objects are under threat. These perceptions could 
be formed without the intervention (or major interventions) of securitizing actors and 
subsequently (potentially) without any speech acts, meaning that the process of 
securitization may commence in a fundamentally different way. The impact of the pivotal 
event determines how strong and adamant the threat perceptions will be and how long the 
subsequent unchallenged period will last. A very powerful and influential pivotal event 
for Greek Cypriots was the 1974 Turkish invasion as it disrupted completely the political 
and social routines and formed at the same time very clear perceptions among the 
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audience about the potential existential threats. Moreover, and as demonstrated in chapter 
6, the event was so powerful that the unchallenged period for some issues is still ongoing 
and the environment is dominated by a series of conflict-perpetuating routines and 
institutionalized securitization processes. 
 
Stage 2: The Unchallenged period 
 
The post-pivotal event period is termed as ‘unchallenged’ as not many individuals or 
organizations (actors or audiences) are willing to challenge the widely-held perceptions 
created from the event. No political elite, for example, after a pivotal event such as the 
1974 invasion would consider challenging the Greek Cypriot established perceptions 
regarding the threat (i.e. Turkey) and the referent objects under threat (e.g. sovereignty, 
political stability, etc.). Similarly the vast majority of the audiences are also unwilling to 
challenge the existing security-related perceptions. It is a period therefore where there is a 
consensus among elite and audiences on what constitutes a security threat.  
 
This period is therefore characterized by a repetitive security discourse that contributes to 
the internalization of the specific perceptions. These perceptions are also further 
internalized because of the silencing of alternative views and the tacit agreement among 
and between elites and audiences regarding the perceived threats. During this second 
phase specific securitization routines develop. These routines are also part of the third 
phase that commences after the early stages of the second phase; once the routines are 
formed the two phases then continue to exist simultaneously. The last two stages 
therefore are neither mutually exclusive nor do they depend on the completion of one 
another. On the contrary they ‘feed of’ each other: the more unchallenged some issues are 
the more likely they are to lead to institutionalized processes and the more 
institutionalized a process becomes the more likely it is to perpetuate the unchallenged 
period. 
 
The notion of an unchallenged period is translated in practical terms as the unwillingness 
of potential securitizing actors to question for a long period of time, in their official and 
unofficial activities, the established views regarding security issues. Elite and media 
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would be unwilling to express or publish articles or views that would challenge the 
established security perceptions, at least not without offering first an ‘alternative threat’ 
that could be securitized. 
 
On an audience level the unchallenged period translates into the unwillingness of the 
public, or specific groups within the general population, to question the existing security 
perceptions and subsequently any securitizing acts from the various ‘mainstream’ actors 
(e.g. political elite, media, the Church, etc.). During this period therefore there is little, if 
any, reaction to the securitizing acts, which is subsequently equated to the acceptance of 
those acts either in the form of active endorsement and support or in the form of tacit 
agreement and thus tolerance. Thus the social context during the unchallenged period is 
particular important as it contributes to the elimination of ‘negotiation’ between actors 
and audiences. The context in which securitization takes place creates such forces that the 
process becomes rather ‘automatic’; acts are expected to take place and the ‘acceptance’ 
is essentially guaranteed.  
 
‘Automatic acceptance’ is possible because people tend to create cognitive shortcuts 
when they are faced with multiple possibilities. Vultee (2011: 80), using the threat of 
terrorism in the US as a case study, argues that securitization could be signaled as a 
heuristic cue that provides actors and audiences with such cognitive shortcuts that allow 
them to make quick judgments about a particular issue (in Vultee’s case, terrorism). What 
is argued here is that the longer issues remain unchallenged, the stronger these heuristic 
cues can become and subsequently the easier it is for actors and audience alike to choose 
the ‘shortest way’ to dealing with specific security issues. This means that for certain 
issues there is a decreasing need for negotiation between actors and audiences when it 
comes to specific issues such as, in the case of Greek Cypriots, the presence of the 
Turkish army and the settlers. The development of such ‘shortcuts’ and the elimination or 
reduction of negotiation between actors and audiences is one of the primary factors that 
allow for routinized and eventually institutionalized securitization. 
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Stage 3: Institutionalization 
 
The third part of the process starts taking place during the unchallenged period, albeit not 
at the very early stages. Specifically, the third stage commences after the securitizing 
actors go beyond simply not challenging the existing norms, into explicitly engaging, in a 
routinely manner, in acts to perpetuate the existing securitized environment. Routine 
securitization is attributed on one hand on the actors’ motivation to keep re-securitizing 
the same issues and to the public need or requests to maintain specific referent objects 
securitized.  
 
The creation of security-related routines is not unexpected in conflict (violent or not) 
cases given, as Kelman (1997: 69) points out, that the political environment is shaped by 
the daily struggles of the people on both sides of the conflict. In practical terms this 
means that actors incorporate into their daily routines securitizing acts. Knowing what is 
important for the people and what has remained unchallenged over long periods, 
securitizing actors such as political elite and media choose to re-emphasize the presence 
of specific threats in their daily official and unofficial discourse, even though there is no 
reason to convince anyone of their existence; the audiences are already convinced as it 
too has incorporated those threats in their daily routines. Eventually this routinized 
behavior transforms into typified discourses that are used ‘automatically’ by actors. 
Similarly, these discourses are internalized by the audiences who expect to hear them 
constantly in order to feel safe that what they consider as threats are treated as such 
without any deviations. 
 
Once securitization is institutionalized the aim of securitizing actors is not to negotiate 
with the audiences about the presence of security threats – which is no longer necessary – 
but rather to present themselves as the most suitable actors to handle the threat. Actors 
that have managed to establish themselves as appropriate agents to handle a situation 
have therefore a personal interest to perpetuate the securitized environment as they 
continue to have access to extraordinary measures, enjoy the tolerance for some of their 
policies, or simply benefit because of their position vis-à-vis the handling of specific 
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threats. Actors are thus unwilling either to desecuritize certain issues or to disrupt their 
securitization routines because of the political or financial cost such actions would have 
for them. In order to re-affirm their appropriateness they need to constantly remind the 
audiences of the potential threats; hence the need for routine securitization. The most 
efficient way of doing that is through an institutionalized process with ‘formalized’ 
discourses. What is more important however is that many times actors are trapped into re-
securitizing old or new referent objects even if they do not necessarily believe there is 
indeed an existential threat. The alternative, either desecuritization or less securitization, 
could potentially lead to personal costs, political or financial and is thus avoided.  
 
A similar logic applies for the audience as well. The audiences’ internalized perceptions 
deriving from the pivotal events and the unchallenged period create an environment with 
specific expectations and high costs of deviation, both of which lead to the desire and 
many times need for repetition of securitizing acts. The audiences, as already explained, 
may desire the perpetuation of securitized referent objects, as it helps them maintain their 
identities (ontological security). As a result, they too incorporate into their routines the 
acceptance of the frequent securitizing acts as it helps them meet their goals, namely the 
perpetuation of their identities. There are cases however that the incorporation of 
‘acceptance’ in daily routines may be ‘involuntary’. Just like the elite may not have the 
option not to securitize something, the public has few options not to accept certain 
internalized security issues as existential threats. As demonstrated in chapter 6, any 
individuals or groups that question the ‘validity’ of securitized referent objects 
experience significant social pressure, run the risk of being negatively identified as 
traitors or even be ‘penalized’ at their work place. In practical terms incorporating 
‘acceptance’ in the routines is demonstrated in multiple ways, ranging from accepting 
and repeating the political discourse, to becoming themselves securitizing actors (on a 
horizontal level) to help maintain the specific routines.  
 
Thus, the main difference between the two stages is that while in the 2nd stage 
securitization is simply ‘unchallenged’ in the 3rd stage securitization is sought after. More 
importantly, in this 3rd stage potential securitizing actors create standard routine 
68	  	  
procedures that utilize the audiences’ sensitivities on specific issues and the internalized 
perceptions regarding perceived security threats. Specifically, they follow a standard 
discourse that repeatedly presents the same issues as threats and priorities, creating a 
repetition that acts as a ‘conditioning mechanism’ for the potential audiences, who in turn 
get accustomed to the specific discourse to the degree they anticipate it and even desire it. 
They also learn to immediately and essentially unquestionably accept the securitizing acts 
as valid, while in some cases they even repeat it themselves during horizontal 
securitization processes. The problem is that these routines become so internalized that 
they cannot be easily interrupted even if the securitizing actors wanted to. This is the 
biggest impact of institutionalized securitization and the primary factor behind 
‘involuntary’ securitization. 
 
Figure 3.2. describes what happens when institutionalization takes place. The outcome is 
a ‘circular’ process where the attitudes and the activities at the bottom (i.e. audiences) 
influence the activities at the top (i.e. actors), which in turn influence again the bottom. 
The top-down process therefore is not independent of the securitization processes that 
take place at the bottom on a horizontal level and the opposite: the bottom-forces are 
influenced by the ongoing top-down securitizing acts. It is not thus argued that bottom-up 
processes replace the top-down ones. On the contrary, the latter influence the 
development of the former by contributing to the internalization of security threat 
perceptions among audiences. The argument is that once these perceptions are formed 
and internalized they take a ‘life of their own’ and become self-empowered influencing in 
their turn securitization at the top level.  
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Figure 3. 2. Institutionalization Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Horizontal securitization, which takes place within the audiences, deserves particular 
attention as it influences both the top-down (i.e. mainstream) and the bottom-up 
securitization. As discussed in detail in the next section, the frequency and standardized 
manner with which ‘normal’ top-down securitization takes place has a spillover impact at 
the bottom where individuals within the several sets of audiences also engage in 
securitization activities (i.e. in a horizontal manner) aiming to influence their peers. 
These horizontal processes gain more importance when they are in line with the top-
down securitization discourses. This means that the mainstream securitizing actor’s (e.g. 
elite, media, etc.) acts will be echoed and re-securitized on a micro-level on a horizontal 
level within the audience. When the two are combined (top-down and horizontal) the 
chances for successful top-down securitization increase significantly not least because the 
negotiation is no longer limited between the actors at the top and the audience at the 
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bottom; parts of the audience that need to be convinced are not only ready to accept the 
act but also ‘fight’ to convince the other parts of the audience that are not yet convinced.  
In sum, such horizontal activities influence the top-down process by empowering the 
actors’ securitizing acts. The reverse is also true. If there are horizontal processes that are 
not in line or even oppose the actors’ positions then these activities weaken the latter’s 
position; indeed they could even apply so much pressure at the ‘top’ that they influence 
what and how something is securitized. This is usually the case when there are multiple 
securitization activities for the same or similar issues, albeit each activity has a different 
goal. 23  Lastly, the more intense the horizontal processes are, the deeper the 
institutionalization will be, as the perpetuation of the securitized environment is not 
limited to ongoing top-down speech acts but also takes place at the ‘bottom’ even without 
the interference of elites.  
 
The last important issue to note is the distinction between the pre-institutionalization and 
post-institutionalization role of securitizing actors. Arguing that the bottom’s views could 
influence the top in the securitization process creates another ‘chicken and egg’ question, 
as an argument could be made that the audiences’ (i.e. bottom) views are the outcome of 
the top’s actions, meaning there is really no real distinction between the mainstream top-
down ad hoc securitization and what is suggested here. I do not discount the elite’s role in 
influencing the audiences; nor do I say that they do not have a role to play in the 
perpetuation and routinization of a securitized environment. What is argued is that they 
may or may not have a big role to play in the development of the institutionalization 
process at the early stages; however, once securitization becomes institutionalized their 
options, and subsequently their role, are diminished. In the institutionalization process 
therefore the elite’s role becomes a question of ‘when’; that is when they can influence 
the most rather than if, that is whether they can have an influence.  
 
Specifically, there are two possibilities when it comes to elite’s role in the early stages of 
institutionalization. The first has to do with the possibility of having a small role to play, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 For instance, during the Annan Plan in Cyprus there were multiple securitization processes some of 
which aimed at securitizing the acceptance of the Plan, while others aimed to securitize the rejection. 
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because, as explained earlier, a pivotal event is so powerful that it may eliminate any 
need for securitizing actors’ interventions (e.g. 1974 invasion). The second possibility 
requires greater involvement on a top level. In these cases the events are still pivotal, but 
the potential threats are not as lucid and there is therefore a need for a more active 
involvement on behalf of the securitization actors. An indicative example of the latter 
case is the Annan Plan, which was a pivotal event but the perceived threats became more 
lucid only after constant securitization. In both cases some positions and issues are 
subject to routinized and eventually institutionalized securitization and the perpetuation 
(and internalization) of specific threats is either the outcome of a powerful pivotal event 
(i.e. first case) or of heavy securitization (second case). In the latter case the actors had a 
bigger role to play than in the former. 
 
What is argued here is that regardless of how the process started, once it becomes 
institutionalized the elite can no longer control it easily. As shown in the figure above 
once institutionalized some securitization routines are ‘self-empowered’ and their 
disruption is not easy as it could create ontological insecurity and thus public reactions. 
Whether or not a constantly securitized environment is beneficial for the elite and would 
like thus to contribute to its perpetuation is a different question that revolves around the 
actors’ incentives and not their ability to perpetuate or disrupt them. Therefore, what is of 
interest here is what happens after the securitization is routinized and even 
institutionalized; the argument is that the elite’s abilities to influence the process diminish 
while that of the audiences increase.  
 
Overall institutionalized securitization is likely to be beneficial for the ‘mainstream’ 
actors. The Copenhagen School, as discussed in chapter 2, argues that actors benefit from 
successful securitization because they gain access to extraordinary measures or enjoy 
tolerance for certain actions. If securitization is institutionalized then these actors are 
likely to constantly enjoy the benefits of successful securitization. This is, therefore, a 
question of short-term versus long-term securitization, a distinction which is not 
examined in the mainstream reading of the theory. According to Wæver (1996: 104), 
threats must be dealt immediately otherwise everything else will become irrelevant. This 
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view of securitization connotes ‘immediateness’ in the sense that the actor must be 
granted the rights he requests before the situation becomes non-reversible. This approach 
neglects the possibility that an actor may securitize issues not only for access to 
immediate measures to deal with the threat per se, but also for long-term ones aiming 
among other to achieve indirect benefits such as the creation of an image for himself and 
his organization as the most suitable agent to deal with a specific security issue. This is 
especially beneficial if that that issue is estimated to dominate the environment for a long 
time and be part of the audiences’ psycho-cultural predispositions. It is precisely these 
kinds of benefits that create incentives for institutionalizing the process. Given that it is 
unlikely to acquire long-term benefits without constant re-securitization, it becomes 
imperative for some actors to engage in routinized securitization in order to successfully 
perpetuate specific threats and subsequently their image as ‘saviors’ or ‘most appropriate’ 
leaders. As demonstrated in chapter 6 political parties and specific individuals attempt to 
institutionalize securitization precisely for this reason.  
 
Elites thus contribute to the perpetuation of institutionalized securitization either because 
it directly benefits them or because the alternative is too costly or risky for them. Either 
way there is a lack of incentives on an elite level to interrupt securitization routines. 
When this is coupled with the audiences’ needs for conflict-perpetuating routines (to 
maintain their ontological security), it becomes evident that once securitization is 
institutionalized it becomes very difficult to reverse the situation.  
 
3.3.1. Horizontal securitization in institutionalized environments  
 
Horizontal securitization is essentially a peer-to-peer process where members of the 
audience become securitizing actors with the aim to influence other members of the same 
audience. In these cases therefore individuals are both actors and part of the audience. 
This mode of securitization could thus be termed as ‘horizontal’ as it is neither top-down 
nor bottom-up. This form of securitization takes place on a micro-level as the aim of each 
potential actor is not to influence the population or large audiences but rather its peers 
and immediate periphery (e.g. colleagues, friends, family, etc.). In this setting there are 
no specific securitizing actors (e.g. political elite), while the ‘absolute value’ of each 
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actor’s social capital is not as important; what is important is the social capital one has 
relative to its immediate audience, namely his or her peers. In other words, a teacher or a 
parent for example may have more relative social capital vis-à-vis his students or family 
than a political elite. The teacher or parent – even though he has less social capital in 
absolute terms than a political elite – may be more successful in securitizing a specific 
issue. The actors on a horizontal level do not necessarily benefit personally and they do 
not request access to emergency measures. Their aim is rather to transfer their own 
security perceptions to their peers. As mentioned, if these views echo the ones that are 
articulated by mainstream actors such as political elite, then the horizontal process 
influences the mainstream top-down securitization process by supporting other actors’ 
positions and acts. Thus, on a horizontal level, parts of the audiences that become actors 
themselves could potentially and inadvertently become ‘ambassadors’ of the mainstream 
securitization actors. 
 
Horizontal processes are probable and possible in some contexts such as protracted 
conflicts where securitization is routinized as it leads to the development (for the 
audiences) of unambiguous threat perceptions that are usually internalized. This in turn 
means that the audiences could become very opinionated about certain issues and have 
very specific expectations on what is or should be a security threat. Horizontal 
securitization is empowered further when the perceived threats are linked unofficial 
narratives, personal historical experiences, myths and anecdotal stories about the enemy-
other as they all contribute to the internalization of the ‘enemy other’ perceptions. 
Therefore, once securitization becomes part of the people’s routines and part of their way 
of living may create a need for individuals to engage in securitizing acts themselves in 
order to protect their identity that is sustained through those routines. As a result, 
horizontal securitization may continue on an audience level even if the elites at the top 
stop the securitizing process. This is especially the case if members of the audience feel 
that the elite are not securitizing sufficiently a specific referent object. If a significant part 
of the audience engages in such acts it is likely to see the diminished top-down 
securitization become reinvigorated and more frequent.  
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The fact that in the horizontal processes the actors are not necessarily individuals with 
particularly high social capital allows for the use of mechanisms that normal actors may 
not be allowed or may not wish to use. Specifically, securitizing acts could be more 
successful with the use of arguments that are powerful albeit politically incorrect or 
sensitive for some audiences. For instance, arguments could revolve around religion and 
ethnic identities – e.g. ‘the increase of Muslim settlers from Turkey destroy our Greek 
Orthodox identity’; the invocation of the Turkish settlers’ religion (for example) creates 
additional anxiety to the Greek Cypriot public as the religious aspect (not just the ethnic) 
of their identity is also endangered. These are arguments that some mainstream actors 
such as political elite or media agents frequently choose not to use as they do not want to 
jeopardize their social capital (e.g. by being accused for racism, nationalistic views, etc.). 
Therefore, political elite or even media may be very hesitant to talk about some issues 
such as religion as that could have a very negative impact on them personally but also on 
the Greek Cypriot position vis-à-vis the conflict in general. These restrictions are not 
applicable in peer-to-peer securitization however, as non-elite individuals can express 
their opinions more freely not least because they do not represent an official agency or 
organization and the personal cost they may occur is much less than that of an elite.   
 
Horizontal securitization also allows for the use of ‘convincing’ tools that may not be 
available in the top-down process. Specifically, it is much easier for a peer than for an 
elite to exert social pressure on another peer when the latter deviates from the ‘accepted’ 
and established positions of the community. The pressure could come in the form of 
name-calling (e.g. ‘traitor’ if you accept or not oppose ‘X’ development) or guilt and 
responsibility (e.g. if you accept ‘X’ development “you” (i.e. personally) are endorsing 
the permanent division of the country). As demonstrated in chapter 6 these mechanisms 
are frequently used among peers of all ages, social class and education levels. As also 
examined later, in more extreme cases the pressure is much more direct and is manifested 
in the form of threats (e.g. at the working environment) or even ostracism (complete 
exclusion from peer activities). Once again, these are mechanisms that cannot be easily 
used by mainstream securitizing actors.  
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Horizontal pressures could eventually lead to an environment where frequent securitizing 
acts are accepted through the audiences’ silence, which might be either voluntary or 
coerced. Hansen (2000), using the gender problems that exist in Pakistan, points towards 
this direction arguing that there is a possibility of either coercion or silence and not 
‘voluntary acceptance’ of securitizing acts. Non-opposing behavior therefore acts as a 
tacit agreement of the institutionalized securitization process. More importantly however 
it makes change difficult and unlikely given that neither the actors nor the audiences are 
eager to engage in change-efforts due to the high costs associated with such attempts. 
This fear of cost leads to ‘involuntary’ securitization, which is discussed in the next 
section. 
 
3.3.2. Bottom-up and involuntary securitization 
 
Once the securitization process is institutionalized and becomes part of the audiences’ 
and actors’ routines there is inevitably a change in the forces leading to the development 
of new securitization acts as well as the perpetuation of old ones. These forces take place 
at elite and audience level and are the outcome of the existing social context, which 
incorporates previous securitizing acts and ongoing horizontal pressures. As mentioned, 
bottom-up securitization occurs when parts of the audiences engage in securitizing acts 
aiming at influencing those that traditionally have the securitizing actors role.  
 
As depicted in Figure 3.2. above, bottom-up securitization is bi-directional going from 
top to bottom and back to the top, creating thus a self-sustaining loop. Specifically, there 
are two ways bottom-up securitization could take place. The first is direct, meaning that 
an audience attempts to act as a single actor and securitize a referent object. In this case 
there is a ‘role reversal’, where the audience becomes the securitizing actor and the 
audience is either other parts of the audience community or the traditional securitizing 
actors. Securitization in this case is either entirely bottom-up or horizontal. The second 
way is indirect as the audience does not attempt to become an actor, but rather to exert 
enough pressure on the traditional securitizing actors (e.g. elite, media, etc.) so that they 
securitize a specific issue. If successful, securitization will thus take place in a top-down 
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manner as the process will be initiated at the top, albeit the driving force behind such 
initiatives is the audience at the bottom. 
 
Given that an audience is not, by definition, a unitary actor there are the questions of who 
performs the speech act – i.e. who is the securitizing actor – and how securitization takes 
place. The audience-actor role reversal could develop into a formal or an informal 
structure. Formal structures take place when parts of the audience form groups with 
representatives who are in charge of expressing in a single voice the specific audience’s 
positions on how security issues should be perceived and handled. A union that 
represents a specific set of audience (e.g. academics, teachers, etc.) is an indicative 
example. Informal structures refer to ad hoc situations where people who share the same 
views and have similar demands on the handling of a particular issue express their 
opinions in a coordinated manner albeit without representatives. This takes place, for 
instance, during mass demonstrations, petitions, or even coordinated individual efforts 
such as direct contact with elite or media demanding specific actions. The latter form of 
bottom-up action takes place when the public, or one particular audience, disagrees with 
the way the elite handles a security issue. Reactions are more intense when internalized 
security perceptions do not receive the attention the public demands and expects, or in 
other words, perceived threats are not securitized sufficiently.  
 
Both approaches to bottom-up securitization have to do with audience pressure. The end 
result is that these pressures, when combined with the horizontal pressures mentioned 
above, may lead to involuntary securitization (as defined earlier). An integral part of 
involuntary securitization is the social context that creates the environment that allows for 
such upward and horizontal pressures to exist. As discussed in detail in chapter 5, 
protracted ethnic conflicts have social contexts that are built on identities and conflict-
perpetuating routines that allow for such pressures to thrive. The argument therefore is 
that the social environment not only allows for bottom-up pressures but also creates 
securitization expectations, especially if what is perceived to be at threat is the audiences 
identity. The concept of ‘expected securitization’ provides us with an alternative view of 
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the audience-actor relationship; one where the audience does not just ‘validate’ the actors’ 
acts, but rather leads to the creation of them.  
 
A key challenge in attempting to clarify these complex dynamics concerns identifying the 
securitizing actor(s). When the direction of the process is reversed it becomes difficult to 
identify the actors not least because an audience cannot easily have one voice or act as a 
single actor who represents his peers or his institution.24 This drawback could be 
mitigated if we accept the existence of multiple audiences. The argument is that if the 
audience is not perceived as a single entity but is rather broken down into multiple 
smaller ones, then it becomes possible for these sub-audiences to engage in securitizing 
acts in an attempt to convince their respective elites (i.e. ‘top-level’ actors) that an issue 
must be handled with a sense of urgency. This is possible because each audience is 
directly linked, and has direct access, to its respective decision-makers, making it thus 
possible to influence them. In addition, precisely because specific audiences are small in 
size they could more easily act with one voice. Academics for instance could act as 
audience and actors at the same time. When they aim to influence other audiences 
through their work they wear the ‘actor’ hat; however, they could also be audience 
themselves in cases where the actors are technocrats and politicians from the ministry of 
education or the top administration in their universities who may want to securitize 
specific issues such as collaboration with the ‘enemy other’. In such contexts however the 
reverse could also be true: a group of academics in a university could act with a single 
voice to securitize issues making thus the mainstream actors such as the Minister of 
Education the target audience. Securitizing acts in this case therefore aim to place issues 
on the agenda for others, with the necessary social capital, to securitize.25 
 
The context in which bottom-up and horizontal securitization takes place is such that may 
create an environment where actors’ choices are limited to two options: securitization or 
desecuritization. This means that elites may have to choose on how to respond to an issue 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 As opposed to, for instance, an immigration officer whose decisions represent an institution (e.g. 
ministry of interior or the equivalent border-control agency) as well as his peers (i.e. other immigration 
officers). 
25 This is one of Vuori’s (2008) argument, which was discussed in chapter 2.  
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or a development they may not have created and their choices might be limited to treating 
it as a threat or as a non-threat. In such environments – where a community has 
internalized beliefs regarding threats – the choice of non-securitization may not be 
available, either because it is not recognized as an option or because it is irrational due to 
the high associated costs. Thus, the only available option therefore might be 
securitization or re-securitization. This lack of choice is often seen in conflicts. As 
Kelman (1997) argues, parties are unwilling to engage in negotiations, or make any 
concessions, because they believe that once they do so they may fall into a ‘slippery slope’ 
that might jeopardize their own existence. Such existential fears (e.g. loss of identity) 
create resistance towards negotiations and subsequently resolution (ibid). This 
unwillingness and fear of uncertainty may be based either on the personal belief systems 
of the negotiators who might be conditioned not to see the desecuritization (resolution 
negotiations) alternatives or they might be the outcome of severe bottom-up and 
horizontal pressures that request re-securitization and not the reverse.  
 
In the first case, the socially constructed reality for the securitizing actors and audiences 
limits their ability to see such alternative options. Securitization therefore in these cases is 
still a conscious choice, albeit in the actors’ and audiences’ minds it is also the only 
choice, making thus the act again ‘involuntary’ given the lack of alternative choices (for 
the specific individuals). In other words, in the social context in which securitization 
takes place, individuals – actors and audiences alike – may be conditioned to see only 
specific options, namely those that lead to the perpetuation of a specific security 
discourse and subsequently specific threats. Those individuals who may be able to 
‘escape’ from the limitations posed by their habitus and are able and willing to explore 
alternative options (e.g. desecuritization) face other forms of pressure as discussed above. 
In these cases, the rational choice may be to go with the least costly option, namely the 
perpetuation of a threat discourse.  
 
The degree of this involuntary process depends on how rigid and how connected the 
identities are to the existing perceived threats. In protracted ethnic conflicts identities 
tend to be particularly rigid and maintain strong connection to the conflict and the 
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associate threats, as the conflict and more specifically the ‘enemy other’ is essential for 
the perpetuation of each side’s ontological security (Campbel 1992; Mitzen 2006; Wendt 
1999). These antagonistic and zero-sum identities are strengthened by official (e.g. 
schooling) and unofficial (e.g. family) narratives, which frequently develop into myths, 
are passed on from generation to generation and eventually become the uncontested 
‘official’ truth and part of the social context and the people’s identities. The more 
internalized these ‘truths’ are the more rigid the identities will be vis-à-vis perceived 
threats, meaning that people would be more skeptical towards any desecuritization 
activities. On the contrary it is more likely to expect and demand activities that will 
support the existing ‘truths’ and subsequently leave unchanged their identity.   
 
3.3.3. Speech Acts: a new role in an institutionalized environment 
 
Having discussed the different possible forms of securitization once the process becomes 
institutionalized, it is worth revisiting one of the integral parts of the theory – the speech 
acts – to examine how they are affected. Bigo (2002) points out that if security issues are 
around for a long time they could develop into threats ‘by themselves’. This is also the 
case in environments where threats are internalized and the process of securitization 
institutionalized, meaning that there is not necessarily a need for ‘real’ threats (e.g. 
violence) to be present for a long time (as Bigo suggests), as long as the perception of 
threats is. This raises an interesting question: if threats can develop without interventions, 
what is the role of speech acts if security issues are already internalized and accepted as 
threats and if the audiences may be ‘unable’ or unwilling to reject any acts?  
 
The main role of speech acts is to convince a significant audience that a specific referent 
object is under existential threat. In institutionalized environments however there is no 
need to convince an audience as it is already convinced; the threats are already 
internalized and perceived as existential, which means that the role and importance of 
speech acts is somewhat downgraded. What is argued here is that speech acts could still 
play a very important role in the process for two reasons: 
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i) They are necessary to perpetuate the securitized environment (not necessarily to create 
it) and to ‘remind’ the audience of who the best agent is to handle a threat. 
ii) They are necessary in creating a sense of imminence or urgency. 
 
Even if threats self-develop they cannot be perpetuated without frequent securitization 
interventions, especially if those threats exist only in principle and in past experiences 
and are thus not ‘felt’ on a regular basis. For instance, if there is violence – as is the case 
in many Middle East – the threats are ‘real’ and people ‘feel’ them frequently. In Cyprus 
for instance, many threats were real at some point in time but are now less ‘real’ and 
more ‘theoretical’. In the latter case speech acts acquire a new role, namely that of 
perpetuating existing security issues or ‘upgrading’ new but tangential issues into the 
realm of existential threat. What is argued therefore is that speech acts are used primarily 
as reminders, not only of the threats, but also of the agents who are more equipped to 
handle these threats. Speech acts in environments where threats are deeply internalized 
are also placed into specific social and historical context that is convenient and beneficial 
for a securitizing actor who wishes to perpetuate a specific threat and emphasize why he 
or she is best suited for the situation. Each actor therefore attempts to remind how others, 
as opposed to him, handled or failed to handle similar threats in the past and what the 
consequences were of their actions. Speech acts therefore do not focus on the threats per 
se only, but also on other actors’ ability to deal with them, meaning that frequently it is 
the actors themselves that are securitized.  
 
The second role speech acts have is that of creating a sense of imminence. Even in 
environments where the process of securitization is institutionalized it does not 
necessarily mean that threats are always perceived as imminent, even if they are 
perceived as existential. This could be the case precisely because the threats may have 
been lingering for decades which means, by definition, they cannot always be imminent. 
In these cases, speech acts will not aim to convince the audience about the threat per se 
but rather about its imminence. An indicative example of a threat that could be perceived 
as existential but not imminent is the Turkish settlers, who are constantly perceived as an 
existential threat for the Greek Cypriot identity, but not an imminent one. They become 
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more imminent only when there are prospects for settlement (perceived as adverse), as 
was the case with the Annan Plan in 2004. This is an issue that is explored further in 
chapter 6. 
 
3.3.4. Spillover securitization  
 
Buzan et al. argue that actors think of their security concerns in an ‘across the board’ 
manner (1998: 169). Security perceptions in one sector influence the interpretation of 
what is a security problem in another sector (ibid: 170). The Copenhagen School focus on 
how security perceptions in some sectors are distorted because of securitized referent 
objects in another indicates that securitization in each sector is not an independent 
process but rather an interconnected one; it is essentially connoted that the influenced 
security perceptions ‘across the board’ could make securitization in other sectors easier. 
They do not however profoundly examine how and why there could be spillover 
securitization from one sector to another.  
 
What is argued here is that in environments where securitization is institutionalized it is 
much easier to see spillover practices from sector to sector. This could take place 
primarily for two interconnected reasons. The first reason is what Buzan et al. argue that 
the audience is already biased about the existence of security threats. The second reason, 
which leads to a great extent to the first, is that the source of threat for many different 
referent objects across different sectors is the same. An indicative example in the case of 
Cyprus is again the Turkish settlers, which is a source of threat for Greek Cypriots for a 
number of different referent objects, such as the identity, political sovereignty and the 
economy. The same source of threat, in this case the settlers, could be used to securitize 
three different referent objects (identity, political power and economy) in three different 
sectors. In such environments, if an actor (e.g. state, community, specific population 
group, etc.) is perceived as a threat for one object, it is almost automatically assumed to 
be a threat for other objects in other sectors as well. 
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A more interesting question than the ‘why’ is the ‘how’; how securitization could ‘spill 
over’ from sector to sector. The easiest way this can occur is to securitize the source of 
threat (that is applicable to multiple sectors – e.g. the settlers) rather than the actual 
referent objects in each sector. This is possible in cases where the process is 
institutionalized to the degree that the source of threats is so routinely used for one sector 
that the audience internalizes the arguments and unquestionably accepts the acts and the 
source of threat as a real source of danger. Thus when the same source of threat is used 
for another sector, no long-term negotiation between actors and audience is needed as the 
latter would easily accept the possibility of an existential threat in yet another sector. 
Indeed, spillover securitization could even take place in other sectors without the 
intervention of securitizing actors. In the case of Cyprus for instance the audience may 
automatically assume that there is an existential threat if the source of threats, e.g. settlers, 
is in any way involved.  
 
One of the major issues with securitization when it becomes institutionalized is that 
securitization is almost never ‘contained’ to one sector; spillover in other words is 
inevitable. This makes desecuritization a much more difficult task, even if it were the 
actors’ goal to desecuritize specific issues. More specifically, there are difficulties 
because the source of threat in some social contexts cannot easily be de-linked from all 
referent objects. For instance, even if there was genuine incentive to desecuritize the 
economy from the threat of settlers, this goal may be unattainable because the settlers as a 
source of threat cannot be delinked from other referent objects such as the identity. This 
problem creates an ‘all or nothing’ environment where unless the source of threat can be 
universally eliminated from all sectors, actors will be unwilling to engage in any 
desecuritizing attempts for the reasons mentioned earlier, namely bottom-up and 
horizontal pressures. 
3.4. Conclusion 
This chapter elaborated and built upon the criticisms and gaps identified in the previous 
chapter and proposes a framework that explains why the social context and the presence 
of multiple audiences, especially in protracted ethnic conflict environments, are indeed so 
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important that they could influence the entire process of securitization, turning the latter 
from ad hoc to institutionalized. It is also proposed that institutionalization in its turn 
leads to two different modes of securitization, horizontal and bottom-up, which in their 
turn lead to a third one, namely that of ‘involuntary’ securitization. 
 
This chapter also explained how institutionalization could develop and examined the 
conditions under which the different modes of securitization become possible and the 
impact the latter have on the theory. The aforementioned theoretical propositions also add 
value to how applicable securitization theory is in explaining real life cases. More 
specifically the proposed framework does not deal with how issues become security 
threats (i.e. what the mainstream reading of the theory does), but also explain why some 
issues cannot be desecuritized.  
 
By linking protracted ethnic conflicts with the proposed framework, and especially the 
idea of involuntary securitization, this thesis also makes a contribution to the literature on 
conflicts as it produces additional explanations on why conflict-perpetuating routines are 
maintained and why the protracted conflicts remain unresolved. While the thesis tests the 
framework using only one case study, that of the Cyprus conflict, the theoretical 
arguments are potentially applicable to other cases where the context is such that allows 
for institutionalized securitization. The link between protracted conflicts and 
institutionalized securitization is discussed further in the last chapter. The next chapter 
introduces the methodological approach of the thesis and of how this framework could be 
tested. 
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Chapter	  4:	  Methodological	  Framework	  
4.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter focuses on the methodological approaches of the thesis, presents the 
different sources used to empirically test the hypotheses presented in the previous 
chapters and explains the reasoning behind the choice of the specific case study.  
 
The thesis examines only one case study, meaning there is no comparative analysis. 
There is little doubt that a comparative approach using other similar case studies, such as 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, would provide more examples of securitizing processes in 
conflict environments and would also help demonstrate that the proposed theoretical 
arguments are not applicable only to Cyprus. It is acknowledged that a single case study 
could potentially lead to methodological concerns with the most important one being a 
potential problem of ‘selection bias’ – i.e. choosing a case study that would provide the 
necessary results that would validate a theoretical model. This however is not a valid 
concern in this case. As already discussed in chapter 3 and as examined in greater detail 
in the next two chapters the variables needed for the development of institutionalized and 
other modes of securitization are not Cyprus-specific, but are found in many similar 
protracted ethnic conflicts. Chapter 5 examines these variables found in such 
environments and demonstrates why Cyprus is an indicative, but not unique, example of 
environments in which institutionalized, bottom-up and horizontal securitization can take 
place.  
 
Therefore, and without arguing that all protracted ethnic conflicts are identical, the 
theoretical premise of the thesis is applicable to other protracted conflicts that share 
similar characteristics as Cyprus. Indeed, the theoretical premises could also be applied to 
non-conflict environments as well if the necessary conditions are present; it is however 
beyond the scope of this thesis to analyze in detail this possibility. Given the absence of 
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comparative analysis, it is worth noting that the chosen case study is used as an 
‘instrumental case study’, meaning that it has a ‘supportive role’ and is used to provide 
insights on a specific issue and to refine a theoretical explanation (Stake 1995; Berg 
2004). Thus, while the case study analysis also contributes to the conflict and Cyprus 
conflict literature, the primary aim is to explain and empirically support the theoretical 
arguments of the thesis as outlined in chapter 3. 
 
In terms of research design, the thesis uses a mixed methods approach combining both 
qualitative and quantitative methods of measurement. From a qualitative standpoint the 
data will be collected from i) twenty-five semi-structured interviews with key actors and 
indicative audience members using an open-ended interview protocol, ii) five bi-
communal focus groups with different sets of audiences and iii) newspapers. All the data 
is collected from the Greek Cypriot community only, with the exception of the focus 
groups, which were bi-communal.  
 
From a quantitative standpoint the research approaches include i) the use of numerous 
opinion polls created and conducted by NGOs and television stations, ii) the design and 
implementation of a survey targeted for a specific audience group, namely the Greek 
Cypriot academic community and iii) a press analysis of the three most widely-circulated 
Greek Cypriot newspapers’ front page for the period 2003-2009. Before examining how 
these approaches could empirically test the theoretical arguments made in chapter 3, it is 
worth visiting first the Copenhagen School’s proposition for empirical observations for 
securitization. As argued below the School’s approach does not provide adequate 
mechanisms to fully capture the securitization processes, especially in some 
environments characterized by frequent securitization. 
 
The Copenhagen School limits any empirical examination of securitization to the 
observation of speech acts through the analysis of texts that formulate political discourse. 
The evidence of securitization exists if the audience accepts a specific move as well as 
the proposed emergency measures. Securitization therefore could be studied ‘directly’ 
and without the use of ‘indicators’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 25) such as opinion polls. Buzan et 
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al.’s choice to limit their empirical examination to speech act observations is not 
surprising given that the level of analysis they use is limited to: i) referent objects; ii) 
securitizing actors; and iii) functional actors (ibid: 36). Indeed,	   from	   a	   critical	  perspective	  securitization	  theory	  is	  often	  seen	  as	  being	  somewhat	  pedestrian	  from	  a	  theoretical	   point	   of	   view	   because	   it	   imposes	   blinkers	   upon	   what	   the	   fieldworker	  looks	   at	   when	   examining	   a	   case	   study,	   and	   this	   may	   result	   in	   pre-­‐determined	  findings	  or	  the	  neglect	  of	  other	  interesting	  dynamics.	  This problem could be resolved 
if one follows Balzacq (2011: 35) recommendation by adding two important elements, 
the audience and context, which are not integrated in the level of analysis. What Balzacq 
recommends is that the level of analysis should be in three different levels, namely agents 
(that include all of the three mentioned above), acts and context (e.g. social and historical 
factors) (ibid). This would subsequently require broader methodological approaches that 
cannot be limited to speech acts observations.	  
 
As discussed in chapter 3, audiences and social context are of utmost importance for a 
more comprehensive view of securitization; subsequently, this thesis is in line with 
Balzacq’s argument that more approaches are required to empirically test the theory. 
Specifically there is a need to utilize methodological approaches that measure the role of 
audiences and social context and not just that of actors and their political discourse, 
without however at any time discounting the latter’s importance. For this reason 
approaches other than speech act observations must be utilized; it is argued here that 
interviews, focus groups, surveys and content analysis are useful tools for incorporating 
the audience and context in the analysis and for explaining and evaluating their role in the 
securitization processes.  
 
Speech acts observations are still an integral part of the methodology, albeit they are done 
in a wider manner of discourse analysis which includes, inter alia, the observation of 
images and symbols. The latter two variables are part of the ‘text’ especially when 
examined within a specific social context. As Balzacq notes, ‘text’ in the discourse 
analysis ‘does not mean written text or spoken words only. […] The notion of text points, 
indeed, to a variety of signs, including written and spoken utterances, symbols, pictures, 
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music’ (2011b: 39). Similarly (Neumann 2008) points out that in order to grasp the depth 
of the securitization process there is a need to focus on more than one kind (genre) of 
texts, at different points in time and social contexts.  
 
Overall there is a need for broader intertextutal observation mechanisms that would also 
deal with the social context and the audiences’ perceptions and behavior. Intertextualism 
creates what Hajer (1995: 56) calls ‘storylines’, which are narratives ‘that allow actors to 
draw upon various discursive categories to give meaning to specific physical or social 
phenomena’. A ‘storyline’ plays an integral role in the process of securitization since it 
holds three functions: ‘it establishes a link among signifying characteristics that point 
toward the threatening phenomenon. Second, when reified, a storyline acquires its own 
momentum by contributing to a cognitive routinization. Third, a storyline creates 
contending coalitions around contrasting sets of common understandings’ (Balzacq 
2011b: 43). These three functions essentially refer to the role of social context, as the 
latter creates specific perceptions that influence the peoples’ views on what is or should 
be a security threat. As argued in this thesis, these perceptions once internalized could 
become cognitive shortcuts that lead to routinized behavior, which in the case of 
securitization is translated into ‘automatic’ acceptance of specific securitizing acts (i.e. 
those acts that are supported by the story lines). With this in mind it becomes evident that 
a simple observation of speech acts – as the Copenhagen School suggests – cannot 
capture the importance of social context and audiences. Similarly, it can capture the 
frequency of securitizing acts – in cases for instance where there is 
routinized/institutionalized securitization – but it cannot explain why there may be such 
repetition.  
 
Observing securitizing moves through key texts (speeches, documents, etc.) is indeed 
possible and relatively easy, especially in cases where securitization is part of the 
political routines. The securitizing move, however, is just the first step of the process. 
The empirical study of the securitization process in its entirety, which goes beyond the 
initial speech act and includes the intersubjective process between the actors and the 
audiences, cannot be examined through speech acts observations only. Even the most 
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detailed examination of key texts that form the political discourse cannot capture the 
intersubjective process, or determine whether or not an act is successful, and more 
importantly why certain moves are more successful than others. Similarly, the 
observation of securitizing does not explain why certain actors repeat specific acts or why 
audiences may unquestionably accept them. For this reason other qualitative and 
quantitative methods are necessary. Process tracing and content analysis, for instance, 
allows us to explore the context and the conditions under which securitization takes place 
and whether or not securitization has indeed occurred and in what form (Balzacq 2011b: 
47). What is argued in this thesis is that quantitative approaches, such as surveys and 
opinion polls, allow us to explore internalized perceptions and link them to each case’s 
social contexts and more easily identify the potential horizontal and bottom-up forces for 
accepting or rejecting an act. 
 
The proposed mixed method approach clearly goes beyond the Copenhagen School’s 
suggestion for speech act observation, without however discounting the importance of the 
that approach. On the contrary, speech acts are closely examined in the political and 
media discourse. Five different approaches are utilized to examine the speech acts and the 
intersubjective process that follows, paying particular attention to the audiences’ role in 
this process and not just that of the securitizing actors. The proposed five approaches are 
listed below and are examined vis-à-vis the thesis’ theoretical claims in the next section. 
 
1. Content analysis: newspapers headlines  
2. Public Opinion polls  
3. Academic survey 
4. Interviews  
5. Focus groups  
 
It must be noted that the analysis for the quantitative approaches, namely the opinion 
polls, the academic survey and the press analysis, is limited to descriptive statistics as the 
aim is to describe the perceptions dominating the specific social context and acquire 
sufficient quantifiable evidence that will help us understand the impact institutionalized 
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securitization has on the different audiences. The data therefore is not used for regression 
or other statistical analyses beyond what was described above.  
 
Similarly, the thesis does not make use of any special qualitative software package (e.g. 
Nvivo, ATLAS, etc.) to analyze the content of either the newspapers or the data from the 
interviews and focus groups. All qualitative data is analyzed in an open coding way, 
where the researcher can ‘identify and even extract themes, topics, or issues in a 
systematic manner’ (Berg 2004: 180). More specifically, the open coding follows Straus’ 
suggestions (1987: 30), which allows the researcher to: i) remain open to indirect 
indicators that may support or refute a hypothesis; ii) insert theoretical notes during 
coding that help link the data with the theoretical hypothesis; iii) work without 
assumptions regarding the analytical relevance of any traditional variable such as age, sex, 
social class, etc. until the data shows its relevant. This is a particularly useful advice 
when studying securitizing acts, not least because it is almost taken for granted that it is 
the elite who perform the securitizing acts and that the impact on the public is universal, 
given the absence of multiple audiences in the mainstream reading of the theory. 
Provided that the thesis takes into account the existence of multiple audiences and the 
role of social contexts, it is imperative that it follows an open coding approach for the 
analysis of the qualitative data to determine, inter alia, who the actors and audiences are.  
 
4.1.1. Time frame of the field research  
 
The empirical part of the thesis examines the specific environment of the Cyprus conflict 
aiming to provide evidence of institutionalized and other forms of securitization. These 
observations however need not rely on historical data stretching from the commencement 
of the conflict. Indeed, more contemporary evidence makes the argument of 
institutionalization stronger, not least because constant and multi-directional 
securitization (i.e. horizontal, bottom-up and top-down) cannot be attributed to the 
immediate effect of the pivotal events – as those could have taken place years ago – but 
rather to the securitization routines on an elite and audience level that maintain a specific 
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conflictual social context. With this in mind the empirical observations are limited to the 
period 2003-2010, a period wide enough to provide the required evidence. 
 
The period 2003 – 2010 starts approximately three decades after the most important 
Greek Cypriot pivotal event (the 1974 Turkish intervention) and extents into a period 
where the conflict has become particularly ‘comfortable’ (for both sides but even more so 
for Greek Cypriots). Examining the securitization processes in such a ‘comfortable 
conflict’ environment and after a long period since the most major pivotal event helps us 
identify institutionalized securitization processes and specific political and social routines. 
The chosen period is important for the empirical analysis of the thesis for a number of 
other reasons that are not related to the 1974 pivotal event or indeed the duration of the 
conflict.  Specifically, during the 2003-2010 period a series of significant events occurred, 
including leadership changes on both sides of the Green Line, the opening of the crossing 
points for the first time in almost 30 years, and the Republic of Cyprus accession to the 
EU. All of the above are to one degree or another small pivotal events that could have 
potentially changed the securitization processes; the fact that they did not lead to 
desecuritization or even the interruption of securitization is an indication of how 
institutionalized securitization can be. Outlined below are the most significant events that 
illustrate why this period important and adequate to test the thesis’ theoretical research 
questions.26  
 
2003: In 2003 the first two crossing points opened allowing for the first time in almost 30 
years Greek and Turkish Cypriots to meet in either side of the Buffer Zone. The unilateral 
Turkish Cypriot decision to open the crossing points was the outcome of massive Turkish 
Cypriot demonstrations and public pressure regarding primarily the poor economic 
situation in the northern part of the island, but also because Greek Cypriots would join 
the EU without the Turkish Cypriots – i.e. the acqui communitaire would only apply to 
the government-controlled areas. During the same year Tassos Papadopoulos, considered 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 A much more detailed ‘time-line’ analysis of the contemporary Cypriot history is presented in chapter 5.  
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by many to be a hardliner, was elected as President of the RoC replacing the more 
moderate Glafcos Clerides.27  
 
2004: A year later, on May 1st 2004, the Republic of Cyprus became a member of the 
European Union without having first reached a settlement. A week prior to the official 
EU accession the two sides had the opportunity for the first time since the division to 
agree to a settlement in the simultaneous referenda that took place in both sides of the 
Green Line; 65% of Turkish Cypriots accepted the UN-sponsored Plan (known as the 
Annan Plan), while 76% of Greek Cypriots rejected it.  
 
2005: In 2005, the Turkish Cypriot leadership changed for the first since 1974. The more 
moderate Mehmet Ali Talat replaced the hardliner Rauf Denktaş.  
 
2008: Three years later (2008) there was yet another change in the Greek Cypriot 
leadership with the leftist and more moderate Demetris Christofias coming to power. The 
Christofias-Talat period was perceived as a golden opportunity for a settlement, given 
that both leaders are leftists and personal friends. Despite the numerous meetings the two 
leaders were unable to even come close to an agreement.  
 
2010: To make things even more difficult for a settlement, in the 2010 Turkish Cypriot 
elections Talat lost to Dervis Eroglou who, according to most foreign analysts, has 
nationalistic beliefs.28  
 
In sum, the chosen time frame includes: i) two leadership changes on each side, allowing 
an examination of how important the leadership style (e.g. pragmatist or crusader style) is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 The Guardian for instance describes Papadopoulos as a ‘69-year-old conservative […] hardliner who has 
rejected all previous UN attempts to reunify Cyprus. 
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/feb/17/eu.cyprus [accessed May 23 2008]. 
28 Indicatively, the first BBC and Guardian online news titles after the	  election	  results	  were	  “Nationalist	  Dervis	  Eroglu	  wins	  northern	  Cyprus	  elections”	  (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8627826.stm	  )	  and	  “Hardliner	  wins	  Turkish	  Cypriot	  leadership	  election”	  (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/apr/18/hardliner-­‐wins-­‐turkish-­‐cypriot-­‐election)	  respectively.	  Similarly,	  CNN’s	  first	  reaction	  to	  the	  results	  was	  that	  it	  the	  outcome	  is	  a	  “Blow	  to	  peace	  as	  nationalist	  wins	  Cyprus	  vote”	  (http://articles.cnn.com/2010-­‐04-­‐19/world/cyprus.election_1_mehmet-­‐ali-­‐talat-­‐cyprus-­‐dervis-­‐eroglu?_s=PM:WORLD).	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for securitization and how much individuals, regardless of their ideologies, are limited by 
the context in which they operate; ii) the RoC accession to the EU, which demonstrates 
that even developments that unquestionably decrease insecurity are incapable of 
significantly influencing securitization processes if the latter are institutionalized; and iii) 
the referenda on the Annan Plan, which gives us direct access to the people’s perceptions 
on why they did not want the specific settlement. The latter also allows us to examine 
whether these concerns are part of the institutionalized securitization framework. 
4.2. Methodological approaches 
 
4.2.1 Content Analysis – newspapers 
 
Part of the empirical observations takes place without any deviation from the 
Copenhagen School recommendations, namely the observation of speech acts. The first 
form of observation is through content analysis. The attention is primarily on Greek-
Cypriot newspapers, albeit other printed and online material that may be distributed to the 
public (e.g. flyers, booklets, etc.) or posted on ‘official’ government or political party 
websites, are also taken into consideration. The method followed is a mixed approach 
that includes both manifest and latent content analysis, with the former being the 
elements in the text that are countable (e.g. specific words, phrases, etc.) and the latter ‘an 
interpretive reading of the symbolism underlying the physical data’ (Berg 2004: 269). 
There is thus both a quantifiable and a qualitative part in this analysis.  
 
The press analysis will focus on the front page of the three most widely-circulated Greek 
Cypriot papers, namely Phileleftheros, Politis and Simerini, examining the conflict-
related headlines. The goal is to identify, count and ‘register’ the relevant news.29 The 
aim of this quantifiable exercise is to acquire evidence of centrality and frequency for 
specific issues. The quantification of the frequency of specific references on conflict-
relevant issues acts as an indication of routine discourse and subsequently 
institutionalization of securitization, provided the references are part of the actors’ speech 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 What qualifies as ‘relevant’ news is examined in detail below. 
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acts. The same analysis also aims to interpret any potential ‘sub-texts’ and underlying 
meanings or messages related to specific threats. The non-explicit references (i.e. sub-
texts) may not qualify as speech acts in the mainstream reading of the theory, as they may 
not follow the ‘security grammar’. However, they contribute towards the internalization 
of threats by connoting the existence of threats, or by creating an environment where 
speech acts can more easily have an impact when they are articulated using the proper 
security grammar. For instance, creating a context where external actors – such as the UK 
or the US for example – are perceived as untrustworthy, allows for easier securitization 
of current and future British and American proposals. In addition, in an environment 
where threats are already internalized, a connotation (i.e. sub-text) as opposed to an 
explicit reference to a potential threat may be sufficient to securitize a referent object or a 
development. The frequency of explicit references and the analysis of sub-texts offer a 
quantifiable measurement of ‘centrality’ of the conflict. Centrality refers to how ‘central’, 
how important, specific conflict-related issues and the Problem in its entirety are for the 
Greek Cypriot population. Centrality is an important variable that influences the process 
of horizontal, bottom-up and subsequently involuntary securitization; the more central an 
issue is the more ‘active’ these modes of securitization will be.  
 
The content quantification therefore is split into two parts: the first part is a measurement 
of the frequency in which conflict-related news appears as headlines or receive particular 
attention in the first page of the chosen newspapers. The second is the grouping of those 
headlines into fourteen different categories. This exercise demonstrates how central the 
conflict is for Greek Cypriots even 30-40 years after the pivotal event of 1974 and 
importantly it identifies which issues are repeatedly portrayed as threats, examining at the 
same time how securitization takes place in the media – e.g. how specific ‘loaded’ 
phrases are used and what kind of pressure mechanisms the media utilizes to influence 
elite and public alike. The quantification and measurement of conflict-related issues in 
the press also allows for the identification of institutionalization mechanisms and more 
specifically how ongoing and potential threats are connected to the social context; how, 
for instance, perceived threats are tailored to the Cypriot society to make them appear 
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more threatening than they could potentially be and how they are formulated in a way 
that allows for continuity and repetition of that discourse.  
 
The examination of routine references also tests the hypothesis that once securitization 
becomes institutionalized and threats internalized, media agents (as securitizing actors) 
may need to engage in involuntary acts. This could be the case because, as Vultee (2011: 
79) notes, ‘media learn from audiences even as audiences learn from media’. For our case 
this means that it is not just audiences that are influenced by the media, but also the 
reverse: when audiences consider something to be of utmost importance – e.g. an 
existential threat (irrespective of why this is the case) – they expect that the media will 
pay attention to it. Thus, in environments where securitization is institutionalized and the 
audiences constantly perceive certain issues to be a threat, the media inevitably has to 
deal with these perceived threats.  
 
4.2.1.1. Choice of newspapers 
 
All Greek Cypriot newspapers deal with the Cyprus problem on a daily basis, dedicating 
a minimum of three pages to report the developments on the negotiation process or to 
host relevant interviews by local and foreign actors. The articles related to the Cyprus 
conflict for the period under study is literally in the tens of thousands making it 
essentially impossible and rather meaningless to examine all the papers and articles for an 
eight-year period. The focus therefore is on only the three most circulated daily Greek 
Cypriot newspapers, namely Phileleftheros, Politis, and Simerini and more specifically 
on their headline news as they appear in the front page. That said, some articles of 
particular importance from the inner pages are also examined, albeit not in a systematic 
quantitative manner.30 Focusing on the front page has several advantages with the most 
important being the ability to quantify the importance of conflict-related news in a 
meaningful way, given that the alternative – examining the entire paper – would not 
provide meaningful results. This is because each paper dedicates a section on the Cyprus 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Articles of particular importance could be, for instance, interviews of political elites and/or other key 
local and foreign players in the conflict, such as the President of the Republic, the UN Special Envoy in 
Cyprus, the US Secretary of State, etc. 
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problem on a daily basis making it thus extremely difficult to identify the important from 
the less important issues. Similarly, such an analysis would have no statistical value 
given that Cyprus Problem related news appear in the paper every single day. Issues that 
appear as headline news, however, by definition are considered to be (for the paper and 
potentially for the audience at least) of particular importance and thus deserve more 
attention.  
 
The papers were chosen based on their circulation (i.e. they are the three most popular 
papers) and on the fact that they frequently have different perspectives on the 
development of the conflict negotiations and on which elite is more capable to negotiate a 
settlement. More specifically, Phileleftheros, the largest paper in circulation, traditionally 
presents and supports the government positions, even though the latest Christofias 
government is an exception. The paper was also very much against the Annan Plan 
during the critical period of the referenda. Politis, the second paper in circulation, was the 
only major newspaper in favor of the Annan Plan and has been very critical of the former 
President Tassos Papadopoulos and all the elite who did not support the Plan. In the post-
2004 period the paper criticizes the elite with the so-called hardline positions. On exactly 
the opposite side is Simerini, the third largest paper in circulation, which is considered by 
many to hold a nationalistic position and criticizes any elite who is not negotiating ‘hard 
enough’. These three papers when combined cover, essentially, all the different views in 
the Greek Cypriot side and over 70% of the circulation.31 Of the three, Simerini is the 
only paper owned by a local ‘media giant’, Mr. Hadjicostis, who also owns, inter alia, a 
television station (Sigma) and a radio station (Radio Proto). It must be noted that none of 
the three papers, or their owners, openly support a specific party or politician, and vice 
versa; no political party owns or openly supports any of the three papers.  
 
The fact that the three papers combined cover the vast majority of the media positions on 
the Problem and because these papers are situated in ideologically opposing camps vis-à-
vis the conflict, allows for a rather holistic examination of the impact institutionalized 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Data provided by Mr. Michalakis Adamides, Director of the Kronos Press Agency, the agency in charge 
of 80% of the distribution of the local press in Cyprus.	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securitization has on the Greek Cypriot media and the reverse; the impact the printed 
media has on securitization processes. Specifically, the argument is that regardless of 
ideological differences the primary variable determining the securitization processes is 
the social context, which dictates what should be securitized. In other words, if papers 
with opposing positions on the (handing of the) Problem still securitize the same issues 
and in a similar manner we have a clear indication that once the process becomes 
institutionalized, desecuritization of specific issues is particularly difficult, even decades 
after the pivotal event. Similarly, an argument could be made that the bottom-up forces 
and audiences’ expectations to see specific issues dominate the media is too powerful for 
any newspaper (regardless of ideology) to ignore, leading thus again to ‘involuntary’ 
securitization.  
 
4.2.1.2. Headline categories 
 
The data from the three papers was taken for the period July 1st 2003 to December 31st 
2009, a period of 78 months or the equivalent of 2,356 days. 32 To avoid seasonal biases 
these 78 months were equally divided among the three papers, meaning that each of the 
three papers was examined for a total of 26 months. Table 4.1 below shows the 
distribution of the 78 months among the three papers indicating the even distribution in 
terms of quantity (i.e. same number of months), as well as in terms of time (i.e. year of 
examination). Specifically, I did not examine the same month (e.g. January) for the same 
paper (e.g. Phileleftheros), for two consecutive years. Similarly, each paper was 
examined at least two times for the same month (e.g. January) during the 78 months. For 
instance, there were a total of 6 ‘Aprils’ during the examination period. Each paper 
received two ‘Aprils’, but never in consecutive years: Phileleftheros was examined for 
the April of 2006 and 2008; Politis for 2005 and 2007 and Simerini for 2004 and 2009. 
This way I eliminated any seasonal biases such as the Turkish invasion that is 
‘remembered’ every July or the Annan Plan every April.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 This part of the research took place at the Press and Information Office (PIO) of the RoC, which 
digitized in microfilms the papers for the period under examination. The digital forms of the papers were 
available from July 1 2003 onwards. This is the reason why the examination did not start from January 1st 
2003; the papers from January 1st to June 30th were not digitized. 
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Table 4. 1: Newspapers distribution for the 78-month period 	  
Month / Paper Phileleftheros Politis Simerini 
January 2004; 2007 2006; 2009 2005; 2008 
February 2004; 2007 2006; 2008 2005; 2009 
March 2006; 2009 2005; 2007 2004; 2008 
April 2006; 2008 2005; 2007 2004; 2009 
May 2005; 2008 2004; 2006 2007; 2009 
June 2005; 2009 2006; 2008 2004; 2007 
July 2003; 2006 2005; 2007; 2009 2004; 2008 
August 2003; 2006; 2009 2005; 2008 2004; 2007 
September 2004; 2007 2003; 2008 2005; 2006; 2009 
October 2004; 2007; 2009 2003; 2006 2005; 2008 
November 2005; 2008 2004; 2006; 2003; 2007; 2009 
December 2005; 2008 2004; 2006; 2009 2003; 2007 
 
Once the distribution was determined, I examined the first page for each of the assigned 
papers and quantified the headline news that were relevant to the Cyprus conflict. To 
qualify as ‘relevant’ two conditions had to be met: i) the actual headline of the first page 
had to be related to the Problem, or ii) the first page had to include least two minor 
references. The first case refers to the main headline, including the main title that usually 
appears in bold and bigger letters and makes reference to the most important issue for 
that day. The latter case refers to two or more minor references with at least a few lines of 
analysis, meaning it occupied some significant space in the front page, enough for the 
reader to make sense of the news. In that case the day ‘qualified’ and was thus coded as a 
‘day that had conflict-related headlines’. Any reference to related issues without any 
elaboration – meaning a few lines of analysis – did not qualify as minor headline news. 
The codification was binary, ‘1’ for the ‘relevant days’ and ‘0’ for the ‘non-relevant’ 
ones.   
 
The reason why the second condition needed two or more minor references to qualify as 
a ‘relevant day’, as opposed to just one, was to give value to the quantification of the 
news. Given that some minor reference on the Cyprus problem appears on the front page 
almost every day, there was a need to create a distinction between the daily and ‘expected 
reference’ to the Problem and the days that paid particular attention to the Problem – i.e. 
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the days the paper considered the Problem-related news to be the most important news 
for that day.  
 
Figure 4.1. and 4.2. are indicative front pages of Politis newspaper (January 2012) that 
demonstrate the test for ‘qualification’ mentioned above. Example-Figure 4.1. did not 
qualify as a ‘relevant day’, whereas example-Figure 4.2. is indicative of a day that 
‘qualified’. 
 
Figure 4. 1. Indicative front page of an ‘unqualified’ day 
 
 
 
Source: www.politis.com.cy  
 
In this case the headline reference (i.e. the bold and capital letters at the very top of the 
page) is ‘ΣΕ ΑΝΑΖΗΤΗΣΗ ενεργειακού µοντέλου’ (translated ‘ΙΝ QUEST for an 
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energy model’). Minor references are the three other items of news in the “boxes” below 
the headline news. Only one of these boxes refers to the Cyprus conflict: “Φεύγει η 
«ΤΔΒΚ», έρχεται το «τ/κ κράτος»” (translated as ‘“TRNC” is leaving, “T/C state” is 
coming’. In this case for instance this front page would not qualify as ‘relevant’ because 
the headline is not in regards to the Cyprus conflict and there is only one ‘minor 
reference’. 
 
Figure 4. 2. Indicative front page of a ‘qualified’ day 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: www.politis.com.cy 
 
In the example above the main title says ‘ΡΕΚΒΙΕΜ ΣΤΟ ΚΥΠΡΙΑΚΟ’ (translated 
‘REQUIEM FOR THE CYPRUS PROBLEM’) and continues with a sub-title indicating 
that it is up to the UN whether the negotiation process will end or continue. It then 
presents Dervis’ Eroglou position on rotating presidency, Demetris Christofias’ position 
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on land redistribution and a view that Turkey is indifferent (to the Problem) as the EU 
accession prospects vanished. This front page would qualify as a ‘relevant day’ since the 
main title is relevant to the Problem. This paper would also qualify even if the main title 
was not in regards to the Problem because it has three minor relevant references.  
 
The quantification was a two-step process: first, as mentioned, all ‘relevant’ days 
received a code of ‘1’ and those that did not qualify received a ‘0’; the second step was to 
categorize all the news from the days that received a ‘1’. The first step aimed to quantify 
on one hand the frequency of references to the Cyprus problem in the first page of the 
three most popular papers, so as to indicate how central the Problem still is for the Greek 
Cypriot community. Indeed, there was reference (as defined above) to the Problem in two 
out of every three days (65% or 1,506 out of 2,323 ‘valid’ days), indicating that the 
Problem is still extremely central for the media and evidently for the people as well.33 
The second step was to analyze the 1,506 ‘qualified’ days and examine the reference(s) 
for each day, grouping them into several categories.34 The number of categories was not 
pre-determined as it was unknown how many categories would emerge from the analysis. 
At the end of the analysis it became obvious that there is significant repetition on the 
issues that appear as headline news, allowing thus the categorization of a total of 1,907 
references into only 14 different categories. These categories are examined in detail in 
chapter 6.  
 
The categorization and the fact that all references could be categorized in just 14 different 
groups is of particular importance for the thesis as it solidly demonstrates that the conflict 
and the related threats are treated in a routinized manner. As argued in chapter 6, this 
routinized behavior is both the cause of institutionalized securitization as well as the 
outcome of it. These issues are also the ones that essentially define the social context in 
which securitization takes place. It is also worth noting that this analysis indicates that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Chapter 6 provides a detailed statistical analysis of the references and the different categories. The term 
‘valid’ days refers to the days there were newspapers. Three times a year there are no newspapers (January 
2nd, Easter Monday and May 2nd). Those days were not taken into consideration. 34	  Given that each ‘relevant day’ could have more than one reference to the Problem, and all references 
were recorded, for the 1,506 ‘qualified’ days there were 1,907 references.	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same issues are being re-securitized in the media irrespective of the paper’s orientation 
towards the problem. Moreover, these same issues are also the ones that are discussed in 
political discourses and are the ones appearing as important in public opinions, indicating 
again how they are part of the overall social context of the community.  
 
The press analysis therefore provides quantifiable as well as qualitative data that supports 
the thesis hypotheses regarding the prospects for institutionalized securitization. It also 
emphasizes the importance of social context and helps explain why horizontal and 
bottom-up pressures are likely to occur in environments that are dominated by conflict-
perpetuating discourses and routines.  
 
4.2.2. Opinion Polls 
 
Opinion polls are not usually used as a securitization analysis tool. Balzacq (2011b: 42), 
in line with the Buzan et al (1998), points out that public polls act more as indicators 
rather than evidence of the prominence of an issue. Be that as it may, polls could still 
become part of the process if securitizing actors use them for their acts (ibid). What is 
argued here is that opinion polls could also be used in another way, namely as a 
measurement of the audience demand for specific issues to be treated as threats. This, in 
turn, could act as an indication of how much bottom-up pressure elites would expect to 
face should they deviate from the public perceptions on important (for them) security 
issues. 
4.2.2.1. Public opinion polls 
 
The thesis uses numerous opinions polls conducted by several third parties, such as 
television stations, NGOs, newspapers, etc., over the years under examination. These 
polls provide a vital source of information regarding the public view on what constitutes 
a threat for each community; information that is important for at least two reasons. The 
first reason concerns the ‘persistence’ of threats – i.e. different opinion polls in different 
years yield the same results. This is an indication that some threats are indeed 
internalized and remain unchanged regardless of the developments. As discussed in 
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chapter 6, this is indeed the case in Cyprus and this raises the question on whether this 
persistence is the outcome of routine securitization that allows for the perpetuation of 
specific threats even though those threats may seem ‘outdated’ given the developments 
(e.g. EU accession) since the pivotal events.  
 
The second reason why these polls are important is because they allow us to examine 
whether actors securitize the same issues that the public already considers as a threat or 
under threat. In other words, it examines whether actors securitize issues that do not 
really need to be securitized, as the audience already accepts them as existential threats. 
This is done by juxtaposing specific securitizing acts from the press with the public views 
as portrayed in the opinion polls. As discussed in chapter 6, actors do indeed securitize 
issues that are already considered to be existential threats, raising the question of why 
elites need to do that. What is claimed here is that they do not really have an option either 
because they fail to see the alternatives or they are unwilling to suffer significant political 
costs. 
 
There are several opinion polls for the desired period from a number of different sources. 
The focus is on opinion polls that took place over the period 2009-2011: 
 
1. Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS): “A People’s Peace in Cyprus” (March 
– April 2009) 
2. Cyprus2015: “Examining the Future”, (December 2009) 
3. Cyprus2015 (in cooperation with CEPS and PRIO): “Public Opinion and the 
Property Issue: Quantitative Findings”, (2009)  
4. ANT1: “Cyprus Barometer” (every three months from January 2009 to April 2011)  
 
All the chosen opinion polls have been conducted by reputable organizations and the 
output of these polls are uncontested both within and across each community. Half of 
them, and more specifically the ones conducted by Cyprus2015 and CEPS, are bi-
communal and were carried out by the two most prominent Cypriot statisticians, 
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Alexandros Lordos (Greek Cypriot) and Mete Hattay (Turkish Cypriot), eliminating thus 
potential biases. 35  
 
As discussed also in detail in chapter 6, the issues covered in almost all surveys are the 
same: 1) security; 2) property; 3) governance; 4) rights and freedom of movement; 5) 
economy; 6) territory and settlers; and 7) issues of trust (e.g. which 
institutions/parties/people the public trusts the most). These are also most of the issues 
that appear in the press as front-page news indicating thus a correlation between the 
public and press perceptions on important issues vis-à-vis the Cyprus Problem. 
 
4.2.2.2. Academic survey 
 
Despite the usefulness of the aforementioned opinion polls, their design was not tailored 
to answer securitization related questions. For the purposes of this thesis therefore there 
was a need to get more ‘targeted information’ through a customized survey. Provided it 
was financially unfeasible to carry out a survey on the entire population, a survey was 
designed and carried out for one specific audience, namely the Greek Cypriot academia.36 
The survey was distributed electronically to almost the entire academic community in the 
Republic of Cyprus controlled areas.37  
 
The survey was designed to examine the prospects and degree of institutionalized, 
horizontal and involuntary securitization. Without using the words ‘threat’, 
‘securitization’ or other similar ‘loaded’ terms, the goal was to understand on one hand 
the reasons why Greek Cypriots accept, many times unquestionably, the perpetuation of 
specific threats and on the other whether they themselves engage in (horizontal or 
bottom-up) securitization. The questions were also designed in a way that would provide 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Opinion polls that were conducted by both Greek and Turkish Cypriot researchers are more likely to be 
less biased both in terms of the phrasing of the questions and in terms of statistical ‘manipulations’. 36	  The survey was designed using kwiksurvey online software, available at www.kwiksurvey.com. 	  37	  The term academic community refers to the six universities (3 public and 3 private) operating in the 
government-controlled areas and numerous research centers, seeking (anonymous) input from teaching and 
research faculty (not students). The goal was to reach all research centers in the government controlled 
areas. Given that the vast majority of research centers operate within or cooperate with universities, it is 
safe to assume that the survey has reached the vast majority of academics in the Greek Cypriot community.	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information on whether or not there are institutionalized threats and horizontal pressures 
that influence the specific audience’s behavior.  
 
Specifically, a set of questions focused on the reasons why some academics chose not to 
cooperate with Turkish Cypriots, identifying thus the perceived threats revolving around 
bi-communal cooperation. These threats would then be juxtaposed to the routinely 
securitized issues as observed in the political and social discourses to determine whether 
and how the institutionalized securitization processes influence the perceptions of this 
particular audience regarding specific issues and threats. Another set of questions aimed 
to identify the kinds of actual and expected pressure academics faced or thought they 
would face from their colleagues and/or family and friends if they cooperated with 
Turkish Cypriots. This would provide indications of actual horizontal and top-down 
securitization, as well as evidence of ‘expected’ securitization. Lastly, another set of 
questions examined directly whether academics themselves would apply pressure to 
colleagues who have cooperated with Turkish Cypriots, or would like to do so, measuring 
thus the degree of horizontal securitization within the specific audience. Discounting 
therefore the demographic questions, all others were designed to explicitly measure 
whether or not there is institutionalized and other forms of securitization and the impact 
they have on this audience’s behavior.  
 
The choice of academics as an audience was not random. On one hand, it is one of the 
few audiences that are relatively easily accessible, as opposed to for instance business 
people, civil servants, etc. On the other hand, it is an audience that traditionally 
cooperates with Turkish Cypriots, which subsequently means they are more directly 
affected by (and potentially affect) securitization routines – as opposed to other audiences 
that may never have, or needed to, cooperate with the ‘other’. In addition, it would be 
particularly interesting to see how routine securitization could potentially influence the 
most highly educated audience in any society (i.e. the academic community).  
 
The survey was entitled ‘cooperation across the divide’ and was comprised of 35 
questions. The structure of the survey was ‘dynamic’ in the sense that it had 
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‘dichotomous’ questions and depending on the answer the participant would be directed 
to a specific set of questions, skipping at the same time another set of questions; thus no 
participant would actually answer all 35 questions. The main dichotomous question was 
whether he or she cooperated with academics from the Turkish Cypriot community. 
Those who answered ‘yes’ would answer one set of questions and those who answered 
‘no’ a different one. Other questions, including the demographics ones, were common for 
all participants. The entire survey can be found in Appendix III. 
 
It is estimated that the total academic population under examination does not exceed 
1000 individuals. Approximately 15% of them completed the survey, providing thus a 
sample size of 148 academics. This means that the data gathered offers a statistically 
significant outcome for the given population, providing thus additional quantifiable 
evidence on the institutionalization of securitization and significant evidence of the 
existence of horizontal and involuntary processes. These outcomes corroborate the 
findings from the qualitative data gathered from the interviews and focus groups. 
 
4.2.3. Interviews  
 
The examination of securitization is essentially an examination of political processes. 
However, such processes are not always accompanied by documentation making 
therefore their study difficult. The lack of documentation, as Tansey points out, could be 
either because people ‘feel their actions are not important enough to merit recording them, 
or instead feel they are too sensitive to document in written form’ (2007: 767). The use of 
interviews could bypass the problem of insufficient documentation, by acquiring 
knowledge that is not available in written form, and thus contribute to our understanding 
of the incentives and reasoning behind political processes. For securitization processes, 
especially the routinized ones, the use of interviews seem to be even more essential given 
that elite may not re-iterate in written form positions that are already documented and 
accepted within a society. Similarly, interviews can help identify the incentives behind 
elites’ and audiences’ actions as well as the impact a social context has on their 
perceptions and subsequently on securitization.  
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Interviews thus are useful in corroborating the quantitative findings of the other 
approaches used in this thesis. Provided therefore that interviews are used primarily to 
corroborate the other empirical findings, they are only a small part of the empirical 
analysis tools used for this thesis, especially when compared to other more elaborate 
approaches such as the press analysis and the survey. 
 
Interview structure: All interviews are semi-structured or semi-standardized. Following 
Berg’s definition the semi-standardized interviews are: i) more or less structured; ii) the 
wording of the questions is flexible; iii) the level of language is adjustable; and iv) the 
interviewer may answer questions for clarification purposes (Berg 2004: 79). Most 
questions are open-ended so as to allow for the interviewee to fully articulate his/her 
response and maximize the response validity. As Aberbach and Rockman (2002: 674) 
note, open-ended questions allow the ‘respondents to organize their answers within their 
own framework. This increases the validity of the responses’. It must be noted that given 
that the aim of these interviews was to corroborate data from other sources and to register 
in a broad manner the incentives behind elite and other individuals actions, coupled with 
the fact that only a few interviews were conducted, the transcriptions were not used in a 
quantifiable way. There was no effort, in other words, to determine how many times a 
specific word or phrase was used, as the small number of interviews would not yield any 
statistically significant results.  
 
Interview Venue: It was up to the interviewees to decide the venue the interview would 
take place. All of them took place at the premises where the interviewee works (e.g. 
political party offices, government office, universities, etc.) or at a ‘neutral’ place such as 
coffee shops. The ones with Greek Cypriots were conducted in Greek and the ones with 
Turkish Cypriots in English. All interviews were recorded – with the permission of the 
interviewees – with one exception, the Chief of Fire Service who asked not to be 
recorded. A list of interviews is provided in Appendix I. 
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4.2.4. Focus groups  
 
Complementing the qualitative data from the interviews, a series of bi-communal focus 
groups were organized that brought together Greek and Turkish Cypriots from five 
different sectors of the society, namely, i) artists, ii) NGOs, iii) academics, iv) high-
school students, v) civil servants. The overall goal was to examine whether and how 
perceptions regarding threats are different among different sets of audiences within the 
same community. The specific aim was to determine whether routinized securitization 
influences different sets of audiences the same way and more specifically whether 
horizontal and ‘involuntary’ securitization is universal across the society.  
 
Focus groups have one main advantage over interviews, namely that they allow the 
observer to examine individual behavior and his/her responses, albeit not in a private 
setting but in one with peers. It was thus interesting to observe whether individuals would 
feel constrained or pressured not to deviate from the ‘accepted’ mainstream positions 
dominating the society. These observations contribute to our understanding on how 
effective peer-to-peer securitization could be and they provided corroborating evidence 
for the academic survey findings. 
 
The focus group discussions were conducted in English, as there were both Greek and 
Turkish Cypriot participants. As with the interviews, the focus groups had a semi-
structured form with some fixed questions for each group and some that developed ad 
hoc based on issues raised by the participants. I coordinated and chaired the focus groups 
workshops. As a moderator I controlled the discussions in the sense that I changed the 
direction and even interrupted the debates when necessary so as not to deviate far from 
the goal. 
 
The five focus group meetings took place from the June 2009 to January 2010 and were 
hosted at the University of Nicosia. Each session lasted for approximately two hours and 
all of them were recorded with the consent of all participants. What must be noted is that 
these focus groups were part of an EU-sponsored program for which I personally drafted 
the proposal and coordinated the project for that entire year. The Host Organization for 
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the program was the Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs - University of 
Nicosia. The results of the program could be used for the dissertation as part of the 
dissemination activities of the project. 
 
Appendix II has a list of the focus groups along with the details regarding the number and 
‘nature’ of participants (e.g. artists, academics, etc.). 
4.3. Use of non-verbal data  
 
As Williams (2003) argues, the study of securitization through speech acts alone is 
insufficient, not least because a big part of the political communication is conducted 
through televisual media and images. As the argument goes, the use of images may be 
particularly important in the dramatization of issues and thus in the process of 
securitization.  
 
In this thesis an argument is made that images are not only used for additional 
dramatization of a speech act, but also could act as substitutes for speech acts. Images, I 
argue, are capable under certain conditions to securitize an issue without the ‘support’ of 
speech acts. This is especially the case when securitization is institutionalized and 
perceived threats are well-internalized among the audiences. Under such conditions 
visual images could be used to remind the audience that something is a specific threat and 
not to convince them; hence there is no need to follow the security grammar of speech 
acts. In addition, the fact that actors choose to use visual images without engaging at the 
same time in the regular speech-act securitization, is also an indication of how 
institutionalized and routine the process could become and more importantly how 
‘conditioned’ the audiences could be to accept securitizing acts (again without the use of 
a specific security grammar).  
 
The study of visual images, therefore, has a lot to offer to our understanding of 
institutionalized securitization. With this in mind the thesis examines images from: 
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i. Billboards (especially during election periods) ii. Flyers handed out to the public (either directly or as part of a package with 
newspapers and/or other printed material) iii. Images used during political advertisements in televised spots iv. Images from newspapers v. Images used in the printed media (newspapers and magazines) 
 
What must be noted is that, unlike the press analysis, the aim is not to quantify this data 
and produce any form of statistical analysis. While there is an abundance of data (a data 
set of over 300 pictures is gathered for the purpose of the thesis), the aim is not to focus 
exclusively on how images are used in the securitization process, but rather simply to 
provide additional evidence of how the process changes once institutionalized. 
4.4. Ethical Issues 
 
The ethical concerns of the thesis revolve around one issue, namely that of anonymity 
and the right not to be recorded. Particular attention is given to the wish of some 
interviewees to maintain their anonymity. As they noted, this was particularly important 
to them in order to speak freely. The names of the individuals who wished to maintain 
their anonymity appear in the thesis as a single letter, which represents the first letter of 
their first name. For instance, Constantinos Adamides would appear as “C”.  
  
Only one interviewer preferred that our meeting would not be recorded, which obviously 
was not. All others (interviewees and focus group participants) consented to being 
recorded. Lastly, all of the participants in the focus groups and all the interviewees were 
informed in written that the data they provided will be used for this dissertation, either 
with or without their names, depending on their preference. 
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Chapter	  5:	  Ethnic	  Conflicts	  and	  the	  Cyprus	  Problem	  	  
 
The absence of social context and the importance it could have on the securitization 
processes were examined in chapters 2 and 3 respectively. What has been argued is that 
there are environments in which the social context creates fertile ground for 
institutionalized, bottom-up and horizontal securitization as they allow for the creation of 
conflict-perpetuating routines that support and are supported by routinized and eventually 
institutionalized securitization processes. This chapter examines one specific kind of such 
environments, namely that of ‘protracted ethnic conflicts’ and explores the reasons why 
they create the most suitable conditions for the development of institutionalized and other 
forms of securitization. The chapter then presents a historical overview of the case study 
– the Cyprus conflict – which as argued is an indicative protracted ethnic conflict. At the 
same time it provides the necessary background information for the next chapter, which 
tests empirically the theoretical hypotheses as set out earlier in chapter 3.  
5.1. Ethnic Conflicts 	  
Fisher defines conflict as ‘a social situation involving perceived incompatibilities in goals 
or values between two or more parties, attempts by the parties to control each other, and 
antagonistic feelings by parties towards each other’ (1990: 6). An ‘ethnic’ conflict is one 
where the incompatible goals are defined by at least one side in ‘ethnic’ terms and the 
confrontation is due to ethnic distinctions (Cordell and Wolff 2009: 4-5; Kaufmann 1996: 
138).38  
 
The term ethnic conflict, and subsequently the aforementioned definition, is contested 
and its usefulness is questioned. Gilley (2004: 1158) for instance cautions that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 It is worth noting that there is not a single ‘category’ of ethnic conflicts. Indeed, there seems to be an 
over-categorization of ethnic conflicts with multiple terms such as ‘ethnopolitical conflicts’ (e.g. Gurr 
1994), ‘communal conflicts’ (e.g. Gurr et al. 2000), ‘protracted social conflicts’ (e.g. Azar 1983; 1990), 
‘deep rooted conflicts’ (e.g. Burton 1987) and ‘identity-based conflicts’ (e.g. Rothman 2001; Gartzke 2006). 
Many of the characteristics of these conflicts are the same, or very similar, and they all incorporate, to some 
degree, the variable of ethnicity in their definitions. 	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existence of ‘ethnic markers’ in a political conflict are not sufficient to label such 
conflicts as ‘ethnic’.  He then argues that the term ‘ethnic conflict’ is not particularly 
useful, unless ethnicity is actually the cause of a conflict (ibid). While the challenge is 
acknowledged, the abovementioned definition is particularly useful for identifying 
specific kinds of conflicts where new or ongoing areas of contention are analyzed vis-à-
vis the ethnic identity of the opposing parties.39 In such cases, and while it may not 
always be clear if ethnicity is the sole cause of a conflict, the term ‘ethnic conflict’ is 
useful for describing the framework in which the two sides (and other actors) identify the 
conflict.  
 
The specific definition is also particularly useful when examining how ethnic conflicts 
could create a securitization-fertile context. The abovementioned definition views the 
conflict in relative terms, meaning that it is examined as part of a context with 
constructed perceptions of enemies, incompatible positions and hostile attempts, and not 
in ‘absolute’ terms that require the presence of ‘fixed’ variables such as violence. Viewed 
this way, conflicts – and especially ethnic ones – may develop or remain unresolved 
because of new or ongoing perceptions regarding threats deriving from an ‘enemy other’ 
and not necessarily because there is violence, as it is frequently assumed (Kriesberg 
1998).40 The presence of exclusive identities of ‘us’ and ‘enemy-them’ – frequently 
found in conflicts that are defined along ethnic lines – could be a particularly useful tool 
for actors wishing to generate and perpetuate a conflict. Specifically, actors who can 
manipulate identities into exclusive positions (Crawford and Lipschutz 1997: 168) can 
then use these identities as a ‘mobilizing force’, as is evident from a number of cases 
such as Tibet, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia (Buzan 1991: 72). Lake and Rothchild 
(1996:41) hold a similar position arguing that intense ethnic conflict is the outcome of 
collective fears of the future, which is used or developed by political entrepreneurs and 
others groups to polarize society. Polarization and the presence of exclusive identities – 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 For instance, in the case of Cyprus all the issues of contention – including those of economic, 
environmental and social nature – are identified in terms of ethnicity, namely Greek and Turkish Cypriots.  
40 As Fearon and Laitin point out in their seminal work, violence is the exception in most ongoing conflicts 
rather than the rule (1996: 716). 
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which lead inter alia to zero sum mentalities – can more easily lead to the emergence or 
perpetuation of conflict.  
 
The presence of exclusive identities is part of social contexts with exclusive social groups 
in which some individuals may be denied access (Tajfel 1978, 1981). In such contexts the 
value one attributes to being a ‘member’ influences one’s behavior towards the 
‘outsiders’, meaning that it is essentially the group’s identity that dictates how the ‘other’ 
and the ‘self’ are perceived, namely as friends or foes (Horowitz 1985). These 
perceptions revolve around the relative worth and legitimacy of one group vis-à-vis 
another, and could lead to struggles for group domination with the use of instrumental 
and symbolic power (ibid). As Horowitz notes, power in ethnically divided societies is 
not only used as a ‘means to an end’, but also as an ‘end in itself’, and this is done for 
two reasons: to confirm a group’s worth and to safeguard a group’s survival (ibid). The 
need to confirm a group’s worth is also unavoidably linked to the need for recognition, 
which, according to Lindemann (2010), is needed for emotional reasons, namely to 
increase one’s self esteem and avoid shame, and for cognitive reasons, namely to 
reinforce one’s identity through the confirmation of significant others.  
 
The presence of exclusive identities therefore could lead to the development and the 
perpetuation of conflicts by perpetuating a struggle of ‘us’ versus ‘them’. More 
importantly for this thesis is that such exclusive identities with the equally exclusive 
perceptions regarding ‘enemy-others’ and specific threats are part of the environment in 
which securitization takes place. These perceptions and the constant need to maintain the 
distinction of ‘our’ identity from that of the ‘others’ can lead to institutionalized, bottom-
up and horizontal securitization, which in turn contribute to the perpetuation and 
internalization of these perceptions, creating thus a vicious cycle.  
 
The struggle for actual or symbolic domination in ethnically pluralist societies often leads 
to long-term and persistent ethnic hatreds. In ethnic conflicts these antipathies are so 
strong that they can ‘survive even the powerful solvent of modernization’ and contribute 
to the perpetuation of ethnic antagonisms (Horowitz 1985: 97-98). The importance of 
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these ongoing ethnic antagonisms is that they allow for the development of mass 
hostilities (Kaufman 1996) and the opportunistic revival of memories of century-old 
conflicts and fears to ‘fit contemporary conditions’ (Horowitz 1985). Indeed, as 
demonstrated in the next chapter, historical fears and animosities are frequently used 
opportunistically as tools to securitize contemporary issues. In intra-state conflicts 
historical experiences are used to determine the intentions of the ‘other’ and thus evaluate 
the security status of each side (i.e. how much of a threat is the ‘other’) in contemporary 
times (Posen 1993: 30); consequently, if past experiences have been negative they are 
likely to increase the security dilemma between the two sides.41 The impact of past 
experiences on elite and audiences decision-making mechanisms becomes greater if those 
experiences are part of an ethnic myth-symbol complex as they become part of the 
people’s identities (Kaufman 2001) and as such can be more easily used by political 
entrepreneurs or securitizing actors. This is also the ‘problem’ with the use of historical 
experiences as they may often be ‘misleading’, ‘inaccurate’ and subject to exaggeration 
and manipulation (Posen 1993: 31). That said, and regardless of the accuracy of historical 
experiences, what matters for cases of securitization is that actors use these ‘real’ or 
‘constructed’ experiences as tools to securitize contemporary issues.  
 
An ethnic conflict environment becomes even more important for securitization if it is 
also intractable. The longer a conflict remains intractable the more likely it is for 
perceived threats – related to the ‘enemy-other’ – to become internalized and part of the 
people’s identities, making at the same time the already exclusive identities even more 
rigid. Long-term conflicts also allow for development of political and social routines that 
focus on the conflict that lead to the creation of a suitable social context for 
institutionalized securitization.42  
 
Intractable conflicts are often considered to be deep conflicts which, as opposed to 
disputes and arguments found in tractable conflicts, they are based on the actual or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 For a review on the role of structure on security dilemmas see Roe (1999). 42	  While intractability is a very ‘useful’ variable it not ‘necessary’ for the development of institutionalized 
securitization. The latter could take place even in non-conflict environments where there are persistent 
(perceived) threats, such as uncontrolled or unwanted immigration.	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perceived identity incompatibilities of the disputants (Rothman 2001: 295). These deep 
incompatibilities contribute to the intractability of the conflict and create a number of 
distinguishable characteristics, which are listed below in brief. According to Bar-Tal 
(1998, 2000), intractable conflicts are:  
 
(a) Protracted, which means that they have remained unresolved for at least for a 
generation.  
(b) Irreconcilable, meaning that each side’s goals are diametrically opposite. 
(c) Violent (or at least could be / or have been), even though the presence of violence 
need not be continuous.  
(d) Of a zero-sum nature, which creates the perception that any gain of one side must 
automatically be a loss for the other.  
(e) Total, meaning that what is (perceived to be) at stake is the existence of one or both 
sides. 
 (f) Central, meaning that members of society, elite and public alike, are constantly 
preoccupied by it.  
 (g) Characterized by the fact that some, or all, parties involved in the conflict have an 
interest in its continuation. This could be because of the economic, military or 
psychological investments that have already been made due to the conflict. 
 
The last point and more specifically the psychological investment is of particular 
importance for the thesis and is worth some more attention. The psychological aspect of 
the parties’ involvement in the conflict is central when analyzing the reasons why some 
conflicts are perpetuated despite the absence of violence. Bar Tal’s argument is in line 
with what has been discussed in chapter 3 regarding the need for ontological security and 
the development of conflict-perpetuating routines (Mitzen 2006). This characteristic of 
intractable conflicts should not be treated independently from all others but rather as their 
outcome. Specifically, the ‘investment’ in the perpetuation of the conflict is more likely 
to take place if the conflict is protracted and central for each side, given that in such 
environments the conflict becomes part of the people’s daily lives. Similarly, the zero-
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sum mentalities, the irreconcilable positions and past and or potential acts of violence 
only contribute to making the conflict ‘central’ and ‘total’ for the people.  
 
What is even more important for this thesis is that the characteristics of intractable 
conflicts, and especially the psychological investments, create an almost obstacle-free 
path for actors on an elite and audience level to engage in successful and routinized 
securitizing acts. The internalized perceptions regarding the ‘other’ coupled with the 
psychological need to maintain the conflict in the population’s routines allow for ‘easy’ 
acceptance of any securitizing acts as long as the proposed threats are linked to the 
‘enemy-other’. More interestingly, as argued in this thesis, in such environments there are 
expectations that anything related to the ‘other’ should be securitized and treated as a 
potential threat, creating therefore a ‘demand’ for constant securitization. For the same 
reasons, as demonstrated in the next chapter, some individuals and groups are also 
willing to engage in the process of threat-creation or threat-perpetuation themselves 
through horizontal and bottom-up securitization.  
 
The next sections examine the case study of this thesis, the Cyprus conflict, and 
demonstrate that it is a protracted ethnic conflict as defined in the section above sharing 
the characteristics of such conflicts.  
5.2. The Cyprus conflict: a historical overview 
 
In Cyprus, just like in almost every conflict case, there are always at least two different 
sets of views claiming ownership of the truth, meaning that there is no agreed objective 
‘truth’ for either contemporary conflict-related events or entire historical periods. There is 
some consensus between the two sides that certain events – violent or non-violent – did 
indeed take place, but each side interprets them very differently, using inevitably a very 
different discourse and phrasing to describe and understand them.43 This is especially the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  For instance both sides accept that in 1974 there was a Turkish military intervention in Cyprus. However, 
the interpretation and phrasing is completely different; while the Greek Cypriot discourse describes it as a 
brutal illegal invasion, the Turkish Cypriot discourse portrays it as justified and necessary peace operation. 
More ‘neutral’ terms describe it as ‘intervention’ (i.e. neither invasion nor peace operation). 	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case with the official narratives, such as government and political elites’ positions as well 
as with most education material. It is worth noting that while the majority of the public 
on each side shares these views and reiterates the established discourse, there are 
individuals and groups on both sides that acknowledge that their side’s views do not 
represent the ‘absolute truth’ and are sympathetic to (some of) the positions of the ‘other’.  
 
In addition to the official discourses there are also constructed myths, which are so 
internalized in each community that carry almost the same weight as the ‘objective truths’ 
and are frequently repeated and used as if they are undeniable facts. The lack of a 
universally accepted objective truth opens the door for multiple interpretations for the 
causes that led to the development and perpetuation of the conflict; interpretations that 
are subject to a number of different variables, with the primary one being ethnicity 
(Greek, Turkish, Greek-Cypriot, Turkish-Cypriot). Secondary factors include whether 
one is more or less sympathetic to the Turkish or Greek positions as well as on one’s 
ideological background (e.g. leftist, Hellenocentric, etc.).  
 
This chapter does not attempt to promote yet another version of the truth. Instead, and in 
line with the constructivist nature of securitization, the aim is to present these discourses 
and how the conflict-related threats are constructed across the dividing line. This goal 
will contribute to our understanding on how specific social contexts can lead to different 
processes of securitization as outlined earlier. The need of this chapter arises from the 
fact that it would be particularly difficult to understand the mechanisms and processes of 
bottom-up and horizontal securitization in the specific context of Cyprus without a 
relatively lucid picture on how the conflict has developed over the decades and how the 
parties involved perceive it.  
 
What makes the Cyprus case particularly interesting and relevant for the study of 
securitization is the fact that essentially every aspect of the conflict, ranging from 
historical ‘facts’ to contemporary issues under negotiation, is highly contested between 
the two sides and is opportunistically used by elite to promote specific positions. As 
argued in detail in the next chapter, it is precisely this contestation that opens the door for 
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frequent and constant securitization, leading eventually to the institutionalization of the 
process.  
 
The rest of the chapter is separated into four broad sections. The first part provides a 
timeline of the problem, stretching from the pre-1950 period to 2010, focusing on the 
specific pivotal events of each decade during that period. Following that is a section 
dealing specifically with the different understandings of the conflict as portrayed in the 
literature over the past four decades. The next section focuses on the areas of contention 
between the two sides and the different perspectives on the causes for the development 
and perpetuation of the conflict. The last section focuses specifically on the impact the 
European Union has had on the conflict and the reasons behind the latter’s failure to 
contribute to a settlement. 
5.3. A time line of key events 
 
The brief description of the contemporary history of the conflict aims to elucidate how 
and why Greek and Turkish Cypriots developed hostile and zero-sum identities.44 
Similarly, it demonstrates how historical animosities and fear for the future developed 
over time. Lastly, it aims to demonstrate that a series of pivotal events have contributed 
to the creation of a protracted ethnic conflict and to the development of a deeply 
securitized environment. While there is a brief reference to the pre-1950’s period, the 
focus is on contemporary historical events and more specifically the period 1950 to 2010.  
 
5.3.1. Pre-1950s and 1950s 
 
Cyprus was under the control of the Ottoman Empire for over three hundred years (1571-
1878). In 1821, with the commencement of the Greek revolution, the Greeks of the island 
joined Greece’s efforts for independence with the Greek Orthodox Church having an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 The term ‘key events’ concerns events that are ‘key’ (i.e. very important) for one or the other side, but 
not necessarily both, even though some events were key for both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. 
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important role to play.45  For contemporary Greek Cypriots therefore the historical 
animosities and negative perceptions towards the enemy/oppressor ‘other’ are centuries 
old.46 Greeks on the other hand did not become the oppressors in the eyes of Turkish 
Cypriots until the middle of the 20th century. 
 
With the demise of the Ottoman Empire and with the increasing need for allies, the 
Ottomans passed on the administrative control of Cyprus to the British who needed 
Cyprus in order to control more efficiently the Suez Canal and the seas to India. The 
British rule lasted until 1959 and in 1960 Cyprus became for the first time an independent 
state, albeit with a lot of ‘exceptions’. Indeed, Cyprus has been a state of exception since 
its conception in 1960 on a number of grounds including the country’s sovereignty, the 
withdrawal of colonial influence (territorially and otherwise) and the direct influence 
third countries have in the new Republic’s local affairs (Constantinou 2008). At a later 
stage and after the 1974 Greek coup and the Turkish invasion the exceptionalities of 
Cyprus grew with the de facto division of the island and the self-proclaimed Turkish 
Cypriot ‘state’, the TRNC (in 1983), which remains unrecognized by all other states with 
the exception of Turkey.  
 
The most turbulent period of the British rule was the 1950’s with the rise of Greek 
Cypriot EOKA47 on one side and the Turkish Cypriot TMT48 on the other. That was the 
period that the contemporary Cyprus problem began along with the development of the 
antagonistic ethnic identities. In 1955 the Greek Cypriot organization EOKA, having as a 
goal the union of the island with Greece (enosis) commenced the armed struggle against 
the British in Cyprus. EOKA focused primarily on British targets, but also attacked 
Greek or Turkish Cypriots who were not in line with the goal of enosis and in favor of bi-
communal cooperation (Souter 1984). Reacting to the creation of EOKA and to prevent it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  It was not surprising therefore that decades later, during the British colonial period (1878-1959), the 
Church became a symbol of political and ethnic unity (Joseph 2006). Similarly it is not surprising that the 
first President of Cyprus was the religious leader of the Greek Cypriot community, Archbishop Makarios 
III.  
46 It is worth noting that at the time the identity of the ‘other’ was not based on ethnicity but based on 
religion; the identity dichotomy therefore was between Christians and Muslims. 
47 National Organization of Cypriot Fighters [Εθνική Οργάνωση Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών].  
48 Turkish Resistance Organization [Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı].	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from achieving enosis, the Turkish Cypriots, with the support of Turkey, formed in 1955 
Volkan, transformed in 1958 into TMT, which aimed to partition the island (taksim). 
TMT also engaged in violent activities against Greek and Turkish Cypriots who were not 
in line with TMT’s goals (ibid). The two ‘motherlands’, Greece and Turkey, were 
inevitably involved in this struggle by supporting the local Cypriots with weapons and 
military personnel. It is worth noting that the Greek Cypriot discourse maintains that the 
British followed a divide and conquer rule to control Cyprus and promoted the Turkish 
positions and subsequently the division of the island.  
 
Figure 5. 1 Training the British 
 
Source: Taxidromos October 1st, 1955 
 
Figure 5.1. above depicts the newly appointed Governor John Harding sending the British 
commandos for training into a Turkish-run school. The sign says: ‘Tutorial School: 
Wiping out Greeks, slaughters, prosecutions, vandalisms. Headmaster: A. Menterez 
(former Turkish Prime Minister).’ The connotation is that the British in Cyprus served 
Turkey’s interests at the expense of the Greek and Greek Cypriot interests.    
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Figure 5. 2. McMillan: The Peacemaker 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Vima October 1, 1958 
 
Figure 5.2. above depicts Harold McMillan, the former British Prime Minister splitting 
Cyprus in two, saying ‘Don’t act like this, woman. It is…temporary!’49, connoting again 
that Britain served Turkey’s interests, namely to dichotomize the island into Greek and 
Turkish parts. 
 
 
The figures above are indicative of the Greek Cypriot perceptions regarding the British 
role in the conflict, the pro-Turkish positions and the anti-Hellenic ones. It is not 
surprisingly therefore that the suggested British proposition (so-called McMillan Plan in 
1957) was perceived by Greek Cypriots as a machination to divide Cyprus. As 
demonstrated with the press analysis (chapter 6), these perceptions, decades later, remain 
unchanged albeit they are manifested in a different way.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 It is interesting to note that Cyprus in the Greek Cypriot discourse is always presented as a young woman 
or a little girl, connoting its helpless nature that is always ‘violated’ by the much stronger enemies, be it 
Turkey, the UK or the US.  
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The struggles for enosis and taksim finally ended with the 1960 Cypriot independence, 
which made their pursuit unconstitutional (Article 185). While the struggle for enosis and 
taksim (officially) ended in 1960,50 the damage was already done, as the distrustful 
environment and the antagonistic identities created during this period would never be 
reversed, influencing to this day the way the two sides perceive each other.  
 
Before proceeding to the more contemporary history, it is worth clarifying a view that is 
many times misused by both communities, namely that in the years pre-dating the 
invasion, or even the 1960’s, Greek and Turkish Cypriots always lived peacefully and 
happily together. While there are several accounts that Greek and Turkish Cypriots did 
peacefully co-exist together in mixed villages in the past this was not the case for the 
entire population. Indeed, because of the problems and the distrust the two communities 
started growing apart much earlier than 1974 or even 1963; the perception about the 
potential ‘enemy other’ therefore was not as contemporary as it is frequently claimed. It 
is indicative that the in 1859 the Muslim population was spread out in 59% of the 
settlements (villages and cities) and by 1960 the percentage decreased to 38.3% 
(Demographic Report 2009). Similarly, according to a population census in 1960 out of 
the 619 villages of Cyprus 64% were homogeneously Greek Cypriot, 19% Turkish 
Cypriot and only 17% were mixed (PIO 2008). Thus, the ethnic-based separations started 
taking place even before the birth of the Republic in 1960.  
 
5.3.2. 1960’s – The creation of an ‘unwanted child’ and the first inter-
communal problems 
 
In 1960 Cyprus became for the first time in its contemporary history an independent 
state.51 The way independence came about, especially when coupled with the preceding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Unofficially the efforts continued for another 14 years. It was not until the 1974 Turkish invasion that 
Greek Cypriots stopped their efforts for enosis and Turkish Cypriots for taksim – which was achieved, at 
least de facto, with the separation of the island.  
51 In 1960 the population of Cyprus was approximately 574,000. The Greek Cypriot community comprised 
78% of the total population, the Turkish Cypriot 18% and the other 2% were Armenians, Latinos and 
Maronites. By 1973 (i.e. the year before the division of the island), the population increased to 632,000 but 
the (percentage) distribution remained unchanged. In 1975, the year after	   the invasion, the population 
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conflict-ridden decade, was a development that was not whole-heartedly supported by 
either community. There was a need to keep a balance between the two sides to meet the 
complexities generated by the recent stormy history. Under these circumstances Cyprus 
ended up with a highly complex and unworkable constitution (Adams 1966) that created 
an independent state, albeit only in principle as it was a partially sovereign state full of 
exceptions (Constantinou 2008). Under this new state of affairs, three other states – 
Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom – were guarantor powers with the constitutional 
right to militarily intervene unilaterally in Cyprus should the need arise, while Britain 
also maintained sovereign British bases on the island.52 The end result was perceived as a 
‘given’ or ‘received’ and dysfunctional constitution (Joseph 2006). 53  Similarly, the 
outcome – namely the newly formed state – was described as a ‘reluctant republic’ 
(Xydis 1973), a quasi-state (Constantinou 2006) and an ‘unwanted child’ (Kizilyurek). 54   
 
Figure 5. 3. The 1960 Constitution and the British Machinations 	  	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Vima, December 11, 1960 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
decreased dramatically 498,000, (RoC Statistical Service 2009) primarily because of mass emigrations of 
both Greek and Turkish Cypriots.  
52 For an elaborate analysis on how the Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) influence the Cyprus-Britain 
relations and the Cyprus Problem see Theophanous and Tirkides (2008). 
53 The constitution is considered by many to be imposed or ‘given’ since what the Cypriot leaders had to 
sign in London in 1959 was a pre-arranged constitution that they never really negotiated. 
54 It was the former president of Cyprus, Glafcos Clerides who said that an independent government in 
Cyprus was similar to the birth of an unwanted child.	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Figure 5.3. above shows the (Greek Cypriot) President (Archbishop Makarios III) and the 
(Turkish Cypriot) Vice President (Dr. Kutchuk) holding the 1960 London-Zurich 
agreements in front of a building with a sign that reads ‘Independent Cyprus’. On the side 
is Selwyn Lloyd, the former British Foreign Minister, entering the house (i.e. Cyprus) 
with a briefcase saying ‘Bases’. The connotation is that the constitution did not really 
create a truly independent state and allowed (through the ‘back door’) the UK to maintain 
some control.  
 
A lot of weight was placed on the good will of the two sides to resolve any problems 
deriving from the constitution’s complexities. The good will however was never there 
and the first inter-communal problems eventually emerged. Leaving aside the everyday 
administration problems (e.g. decision-making deadlocks), the constitution also created 
much more profound problems for Cypriots. As Theophylactou (1995) points out, the 
constitution did not aim to create a new Cypriot identity but rather maintain the existing 
ones. It failed to create a new Cypriot identity that would help bridge communal 
differences; rather it contributed to the perpetuation of the old ethnically distinct ones that 
maintained and even solidified further the zero-sum mentalities, creating thus an 
environment full of perceived enemies and potential threats for both sides. 55   
 
Within the first three years the first problems emerged and were intensified after 
Makarios’ proposals to amend the 1960 Constitution. 56  The emergence of inter-
communal violence followed soon after. The first acts of violence occurred in 1963 and 
impacted primarily the Turkish Cypriots. After the clashes many Turkish Cypriots 
withdrew or were forced to flee, depending on the discourse one follows, into enclaves. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 For a brief summary on how the constitution divided powers between the two sides see Ker-Lindsay 
(2011 - especially pp. 25-26) and De Smith (1964 – especially pp. 282-296). 
56 The disputes were mainly over the issues of separate municipalities, public service, army (ratio between 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots), and taxes. By 1962 no agreement was reached on the sensitive issue of the 
separate municipalities, while the Turkish Cypriots vetoed the proposed taxes amendments. In 1963 the 
President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios III, after two years of disputes wanted to amend the constitution 
claiming it was not functional. On November 29, 1963 Makarios submitted to the three guarantor power 
thirteen points for constitutional reforms, which included, inter alia, the abandonment of the president’s 
and vice-president’s veto powers. The proposal was first rejected by Turkey and then vetoed by the Turkish 
Cypriots, since it was perceived as a Greek Cypriot manoeuvre to obtain more control over Turkish 
Cypriots (Necatigil 1993). For a summary of the thirteen points see Vrachas (1993) p.38-9. Also, for more 
on the chronology of those events see http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/chronology.htm.	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The reason for the Turkish Cypriot withdrawal is yet another area of contention and is 
used opportunistically decades later to highlight potential threats. Turkish Cypriots argue 
that they had no other choice but to withdraw into enclaves to defend themselves; they 
fled thus out of ‘sheer fear’ (Dodd 1999).  Greek Cypriots on the other hand called this 
withdrawal ‘Τουρκο-ανταρσία’ (‘Turkish-Mutiny’) arguing that the withdrawal took 
place in order to facilitate the eventual division of the island – i.e. withdrawing into 
enclaves was just the first step for more concrete bi-communal division. These two 
diametrically opposite arguments are not just academic positions, but are also re-iterated 
on elite and public level. According to former President Glafcos Clerides’ deposition, in 
the post-1963 incidents documents were found in Dr. Kutchuk’s office with plans for 
specific and pre-determined actions, including the withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriot 
MPs and other public servants from the parliament and other government positions 
(Vrachas 1993: 40). The Turkish Cypriot official position for this period is that Turkish 
Cypriots ‘were confined to small enclaves, and subjected to gross violations of human 
rights including being rendered refugees over and over again living under open-air prison 
conditions’ (TRNC Ministry of Foreign Affairs).57  
 
The 1963-68 period was particularly volatile with inter-communal violence and the first 
foreign military interventions. In August of 1964 after armed struggles between the 
Greek Cypriot National Guard and the Turkish Cypriot TMT, the Turkish Air Force 
bombarded the north-western tip of Cyprus with significant collateral damage. It was that 
same year that the UN force (UNFICYP) came to Cyprus and still maintains its presence 
on the island ever since.58 In 1967 there were clashes again between the (Greek Cypriot) 
National Guard and Turkish Cypriots, leading not only to loss of lives (mostly Turkish 
Cypriots), but also to Turkish threats for an invasion and the latter’s request for the 
withdrawal of the Greek troops and General Grivas from the island; a request which was 
granted.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  http://www.trncinfo.com [accessed November 23, 2011]. 
58 For a history on the UN in Cyprus see James 2002. For the role of the UN after 2004 see Ker-Lindsay 
(2006). For how the two sides perceive the UN mediating efforts see Richmond (1998).	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The discourse as well as the two sides’ internalized beliefs about this period is 
substantially different. While there seems to be an agreement on the ‘facts’ (i.e. inter-
communal fighting and Turkish bombings), there are disagreements as to why they were 
necessary. Turkish Cypriots, as mentioned, argue that they were helpless and subject to 
attacks from the Greek Cypriots and thus needed Turkish support. Greek Cypriots on the 
other hand argue that Turkey was secretly arming TMT in Cyprus, encouraging it to 
engage in violent acts so as to provoke Greek Cypriot reactions and thus provide an 
excuse for Turkey to intervene.  
 
The events of the 1950’s and 1960’s set the foundations for the development of zero-sum 
identities, mistrust and overall hostile feelings towards the ‘other’. More importantly 
however all potential threats and problems were defined in ethnic terms.  
 
5.5.3. The path-changing decade of the 1970’s 
 
The finale of the turbulent 1960’s came on July 15th 1974, when at first the Athens Junta 
attempted to overthrow the elected president Makarios and five days later Turkey invaded 
the island, placing under its control 37% of the island.  
 
The dividing line that separates the two sides is known as the Green Line (Figure 6.1.). 
The Greek Cypriots do not consider this to be an external (or internal) border, since that 
would connote the existence of two states; they rather see it as the cease-fire line, a view 
that is shared by the UN (Demetriou 2005). The Turkish Cypriots on the other hand 
consider the Green Line to be ‘a territorial border that defines the limits of an 
independent state, the statehood of which is protected and maintained by the Turkish 
army (ibid: 12). 
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 Figure 5.4  Map of Cyprus59 
 
(Source: http://www.thecyprusguide.net/) 
 
Since 1974, there have been approximately 35,000 Turkish soldiers in the areas not 
controlled by the Republic, making Cyprus one of the most militarized areas in the world. 
The invasion led to a significant number of missing people and the displacement of 
approximately 190,000 Greek Cypriots from the northern part of the island and 40.000 
Turkish Cypriots from the south.60 Following the military intervention, the United 
Nations requested the withdrawal of any foreign troops from Cyprus (UNSC resolution 
353). While the Resolution was never implemented, it remains the foundation of the 
Greek Cypriot discourse that revolves around the illegality of the intervention and the 
perpetuation of the status quo.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 The Green Line (blue lines on the map) and the Buffer Zone (the area between the two blue lines). 
60 The number of displaced people is not contested. Indeed, local and international sources (see e.g. 
internal-displacement.org which uses UNFICYP figures) place the total figure at 210,000 figures 
http://www.internal-
displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpPages)/22FB1D4E2B196DAA802570BB005E787C?OpenDoc
ument. The official Greek Cypriot figure of missing persons following the 1974 invasion is 1,619. The 
Turkish Cypriot number from the period 1963-1967 was estimated at 500. According to the bi-communal 
Committee of Missing People (CMP) in Cyprus, the figures are 1,493 and 494 respectively 
(http://www.cmp-cyprus.org/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=1343&tt=graphic&lang=l1).  
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The Turkish Cypriot discourse maintains that the coup aimed to annex Cyprus with 
Greece and thus Turkey had the obligation to intervene. More importantly however, 
Turkish Cypriots perceived the coup as the ultimate proof that they were in grave danger, 
arguing that both their physical and societal security were under threat, requiring thus 
Turkey’s military support. In the Turkish discourse therefore the military intervention is 
described as the ‘Cyprus Peace Operation’, and the official Turkish Cypriot position is 
that ‘the presence of the Turkish Peace Forces in Cyprus is a vital security requirement 
for the Turkish Cypriot people as it serves as a deterrent against the repetition of the 
Greek/Greek Cypriot atrocities’.61 Greek Cypriot discourse on the other hand does not 
question the Junta coup, but questions the danger in which Turkish Cypriots were in, 
arguing that the coup was the excuse Turkey needed to intervene and implement its long-
standing plans. 62  More importantly however they argue that the violence was 
disproportionate to the events at the time, while the continuous occupation is unjustifiable 
given that the Turkish Cypriots are not in any danger from Greek Cypriots after the 
collapse of the Junta in Greece.  
 
To this day numerous Greek Cypriots believe that the Turkish invasion should not have 
focused only on Turkey’s aggression but also to the Greek Junta and other foreign powers 
and more specifically Henry Kissinger, the former US Secretary of State. As is the case 
with the British mentioned earlier, these perceptions have not changed significantly and 
elites use them opportunistically to securitize contemporary issues.  
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 http://www.trncinfo.com [accessed November 23, 2011]. 
62 One of the most frequently arguments is that the invasion and the territory Turkey would occupy was 
already decided. As Brewin points out, the Turkish army eventually stopped at a point they ‘had proposed 
ten years earlier to the UN mediator, Galo Plaza’ (Brewin 2000: 44) connoting that the military actions 
were to a significant degree pre-decided long before the coup of 1974.  	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Figure 5.5. Junta, CIA and Turkey  Figure 5.6. Kissinger the Butcher of Cyprus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Satiriki July 19, 1975    Source: Satiriki December 14, 1975 
 
Figure 5.5. shows Greek dictator Ioannides, along with Kissinger (wearing a CIA sign) 
and an Attila figure with the face of the former Turkish PM Bulent Ecevit, together 
persecuting Cyprus. Figure 5.6. depicts Kissinger as a butcher dichotomizing Cyprus as 
per Turkey’s request. 
 
The rest of the decade was the golden age of ‘cypriotism’, which developed at the 
expense of Greek Cypriot nationalism – i.e. hellenocentrism (Mavratsas 1999). There was 
in other words an attempt to change the orientation of the Greek Cypriot identity from 
Hellenic to Cypriot. Mavratsas argues that the reason behind this move was the need for 
Greek Cypriots to convince Turkish Cypriots that they were ready to find a solution. 
While I agree with the assessment of the rise of cypriotism, the reasons for its grow are a 
matter for debate. It is unlikely that so early after the invasion Greek Cypriots would 
forgo their fears and seek a trustful coexistence with Turkish Cypriots. A more rational 
reason I argue is ‘guilt’. Specifically, because the Turkish invasion took place after the 
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Greek Junta’s coup, many hellenocentric groups and individuals were much more 
reluctant to openly admit and promote their allegiance to Greece that was still blamed for 
giving Turkey the pretext to invade.  
 
As discussed in detail in the next chapter, 1974 was by far the most important pivotal 
event for Greek Cypriots. Its importance was such that decades later it still dominates and 
influences the context in which political and many times social discourses take place in 
Cyprus. More important however is the fact that it is opportunistically used to securitize 
contemporary issues.  
 
5.3.4. 1980’s and 1990’s: The peaceful but politically turbulent decades 
 
The most pivotal event of the 1980’s came in 1983 when the Turkish Cypriots self-
declared the area north of the Green Line an independent state, the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus (TRNC). TRNC, however, was declared invalid by Security Council 
Resolution 541 (1983) and, as mentioned, does not enjoy international recognition with 
the exception of Turkey.  
 
The exception to the otherwise very static conflict was the ‘European’ turn that the 
Cyprus conflict took in the 1990’s when EU accession for the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) 
became a realistic goal. The Turkish side was clearly against the prospects of Cyprus 
entering the EU prior to a settlement, arguing that the RoC could not (legally) apply for 
membership (Kabaalioglou 2006) and that the EU’s decision to accept the RoC’s 
application promoted more integration between Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, thus 
solidifying the division (Oguzlu 2002).63  
 
The 1980’s and 1990’s developments indicate that even during non-violent periods the 
zero-sum mentalities dominated the Cypriot environment. Ethnic distinction and more 
physical and political security vis-à-vis the other (as opposed to domination) became the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Bahcheli and Noel (2010) have a different opinion arguing that the identity chasm between Turkish 
Cypriots and Turkey is growing not shrinking as Oguzlu argued. 
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goal for both sides. It became evident that the lack of violence did not contribute to the 
development of a trustful environment and it did not mitigate the fear for the future. 
 “As	  Richmond	  (1998:	  166)	  notes,	  by	  that	  time	  the	  deadlock	  had	  become	  a	  form	  of	  a	  solution.	   Groom	   (1986:	   140)	   explains	   how	   the	   unilateral	   declaration	   of	  independence	  of	  the	  TRNC	  was	  a	  victory	  for	  Turkish	  Cypriots,	  although	  it	  came	  at	  a	  price,	  namely	  their	  international	  isolation	  and	  heavy	  dependency	  on	  Turkey.”	  
 
5.3.5. The ‘European’ decade of the new millennium and the Annan Plan 
 
The poor economic conditions in the TRNC,64 coupled with the upcoming EU accession 
of the Republic of Cyprus led to mass Turkish Cypriot demonstrations and the demand 
for change in the areas north of the Green Line. The mass demonstrations forced the 
Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş to engage in measures that would defuse the 
growing pressure. In 2003 the Turkish Cypriot leadership decided to open some crossing 
points that would allow for the first time since 1974 direct interaction with the ‘other’.  
 
The opening of the crossing points and the upcoming RoC’s EU accession created the 
need for legal changes in regards to the movement of goods and people from the Green 
Line. Thus, on April 29 2004 the European Council adopted the Green Line Regulation 
(866/2004), which would facilitate the movement of goods and people across the 
ceasefire line. The transfer of goods through the Green Line may have been rather 
insignificant for Turkish Cypriot economy – as trade over the divide amounted to only 
4% of their total exports (Watson 2007) – but the opening of the crossing points gave an 
important boost to the Turkish Cypriot tourism (Arslan 2006).  
 
The most pivotal event of this decade was the 2004 so-called Annan Plan (after the 
former UN’s SG Kofi Annan), the most comprehensive settlement proposal since the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 The TRNC was (and still is) economically and politically dependent on Turkey, (Guven-Lisaniler 2002; 
Nugent 2000). This means that any Turkish economic and monetary problems could easily be transferred to 
TRNC, as was the case in 2000-2001 during the Turkish economic crisis (Theophanous 2006: 64). 
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beginning of the conflict.65 After a series of negotiations between the two communities 
and the two motherlands, and after five different versions of the plan, the fifth and final 
one was put to simultaneous referenda in the northern and southern part of Cyprus for the 
people to decide whether they wanted the particular solution or not. On April 24 2004 the 
majority in the northern part (Turkish Cypriots as well as settlers) overwhelmingly 
accepted the plan (65%), but an even bigger Greek Cypriot majority (76%) rejected it to 
the disappointment of the UN and EU officials.  
 
Thousands of pages have been written to explain the outcome of the referenda, reaching 
many times diametrically opposite conclusions. The Turkish Cypriot ‘yes’ for example 
has been explained as evidence of true goodwill for settlement on behalf of the Turkish 
Cypriot community (e.g. Sözen and Özersay 2007), but also as an ‘easy’ choice since the 
Plan (according to the authors) was positively biased towards Turkish Cypriots and 
satisfied all the Turkish political expectations (e.g. Theophanous 2004, Venizelos et. al. 
2004). The ‘yes’ vote is also explained as the outcome of a ‘rational’ win-win choice for 
Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots given that the Greek Cypriot ‘no’ became inevitable 
days before the referenda (Loizides and Keskiner 2004).  
 
The Greek Cypriot ‘no’ also has numerous and diverging explanations. Some observers 
argue that Greek Cypriots had no real incentives to accept the Plan and the settlement 
even though they did not have much to lose had they accepted it (e.g. Dodd 2004; Azgin 
2006). On the opposite side there are those who argue that Greek Cypriots had too much 
to lose and Turkey a lot to gain. The latter group of people argued among other things 
that the Plan was extremely problematic, ‘un-European’ and the outcome of ango-
american machinations (Constantakopoulos 2005; Theophanous 2004, Venizelos 2004 et 
al.; Stavrinides). The Plan was also considered to be ‘excessively conditioned by the 
factor of timing’, meaning that while the timing of the Plan was in the beginning good for 
a comprehensive solution, as time progressed and the RoC was one step closer to 
becoming a ‘European State’, the Plan was becoming more obsolete and outmoded, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 For a very interesting and comprehensive analysis of the development of the Plan and the negotiations 
that led to its formation see Claire Palley (2005).	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especially in regards to certain issues that were perpetuating issues of the past – e.g. 
treaty of guarantees (Tassopoulos 2006). Others argued that the ‘no’ had less to do with 
the Plan per se and so the outcome should be primarily attributed to the nationalist 
leaders and specifically the former President Tassos Papadopoulos who securitized the 
debate, convincing Greek Cypriots that it was an existential threat (Anastasiou 2007).  
 
The next turning point took place on May 1st 2004 when the RoC became an EU member. 
The two things worth noting from the EU accession is the 1999 Helsinki Summit when i) 
the EU announced that a solution to the Cyprus problem was no longer a precondition for 
accession (European Council 1999, par. 9b), and ii) it confirmed Turkey’s eligibility for 
membership (ibid, par. 12). This was a milestone for the process as for the first time 
Greek foreign policy linked the accession negotiations with the RoC with the lifting of 
Greek objections for the implementation of Turkey-EC customs Unions (Attalides 2010). 
The second issue is the Protocol 10 of the 2003 Accession Treaty which states that the 
acqui communitaire does not apply to the areas not controlled by the RoC.66  
 
It is important to emphasize how neither the lack of violence after the opening of the 
crossing points (as many expected), nor the prospective or actual accession of the 
Republic to the EU were sufficient to promote a settlement. Why this is the case is 
discussed further below. Suffice to say for now that the settlement that was sought – 
namely a bi-communal federation – is the second best option for both sides (Bahcheli 
2000; Nicolaides 1998).67 It is also quite unclear whether either side wants indeed to 
reach such a settlement. The ‘comfortable conflict’ in Cyprus, especially on the Greek 
Cypriot side, makes the potential compromises necessary to reach such a solution quite 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  The	  complete	  EU	  proposal	  is	  as	  follows	  for	  the	  Protocol	  10	  is	  as	  follows:	  ‘Adopted by the 
Commission on 2 March. The Commission set out the terms under which provisions of EU law apply to the 
demarcation line [Green Line] between the zones in which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus 
exercises effective control and those in which it does not. As the application of the acquis in the northern 
part of Cyprus will be suspended pending a settlement of the Cypriot problem, in accordance with Article 1 
of Protocol No 10 of the Act of Accession, and as the demarcation line does not constitute an external 
border, special rules concerning the crossing of the line by persons, goods and services need to be 
established. The draft, taking account of the particularity of the situation and political sensitivities on the 
island, covers such issues as the prevention of illegal immigration, customs, food safety, taxation and travel 
facilities (Commission 2004/145).’Protocol	  10	  can	  be	  found	  at	  http://eur-­‐lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12003T/PRO/10:EN:NOT	  [accessed	  April	  10,	  2010]	  
67 This is also documented by the several opinion polls (see e.g. Cyprus2015 2009). 
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risky and thus unlikely (Adamides and Constantinou 2012).68 As opinion polls show, a 
unitary state still remains the optimal solution for Greek Cypriots (Cyprus2015 2009), 
and even the status quo might be a more preferred options than some forms of federal 
solutions, as seen from the outcome of the referenda in 2004. Turkey and the Turkish 
Cypriots on the other hand seem to aim for an international ‘upgrade’ of the TRNC rather 
than a federal solution (Cyprus2015 2009).  
5.4. The Cyprus conflict – what kind of a conflict is it? 
 
The early sections of this chapter examined some of the conflict characteristics and how 
they contribute to the institutionalization of securitization. This section examines how 
Cyprus shares many of these characteristics and thus fits the ‘profile’ of protracted ethnic 
conflicts.  
 
As seen from the ‘key events’ section above Cyprus is an intractable conflict. Specifically, 
it is intractable as it is unresolved since the 1950’s; irreconcilable and of zero sum nature, 
as the two sides’ goals are perceived to be diametrically opposite; it has been at some 
point violent; it is also ‘total’ and ‘central’, meaning that both sides believe that their 
existence is at stake, while elite and the public are constantly pre-occupied with the 
conflict. The most important variable, however, is the interest of the two communities in 
the continuation of the conflict. The last two points are examined with empirical evidence 
in much greater detail in the next chapter, along with how they contributed to the 
institutionalization of securitization in the island. What is worth noting is that the 
intractable nature of the conflict seems to make local and international actors focus on 
how to manage the conflict rather on how to resolve it (Richmond 1998).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	  apparent	  reluctance	  to	  achieve	  a	  settlement	  has	  been	  a	  recurring	  theme	  in	  Cyprus.	  Indeed,	  as	  Groom	  notes	  (1993:	  2)	  the	  lack	  of	  sense	  of	  urgency	  (for	  a	  solution)	  was	  evident	  on	  both	   sides;	   as	   a	   result,	   the	  UN	   forces	   in	   Cyprus	  were	   relatively	   successful	   in	   peacekeeping	   and	  conflict	  settlement	  but	  not	  in	  peacemaking	  and	  conflict	  resolution.	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At the core of the conflict are the two sides’ opposing interests, which are further 
exacerbated by the ‘double minority’ environment, or as Milne (2003) calls it ‘double bi-
communalism’,69 making thus the small island state vulnerable to external influences 
(Richmond 2002: 122). This environment also creates and sustains a threatening and 
securitized environment for both communities since both feel they are, or could be, the 
endangered community (Ker-Lindsay 2008). These perceptions inevitably create strong 
security dilemmas on both sides of the Green Line (Tassopoulos 2006).  
 
In the vast literature on Cyprus, the problem has been examined in numerous ways: as an 
identity or ethno-national conflict (Papadakis et al. 2006) where Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots are unable to live together, either because of conflict of interests or because of 
conflict of identities (Theophylactou 1995; Loizou 1995); as a conflict which is formed 
and perpetuated because of the incompatibility of subject positions between the two sides 
(Diez 2002); as the outcome of regional and superpower interests and machinations 
(Hitchens 1984), or as a combination of the any of the above. However, attempting to 
explain the Cyprus case as a single-issue conflict is problematic. As Loizos (1995: 105) 
argues, in Cyprus there has never been a single problem, but rather a multiple sets of 
problems determined by a number of ways and actors. The incompatibility of positions in 
all areas – e.g. economics, property, governance, etc. – could be understood as a 
derivative of the conflicting identities and socio-psychological factors dominating each 
side. Similarly, the negative perceptions about the international powers’ actions and the 
subsequent bitter feelings of both sides (Herzfeld 2006) could also be seen within the 
framework of an identity conflict. At the heart of the identities of the two sides are 
internalized perceptions regarding the intentions international actors; as demonstrated in 
the next chapter both sides perceive international actions as biased for ‘them’ and 
favorable to the ‘other’.  
 
The incompatibility of identities of the two sides is solidified by the deep inter-communal 
distrust and vice versa: the distrust feeds the incompatibility. Distrust is not only 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Turkish Cypriots are a minority in Cyprus, but the Greek Cypriots are also a minority if the two 
motherlands, Turkey and Greece, are brought into the picture.  
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important because it contributes to the development of conflicts (Hannes 2005), but also 
because it could create severe problems of communication. Indeed, in Cyprus the 
internalized distrust coupled with the vivid memories of pain on both sides of the Green 
Line has created severe problems of communication and inevitably to information 
failures. As Anastassiou (2002: 583) argues, ‘over the decades, the conflict dynamic has 
led to a form of alienation that has institutionalized the interaction between the two sides 
psychologically, intellectually and culturally into what may be called dialectical process 
of non-communication’. All of the above led to what Papadakis (2006) calls ‘ethnic 
autism’, where any argument presented by the ‘other’ is immediately dismissed as 
propaganda. Both sides are thus strong believers that there is only ‘our’ truth and only 
‘their’ propaganda (ibid).   
 
Given the importance of identities in the Cyprus conflict, it is worth examining them in 
detail. While there is a clear distinction between Greek and Turkish Cypriot identities, 
there are also intra-community ‘identity conflicts’: On one side of the divide there is a 
distinction between those who ‘feel’ Greek and those who ‘feel’ Cypriot and on the other 
side between those who identify themselves as ‘Turkish’ and as ‘Cypriot’.  What must be 
noted is that the ‘Cypriot’ identity on each side is not necessarily the same. In other 
words, the people who feel ‘Cypriots’ on the Greek Cypriot side do not necessarily feel 
that they share the same identity as the Turkish Cypriots who feel just ‘Cypriots’. 
 
Within the Greek Cypriot community, the dilemma of Greek and Cypriot identity exists 
since the 1950’s and was exacerbated in the 1960’s and 1970’s due to the developments 
mentioned earlier. The Greek Cypriot, or rather Greek and/or Cypriot, identity was never 
constant; on the contrary it has been changing depending on the developments (Mavratsas 
1999). This evolution could be described as follows: Phase 1: hellenocentrism, which 
focused on the ‘Greekness’ of Cyprus (Attalides 1979; Salih 1968; Loizides 2007; 
Kitromilides 1994); phase 2: cypriotcentrism, which focused on the common identity of 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots and is primarily supported by the leftists (Spyrou 2001; 
Papadakis et. al. 2006); and phase 3: Hellenocypriocentrism, which emerged after 1974 
and is an ‘in-between’ or ‘hybrid’ identity (Psaltis 2008) that inevitably has elements of 
136	  	  
both Greek and Cypriot identity (Attalides 1979). 70 Greek Cypriots have one of these 
three identities and political elite ‘use’ them opportunistically when the need arises, 
usually by playing one identity against the other to promote specific security discourses.   
 
On the other side of the Buffer Zone a similar situation exists. Some, including the 
Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş, argue that there are no such thing as Cypriots on 
the island, but just two peoples with different nationalities: Greek and Turkish. In general, 
the Turkish nationalist discourse claims that Turkish Cypriots are Turks; they are part of 
the same ethnic group (Navaro-Yashin 2006). Others argue that the past few years the 
Turkish and Turkish Cypriot identities are no longer in line and are drifting apart 
(Bahcheli and Noel 2010; Lacher and Kaymak 2005).  
 
5.5. Issues of contention 
 
 
Asking the average Greek Cypriot to tell you why the conflict has not been resolved, the 
answer one will get is that Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots are intransigent, inflexible 
and their requests are unjust and unreasonable. In response to the same question any 
Turkish Cypriot will say that Greek Cypriots have no incentive to resolve the conflict, 
given that they are economically well off and members of the EU, while they also fail to 
acknowledge the Turkish Cypriot needs and fears. This is expected, given i) the zero-sum 
mentalities, ii) the internalized (on both sides) perceptions of who is to be blamed and 
who is a source of threat for ‘us’, iii) the historical animosities and iv) the lack of 
sufficient communication between the two sides, at least on a public level.  
 
The socio-psychological pre-dispositions of the people do not leave much room for 
convergence. As Papadakis (2006: 68) notes, ‘obsessive ethnic nationalism, one sided 
constructions of history focusing solely on periods or incidents of conflict, and the 
inability to see certain commonalities of history’ are factors of utmost importance for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 For a very good analysis of the historical moments in terms of national identity construction for the 
Greek Cypriot community see Philippou and Klerides (2010).  
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perpetuation of the conflict. These are socio-psychological issues that derive primarily 
from the very distinct and internalized identities of the two sides, meaning that they 
cannot easily change; at least not without transforming the current identities. These 
factors also create, inter alia, problematic mentalities that maintain the view that one side 
is always ‘maximalist’ and ‘rejectionist’, while the other is always the victim and the 
‘flexible’ that makes concessions aiming at the resolution of the conflict. These 
mentalities in turn can be easily manipulated and incorporated into routinized 
securitization practices on an elite and audience level.  
 
Below is an examination of the most important conflict-perpetuating factors and areas of 
contention, all of which are understood and negotiated within the aforementioned ‘mental’ 
framework of distinct perceptions of ‘enemies’ and ‘victims’. 
 
 
5.5.1. Sovereignty  
 
 
The most salient issue of contention is that of sovereignty and recognition (Brewin 2000; 
Diez et al. 2002; Tocci 2004b; Papadakis et al. 2006). Since 1963, but much more after 
1974 and even more so after 1983, the struggles for recognition and the 
internationalization of the problem indicate how important the notion of statehood, 
sovereignty and need for ethnic recognition is for the two communities.  The issue of 
recognition is twofold: state and identity recognition. The latter usually revolves around 
the issue of political equality, which is the struggle to confirm each group’s worth 
relative to the significant other (Lindemann 2010) and in the case of Cyprus is always 
negotiated on the basis of ethnic identities.  
 
The struggle for the former is more straightforward than that of identity: Turkish Cypriots 
are striving to receive international recognition for TRNC, or at least an upgrade similar 
to the one Taiwan enjoys, whereas Greek Cypriots are struggling to make such 
recognition, in any form, impossible and instead try to legitimize even more their 
international status as the only legitimate government on the island.  Indicative of the 
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Greek Cypriot fears is that the (1960) independence was not commemorated at the 
beginning, but rather only after 1974 as part of the general effort to emphasize the 
presence of the RoC and the threats it faces from the ‘other’ side, the non-recognized 
TRNC and Turkey (Papadakis 2010). 
 
A good starting point to understand this issue of statehood is by examining how each side 
perceives borders in Cyprus and more specifically the Green Line. International law 
considers the Green Line to be a cease-fire line, a view shared by all Greek Cypriots. The 
Turkish Cypriots on the other hand consider the Green Line to be ‘a territorial border that 
defines the limits of an independent state, the statehood of which is protected and 
maintained by the Turkish army’ (Demetriou 2005: 12; see also Navaro-Yashin 2005: 
109 for a similar argument). The process of crossing to the ‘other’ side also indicates how 
each side understands the concept of borders. Turkish Cypriot authorities set up premises 
that resemble those at any international border and require an identity card or a passport 
and a visa to allow anyone to cross over, creating thus the impression of entering another 
state. 71  Greek Cypriots on the other hand have a much more ‘loose’ behaviour, with 
much less control and without asking for any proof of identity on the ‘way out’. This 
sometimes occurs even when entering back to the government controlled areas, creating 
thus the impression that these are not borders but simple ‘check points’.  
 
The issue of borders and sovereignty has political spillover effects domestically as well 
as internationally. More specifically the Greek Cypriots (i.e. the RoC) use the 
international legitimacy they enjoy to point out their right for sovereignty over the whole 
island, which would include the areas not controlled by the Republic. It is no coincidence 
therefore that Greek Cypriots characterize the problem as one of ‘invasion and 
occupation’, (since the sovereignty of the country has been violated) (Stavrinides 1999: 
60; Constantinou and Papadakis 2002: 86-7). As a result, a just solution for Greek 
Cypriots would be one that would reverse the consequences of the invasion and 
occupation (Stavrinides 1999: 60). Anything less constitutes unacceptable concessions. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  The	  passports	  or	  identity	  cards	  are	  not	  stamped	  by	  any	  TRNC	  symbol.	  The	  ‘visa’	  used	  is	  a	  piece	  of	  paper	  given	  on	  the	  spot	  to	  the	  person	  that	  crosses	  over	  (it	  is	  not	  attached	  to	  the	  passport	  or	  ID)	  and	  is	  returned	  to	  the	  Turkish	  Cypriot	  authorities	  on	  the	  way	  back.	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Turkish Cypriots on the other hand claim sovereignty through secession over the northern 
part of the island and they tend to see the conflict as mainly a domestic problem of 
persistent ‘ethnic persecution’ (Constantinou and Papadakis 2002: 86-7). Consequently, a 
just solution for them appears to be one that would recognize the ‘realities’ of the post-
1974 division. This argument is in line with the former Turkish Prime Minister Bulent 
Ecevit’s view of the situation: that ‘the Cyprus problem had been solved by him in 1974 
and that nothing remained to be done except for the rest of us to come to terms with 
that’.72 These positions are also evident from bi-communal opinion polls indicating the 
two diametrically opposite positions on this issue: The preferred option of the Greek 
Cypriots is a unitary state (i.e. pre-1974 status), while Turkish Cypriots desire a two-state 
solution (see e.g. Cyprus2015 2009; 2010; 2011). 
 
5.5.2. Security 
 
The violent past, the loss of lives, the thousands of refugees from both sides, the presence 
of tens of thousands of troops and the perpetuation of the treaty of guarantees propel the 
issue of security to the top spot of the hierarchy of contention issues in Cyprus. Indeed, 
numerous opinion polls place the issue of security as the most important reason for 
accepting or rejecting a settlement (see example Lordos 2006, Cyprus2015 2009). The 
problem of security is exacerbated as it extends beyond the two communities; the island 
is also important for Turkey’s geostrategic interests, while it is also considered to be 
important for its own security – i.e. Cyprus at Turkey’s ‘soft’ underbelly (Kazan 2002; 
Birch 2003). As the former Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit stated, ‘Cyprus is of 
indispensable strategic interest to Turkey and Ankara would not withdraw its troops from 
the island even if there were not a single Turkish Cypriot living on it’ (cited in Brey 
1999). Whether such positions are expressed because Cyprus is indeed of military 
importance is questionable. Ker Lindsay (2008) for instance points out that Cyprus is no 
longer of any strategic importance for either Turkey or Greece. Similarly, Kaliber (2005) 
argues that such positions are mostly the outcome of ongoing securitization practices in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Bulent Ecevit was the Prime Minister of Turkey in 1974 (hence the argument that the problem was 
solved by him). Ecevit told this to Lord David Hanney, the UK Special Representative in Cyprus during a 
meeting they had in 1996 (cited in Hannay 2005). 
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Turkey rather than actual security concerns. Regardless, such statements are echoed 
constantly in the Greek Cypriot society, contributing to the perpetuation of the already 
distrustful environment and to the internalization of the perception that Turkey is a threat 
regardless of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot relationships. 
 
5.5.3. Settlers, Refugees, Territorial Adjustments and Governance 
 
Settlers 
The number of Turkish settlers is another issue of great contention and one that that 
creates anxiety to Greek Cypriots. It is also one of the most securitized issues in a cross-
sectoral manner. Specifically, the increasing number of settlers creates (for Greek 
Cypriots): i) societal threats – i.e. there is the fear that the demography of the island will 
change putting at risk the Greek identity; ii) political threats – i.e. the settlers are 
expected to be much more influenced by Turkey and thus vote in (Turkish) Cypriot 
elections based on what is more beneficial for the latter, not necessarily for Cyprus or 
even the Turkish Cypriots; and iii) economic – i.e. the settlers are considered to be much 
poorer than both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and they could thus become a huge burden 
on the economy.  
 
On an elite level the discourse on settlers focuses on the number of settlers who are to 
remain in Cyprus in case of a settlement. The number of settlers ranges from 50,000 to 
180,000 depending on one’s sources.73 This issue however is not as straightforward as 
one would assume, as there are fundamental disagreements between the two sides on who 
is a settler. The Turkish Cypriot side considers the TRNC citizenship as the determining 
factor on who is or not Turkish Cypriot – i.e. any person, regardless of origin, could be 
Turkish Cypriot if he or she has a TRNC citizenship. Greek Cypriots on the other, who 
do not recognize the TRNC citizenship, do not accept this position arguing that Turkish 
Cypriots are the people who have Cypriot lineage. They do accept however some of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 A discussion about the estimated number of settlers and an analysis on what would be reasonable 
estimation can be found in Appendix IV: ‘Settler population calculations’. What is argued in this thesis is 
that the number of settlers is somewhere between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot figures, namely a 
little over 100,000.  
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realities deriving from the protracted conflict, such as the second or even third generation 
Turks who are not of Cypriot lineage but were born in Cyprus and lived in the island all 
their lives. Greek Cypriots accept that these individuals, along with others who married 
Turkish Cypriots, should stay in case of a settlement.  
 
 
Refugees 
The issue of refugees, and more specifically the number that could potentially return to 
the areas currently not under the control of the RoC is another thorny issue, not least 
because it is perceived in zero sum terms (Pfirter 2006). What is worth noting is that the 
issue is not only the number of people who will potentially return, but also how quickly 
they will return and more importantly what rights they will have when they return.  
 
The two issues (settlers and refugees) are particularly interesting for the study of 
securitization and bottom-up pressures because after 1974 elite, educators and media 
adopted a discourse that reiterated the position that an unquestionable goal of a settlement 
is for all refugees to return to their homes, while all settlers would leave Cyprus. Indeed, 
the slogan ‘όλοι οι πρόσφυγες στα σπίτια τους και όλοι έποικοι έξω από την Κύπρο’ (all 
refugees to their homes and all the settlers out of Cyprus) was reiterated and internalized 
at all levels, elite and public alike. Subsequently, for Greek Cypriots any alternative is 
considered to be at best unacceptable and at worst a threat, which leads to the public 
demand that the issue of settlers and to a lesser degree the refugees’ return to be 
securitized and be treated as existential threats.  
 
Territory and governance 
Equally important are the issues of territory and governance. Both sides argue that they 
want a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal solution. As mentioned this is the second best 
option for both sides,74 while their understanding and definition of bi-zonal federation is 
completely different (e.g. Bahcheli and Rizopoulos 1996/97; Zervakis 2006). Within the 
framework of bi-zonality the RoC wants a federal solution with a strong central 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Cyprus2015 (2009; 2010; 2011) bi-communal opinion polls. 
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government, while the Turkish Cypriots want essentially a confederation with equal 
status of both communities and a weak federal centre (Diez 2002). This difference in 
understanding influences significantly the negotiations on how a new federal state would 
be governed and specifically how much power each constituent state would have and 
how weak or strong the central federal government would be. Similarly, there is a very 
different understanding of what ‘political equality’ means and while both sides agree that 
there should be political equality, this is still one of the major issues of contention during 
the negotiations for governance issues. More importantly for this thesis is the fact that the 
lack of definitions allows for securitization of either the entire form of settlement, i.e. bi-
zonal, bi-communal federation, or parts of it, e.g. the governing aspect of the settlement.  
 
Lastly, the territorial adjustments, namely how much territory will be returned to Greek 
Cypriots, also receive particular attention in the negotiations. This is an issue that can be 
negotiated more easily not least because many Greek Cypriots came to terms that some 
areas are very unlikely to be returned. This not to say however that it is not an area of 
contention or that some Greek Cypriots still find it unacceptable that some areas will not 
be returned. Subsequently, the loss of territory also becomes subject of securitization.  
 
5.6. EU-Cyprus conflict 	  
Given the areas of contention mentioned earlier, as well as the socio-psychological 
factors dominating the conflict, it was not unreasonable to believe that the EU could 
indeed have a significant impact on the conflict. Hopes for a settlement were placed 
heavily on the EU and more specifically on the pre-accession period; indeed many 
believed that the conditions for a settlement were ripe and that period was a golden 
opportunity given the potential benefits of a settlement and the prospects for a unified 
island within the EU. This section examines the incentives for Cypriots to join the EU 
and the theoretical conflict resolution mechanisms of the latter. Finally it examines why 
the EU did not have the anticipated impact.  
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5.6.1. Incentives and conflict resolution mechanisms 
 
The primary incentives behind the RoC’s application were not economic, but rather 
political (Nugent 2006). The former Cypriot Foreign Affairs Minister, Ioannis Kasoulides, 
confirmed that ‘the overall process [of accession] is subsumed under our supreme 
strategic objective, namely to end the division of the island’ (Kasoulides 1999: 8, my 
emphasis). Greek Cypriots believed that the prospect of accession and eventual 
membership would change the Turkish side’s incentive structure, ‘forcing’ it to become 
more flexible on the Cyprus problem, while it would also shift the balance of power in 
the island in favour of Greek Cypriots (Tocci 2004; 2004b; Christou 2004; Diez 2002). 
Membership would also provide Greek Cypriots with even more legal ‘weapons’ such as 
the liberalization of the freedom of movement, which would help tackle the Turkish 
demands for ‘strict bi-zonality’ and restrictions in the freedom of movement (Tocci 2007). 
But there were also other expectations related to the conflict. It would also allow Greek 
Cypriots to internationalize the problem even further by involving another global actor 
besides the UN (Christou 2004), while it would also provide additional security against 
any further Turkish military intervention (ibid; Tocci 2004). 
 
The Turkish Cypriot expectations on the other hand are not as straightforward, not least 
because it is not them that applied for membership, but the RoC. Thus, unlike the Greek 
Cypriot elite, the Turkish Cypriot could not clearly articulate what benefits they could 
expect from the RoC’s application since they considered it illegal to begin with. 
Regardless, it is still possible to estimate some of those expected benefits, especially after 
the opening of the crossing points in 2003.  
 
The primary short and medium term incentive for Turkish Cypriot was economic. In 
2000 the Greek Cypriots’ GDP per capita was 2.8 times more than that of the Turkish 
Cypriots (Emerson and Tocci 2002). Accession for the Republic, therefore, would bring 
significant economic gains for the Turkish Cypriots, not only because they would receive 
funds from the EU, but also because there would be more investments and tourists 
(Nugent 2000). This would be particularly the case after 2003 with the opening of the 
crossing points and the relative free movement of people and capital across the Green 
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Line. In addition, Turkish Cypriots recognized that they would not become ‘European 
citizens’ with either a Turkish or TRNC citizenship; the only alternative would be 
through the RoC, since they have the right to acquire the Republic’s (and thus EU) 
passports with all the benefits this entails. 
 
It is relatively easy to see what the Greek and Turkish Cypriots expected to gain from 
accession. A more challenging question is what where the EU incentives to accept a 
conflict-ridden state into its family. First of all, it must be noted that there should be a 
distinction between the expectations of the EU as a whole and of those of specific 
member-states. On one hand, as Tocci (2007: 28) argues, the ‘EU interests [as a single 
actor] in the Cyprus conflict are defined in relation to its wider concerns for peace and 
stability in the eastern Mediterranean’. Similarly, Brewin (2000: 3) argues that ‘after the 
end of the Berlin wall, the end of the Green Line would be a step towards a “frontier free” 
Europe’. The idea was that Cyprus would be an extension of the ‘community method’ to 
the resolution of conflicts (ibid: 4). A solution to the Cyprus conflict would also increase 
the chances for peace between Turkey and Greece (Tocci 2007), making thus the 
European neighbourhood even safer.  
 
On the other hand there were specific member states that had a special interest in the 
Cyprus case. Above all was Greece’s insistence to include Cyprus in the eastern 
enlargement wave, threatening to block the entire eastern enlargement process should the 
Cypriot application be rejected (Brewin 2000). The British also had a special interest in 
Cyprus mainly because of their colonial past and because of the two sovereign bases they 
still have on the island. They supported Cyprus’ accession but were against any EU 
involvement in the conflict, as any EU involvement would complicate things and dilute 
their own power as a key player (Tocci 2007). Other member states that are generally 
negative towards Turkey’s prospects for accession (such as France) had an interest in 
Cyprus’ accession because they could use the lack of resolution as an excuse for rejecting 
or delaying Turkey’s accession in the future. This is obviously just a hypothesis that can 
neither be easily proved nor openly uttered by either Cypriots or other Europeans. It is 
however emphasized frequently in the Greek Cypriot press and unofficial discourses.  
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The EU attempted to influence the conflict in more than the expected traditional direct 
way, namely by changing the incentive structure of parties involved. It also tried through 
what Diez et. al. (2006; 2008) call the ‘enabling pathway’, meaning that it provided the 
elite with reference points in order to legitimize conflict-diminishing policies without 
having significant domestic political costs (ibid). These reference points allow actors 
from both sides ‘to link their political agenda with the EU and through reference to 
integration, justify desecuritizing moves that may otherwise have not been considered 
legitimate’ (Diez et al. 2006), or according to Hill, ‘governments [are] able to resist their 
own nationalists by constraints of EU membership’ (2001: 315). This pathway was used 
frequently prior to 2004 but much less afterwards. As discussed in detail in chapter 6, the 
deeply securitized environment and the securitization routines did not allow for the 
enabling impact to have the wanted outcome, as horizontal and bottom-up forces were 
too strong for the elite to efficiently use the enabling pathway. Indeed, the failure of the 
EU to act as an ‘enabling agent’ is an indication on the impact institutionalized 
securitization processes could have on the perpetuation of such protracted conflict 
environments. 
 
5.6.2. Why the EU did not have the expected impact 
 
Obviously the EU was not successful since there is no settlement to the conflict. Some of 
the most obvious reasons relate to the zero sum mentality already discussed and more 
specifically to the exclusive positions of both sides, which blame the ‘other’ side of being 
unwilling to make any concessions. These factors revolve around the nature of the 
conflict. As Diez (2002) argues, the conflict has very modern characteristics, as opposed 
to the EU and its approaches that are rather postmodern. As the argument goes, if Cyprus 
is not ‘postmodernized’ (i.e. if the modern characteristics persist) there are no chances of 
coming to a sustainable resolution (ibid). According to Diez, it is the very nature of the 
Cyprus problem, i.e. the fact that is based on two exclusive identities more than anything 
else that makes it a ‘modern’ conflict (ibid). Along this line Diez and Tocci (2010) argue 
that Cyprus has only partially become Europeanized and the Cypriot identity can only be 
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postmodernized only if the Turkish Cypriots become (fully) part of the EU as well (ibid; 
Diez 2002b). Part of this conflict is an issue already discussed, namely the importance of 
Cyprus for Turkey. Whether or not Cyprus’ importance for Turkey was indeed based on 
military considerations or was only symbolic and the outcome of securitization is not as 
important. Either way it was wrong for the EU to assume that Turkey would not be 
willing to ‘sacrifice its perspective for membership for the sake of maintaining a “puppet  
regime” in northern Cyprus’ (Rhein 2002).  
 
Other factors revolve around the EU’s structural limitations. Eralp and Beriker (2005: 
188) for instance argue that the EU’s ‘structural prevention mechanisms correspond to a 
very rigid and limited set of foreign policy actions, whereas the nature of the dispute 
required a more sophisticated and complex approach to foreign policy’. In other words, 
the authors argue that there were insufficient conflict transformation activities, such as 
the creation of common values among parties. More specifically, even though the EU 
created a structural prevention mechanism using the enlargement process to change the 
incentive system in Cyprus, it neglected to tackle the conflict transformation aspect (ibid: 
177), limiting its chances for becoming a successful resolution catalyst. Another 
structural problem was the way the EU chose to change the incentive structure. As Tocci 
argues, the EU did not, and maybe could not, change the incentive structure of the 
conflicting parties because it did not, or could not, act as a ‘single and coherent actor’ 
(Tocci 2004: 19). Despite what seemed to be a well thought-out policy towards Cyprus 
and Turkey, in reality the ‘EU’s decisions were the result of an aggregation of internal 
and external actors and factors’, while the policy outcomes were influenced by both 
internal (Greek national interests) as well as external factors (e.g. US interests) (ibid: 
141). 
 
Other factors are the outcome of the two aforementioned arguments. The EU’s limited 
understanding of the nature of the conflict coupled with the absence of structural 
mechanisms led to a series of faulty assumptions and mistakes on behalf of the EU. One 
of the EU’s mistakes was that it did not realize that Turkish Cypriots considered the 
Union to be a biased ‘non-third party’ actor which according to them was working to 
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facilitate a Greek Cypriot solution (Diez 2002; Tocci 2004). This perception was 
especially strong prior to 2003, even though many still believe that this is still the case. 
Needless to say that Greek Cypriots do not accept this position, claiming that they had 
every right to become EU members and they should not be held hostages to Turkey’s 
intransigency (Brewin 2000: 138; Tocci 2004: 139), a view that was shared at the time of 
negotiations by the Union.75 
 
A second mistake was the EU’s miscalculation on how much accession could decrease 
significantly the opportunity cost of a solution, or what Tocci (2004) calls BATNA – 
Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement. As the argument goes, EU membership 
reduced the cost of non-solution for the Greek Cypriots, since the alternative – i.e. the 
status quo – was not as bad as it used to be; there is in other words a comfortable conflict 
or a state of cold peace (Adamides and Constantinou 2012).76 After 2003 and much more 
after 2004 the Turkish Cypriots’ view of the status quo also changed significantly since 
they too became better off from the RoC accession. This was because they were still 
autonomous (i.e. under the TRNC administration), but they could still get most of the EU 
benefits as Cypriot citizens. Overall, the high BATNAs on both sides inevitably made 
concessions scarce and improbable.    
 
The last faulty assumption concerns one of the EU’s strongest ‘cards’, namely the 
economic incentives of both membership and settlement of the conflict. The EU assumed 
that the political and security issues were of secondary importance compared to better 
economic conditions (Diez 2002). The assumption was that economic security would 
undermine all other security concerns for Turkish Cypriots (i.e. societal and political), but 
as Diez argues this assumption was problematic, not least because the Turkish Cypriots’ 
conditions, as harsh as they may be, are acceptable to them and they would still prefer 
direct trade and international recognition to any EU financial assistance  (ibid).  Christou, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 The European Council’s decision was to proceed with the RoC’s accession regardless of a settlement. 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm [accessed May 2, 
2009]. 
76 This is not a position that any political elite would be willing to admit as in theory they are all committed 
to a settlement, and any other view would have political costs. This is an issue that is examined in greater 
detail in chapter 6.	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who partly agrees with Diez, also concluded that ‘for the Turkish Cypriot ruling elite the 
issue was predominantly about societal security and identity’ and not so much about 
economics (2004: 175). But Christou also concluded that the public was more convinced 
by the prospective economic benefits from EU accession – even though they did not see 
the issues of identity and security as less important – and thus disagreed with their own 
leadership (ibid: 176); this is what led to the 2003 mass demonstrations.  
 
What could be argued with certainty is that the prospects for a stronger economy in case 
of a settlement, as many have argued (e.g. Watson 2007; Cilsal, Antoniadou-Kyriakou 
and Mullen 2008; 2009; 2010) did not influence Greek Cypriots into voting in favour of 
the Annan Plan. This can be explained in part by the already comfortable conditions that 
most Greek Cypriots live in and the fact that other security concerns (societal, political 
and military) are of much greater importance than the economy. The most important 
reason however for disregarding the potential economic benefits concerns the perceived 
threats deriving from the specific settlement. These threats were, as argued in detail in 
chapter 6, the outcome of institutionalized securitization.  
5.7. Conclusion 
 
The contemporary history of the island helps elucidate how and why the conflict has 
always revolved around the two distinct ethnic identities and why there is such an 
internalized zero-sum environment that limits the prospects for resolution. Similarly, the 
summary of the opposing views on what caused and maintains the conflict sheds light on 
why threats are so deeply internalized and subsequently why they can relatively easily be 
part of a routinized securitization discourse. Chapter 6 builds on this chapter and 
elucidates, using specific examples, why these perceptions have become part of the 
routinized securitization discourse and how they open the door for horizontal and bottom-
up securitization.   
 
Understanding the EU resolution mechanisms and the failure of the former to have a 
significant impact on the conflict acts as a base to understand how a securitized 
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environment, when coupled with identity-related grievances and the conflict routines that 
are maintained for ontological security purposes, could limit the ability of local, 
international and regional organizations to influence the development of the conflict. 
Indeed, in Cyprus, as is the case in other conflict cases, ‘heavy footprint’ international 
interventions could and do create more local resistance and much more securitizing acts 
than anticipated.77 As the argument goes, the more institutionalized the securitization 
process is, the more resistance international actors will face. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  For an analysis on heavy and light footprint interventions and their link to local resistance see Newman 
2009.	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Chapter	  6:	  Institutionalized,	  horizontal	  and	  bottom-­‐up	  
securitization	  in	  the	  Cyprus	  conflict	  framework	  	  
 
This chapter connects the previous chapters by linking the literature on ethnic conflicts 
and the case study (chapter 5) with that of securitization (chapter 2) and provides 
empirical support for the conceptual framework and hypotheses as outlined in chapter 3. 
It is worth reiterating that while the evidence is limited to one case study the findings are 
to some extent generalizable and could therefore have relevance to other similar 
environments. As demonstrated in chapter 5, the Cyprus Problem is a ‘typical’ protracted 
ethnic conflict meaning that the findings can be extrapolated into more generalizable 
arguments that link specific social contexts and the development of institutionalized, 
horizontal and bottom-up securitization.78  
 
The chapter is separated into two broad parts. The first section tackles the first hypothesis 
and provides empirical support for the three-step institutionalization process. The second 
part deals with the other two hypotheses and provides evidence on how and why 
horizontal, bottom-up and ‘involuntary’ securitization take place. 
6.1. Institutionalization process 
 
The first hypothesis argues that it is possible, under some conditions, for the process of 
securitization to become institutionalized. As explained in chapter 3, the term 
‘institutionalization’ in this thesis refers to the process through which securitization 
becomes part of the community’s political and social routines to the degree that they are 
‘formalized’ and ‘automated’. Thus, securitizing acts become part of the actors’ routines 
leading to continuous and rarely interrupted securitization attempts. In turn, this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  It must be noted that I do not make the argument that all ethnic conflicts are identical. Indeed, it is 
acknowledged that each protracted ethnic conflict has distinct variables (e.g. specific relationships between 
opposing parties). However, the social context and characteristics in such environments are very similar, 
and subsequently so is their impact on the securitization processes.	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routinized process is incorporated into the audience’s daily lives leading to an 
environment where securitizing acts are both expected and many times demanded and 
where they are often accepted without significant negotiation between actors and 
audiences.  
 
As discussed in chapter 3, the three steps through which securitization could change from 
an ad hoc process to an institutionalized one are: i) the birth stage, ii) the unchallenged 
period and iii) the institutionalization phase. Each of these stages is examined below 
using Cyprus, and more specifically the Greek Cypriot side, as a case study.   
 
Stage 1: Birth 
The first stage refers to pivotal events that generate an environment in which no doubt 
exists, within the entire or significant part of the society, of what constitutes a threat. 
Such a pivotal event for Greek Cypriots was the Turkish invasion in 1974, which led to 
an unchallenged and unquestionable perception of what constitutes the biggest Greek 
Cypriot threat, namely Turkey and more specifically the Turkish military.79  There have 
been also other pivotal events that did not involve violence but were still significant 
enough to generate strong perceptions regarding potential threats. Such pivotal events 
were the 1960 constitution with the related political deadlocks and bi-communal fighting 
and more recently the ‘Annan Plan’.  
 
A pivotal event could be either a one-time incidence (e.g. Turkish invasion), or an entire 
period of political discourse with or without a ‘tangible’ outcome (e.g. Annan Plan 
period). Regardless, the outcome is the same: the emergence of an unchallenged period 
for what constitutes a threat for the entire population, as was the case with invasion, or 
significant parts of it, as was the case with the Annan Plan. These events are so pivotal 
that they form the foundation for future political and social agendas when it comes to 
potential threats. This is evident from the fact that for all post-event elections, 
presidential, parliamentary or for MEPs, the focal point remains the Cyprus problem and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  For Turkish Cypriots the equivalent would be a series of events during the 1963-67 period as discussed 
in chapter 5.	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since 2004 the Annan Plan. An indicative example is a 2013 Presidential campaign event 
– with invited speakers including the President of the Parliament, Yiannakis Omirou, the 
former Foreign Minister (and 2013 Presidential candidate) Yiorgos Lillikas and the well-
known academic Van Koufoudakis – entitled ‘From Annan 5 to Annan 6: Is there another 
way?’.80 Despite the fact that the Annan Plan failed and it is no longer (officially at least) 
on the negotiations table, the event was so pivotal that it is part of all elite discourses, 
while it has also become the ‘standard’ with which all other potential settlement efforts 
are compared with.  
 
Pivotal events vary in magnitude and subsequently on how they are securitized. In the 
case of the 1974 intervention for instance, the severity of the Turkish military actions (i.e. 
loss of Greek Cypriot control of 37% of the territory, displacement of one third of the 
population and the death of several thousand people) was so significant that eliminated 
the need for any actor or political entrepreneur to securitize it. There was no need for 
‘negotiation’ between actors and audiences to establish which referent objects were under 
threat or what the source of threat was. That does not mean that there is no securitization; 
indeed there is constant securitization, albeit there is no negotiation as there is no need to 
‘convince’ an audience. Any form of negotiation that takes place is to remind audiences 
of the threats and of the agents able to handle them. 
 
In the other cases however, when the event is pivotal but also unclear on why it 
constitutes a threat, securitizing actors have a more active role to play. The Annan Plan 
for example was indeed pivotal and thus central for the society as a whole but, unlike the 
invasion, there was no consensus either among the elite or the audiences on why this was 
the case. During that period (2003-2004) the audiences and securitizing actors were 
divided as to what constitutes a threat; it was not clear in other words whether accepting 
or rejecting the Plan would create more existential threats for Greek Cypriots.81 Precisely 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  ‘Από το Ανάν 5 στο Ανάν 6: Υπάρχει άλλος δρόµος;’ Details for the event can be found at 
http://www.yiorgoslillikas.com/ [accessed April 2, 2012].	  81 	  Indicatively of the opposing opinions, President Papadopoulos and other elite claimed that the 
implementation of the Plan would lead to the destruction of the Republic of Cyprus, Nicos Anastasiades, 
the President of DISY (and 2013 Presidential candidate) and Yiannakis Kasoulides, an MEP, argued that a 
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because of this ambiguity some parts of the population (elite and audiences) had very 
strong and unchanging perceptions of what constituted a threat, while others did not. In 
such cases, given the importance of the event and the possibility for ‘convincing’, there is 
significant negotiation between actors and audiences, as well as between audiences (i.e. 
horizontal securitization). 
 
Inevitably the ‘birth stage’ is a period of ‘hyper-securitization’: this is a period when an 
entire society and subsequently the securitizing actors and audiences are constantly pre-
occupied with the pivotal event related threats. During the period leading to the Annan 
Plan referenda for instance the securitizing actors increased significantly and included 
journalists in major newspapers, academics, literally all political elites, the President of 
the Republic, and more importantly each individual, regardless of social capital, who 
became a securitizing actor aiming to influence his/her immediate periphery. Similarly, 
references to the pivotal event (e.g. Annan Plan) dominated political, media and public 
discussions. Indicatively, in the month leading to the referenda all newspapers had, on a 
daily basis, Plan-related issues as headline news. The audience inevitably also engaged in 
a mode of ‘hyper-securitization’ in the sense that it was constantly ‘bombarded’ with 
potential threats and thus became particularly passionate and opinionated about threats 
deriving from the specific event. This passion is often manifested as an echo of the elite 
and media positions and frequently develops into horizontal securitization among peers.  
 
These kinds of events are also pivotal because they remain in the political and social 
discourses for a long period as seen from the example above for the Lillikas presidential 
campaign. This means that they shape to a degree the social context in which future 
securitization will take place. Pivotal events therefore create a form of ‘path dependency’ 
as securitizing actors link potential future threats to past events, while they are also 
themselves linked to the way they handle or position themselves vis-à-vis that event.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
rejection of the Plan would be a ‘second Asia Minor destruction’ for Greek Cypriots (see e.g. 
www.parliament.cy/parliamentgr/008_01/praktiko2005-12-14.doc)	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Stage 2: Unchallenged Period.  
 
The essence of the unchallenged period is that elite and audience are either unwilling to 
question the generally accepted perceptions regarding perceived pivotal event-related 
security threats, or they adamantly support specific positions related to the event. Its 
importance lies in the fact that it opens the door for un-negotiated securitization between 
actors and (some) audiences, while it also allows for horizontal processes among the 
audiences. These periods may be either short, albeit very intense (as was the case during 
the Annan Plan period), or long-term with diminishing intensity (as was the case with the 
1974 invasion). Either way this period is sufficient to make certain issues so ‘central’ for 
securitizing actors and audiences that they incorporate them into their routines until they 
eventually become institutionalized. Thus stages 2 and 3 could run concurrently since the 
internalization of perceived threats and their incorporation into social routines is a slow 
and incremental process and the rate at which it takes place is not uniform throughout the 
population or for each pivotal event. What is worth noting is that these issues are self-
reinforcing in the sense that the longer they remain unchallenged (or enjoy strong 
support), the more difficult it is to challenge them in the future or even remove them from 
the routines, making therefore desecuritization or less securitization particularly difficult.  
 
The most indicative unchallenged period in Cyprus was the one following the invasion 
when no politician or media ‘dares’ to this day question i) whether Turkey is indeed a 
threat for Greek Cypriots, ii) the official discourse which dictates that the Problem is one 
of ‘invasion and occupation’ and iii) that the fault for the non-settlement is all on Turkey 
and its allies, namely the British and Americans. Decades later this position is still 
unchallenged by all Greek Cypriot political parties,82 indicating how central the specific 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  For the official positions on the Cyprus problem (re-iterating what was mentioned above) of the five 
Parliamentary Parties, almost four decades after the pivotal event, see: ‘AKEL’s position on the Cyprus 
Problem’, National Council 15-17 February 2012 [available at www.akel.org.cy] (accessed February 20, 
2012); ‘Speech by Nicos Anastasiades’ (President of DISY), Parliament, February 24, 2012 [available at 
www.disy.org.cy] (accessed February 28, 2012); ‘DIKO - Pancyprian Tactical Conference: Principles 
Framework and Political Goals’, March 14, 2009 [available at www.diko.org.cy] (accessed February 28, 
2012); ‘EDEK - 12th Pancyprian Tactical Conference: The Cyprus Problem; Strategy change now’, May 5 
and 6, 2012 [available at www.edek.org.cy] (accessed February 28, 2012); ‘Green Party positions in 
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pivotal event and its subsequent consequences is for the elite and public alike. Indeed, the 
Cyprus Problem has been so central for Greek Cypriots that it became part of their 
identity; every development, be it political, economic or issues pertinent to natural 
resources (e.g. natural gas), revolves around the Problem. Loizos (2010: 11) offers an 
indication of this centrality when he points out that ‘if we were to carry out a simple 
numerical count of the vast literature of the last 75 years about Cyprus, it is a safe bet that 
at least 95% of it would be connected with “The Cyprus Problem” and would be about 
the actions of states and their leaders, policies and political programs’. Similarly, he also 
argues that the daily newspapers would, until the mid 1980’s, almost always have on their 
front page news related to the Cyprus problem. While this would not be surprising for the 
immediate period following any pivotal event of such nature, it is not expected to enjoy 
such centrality three or four decades later, especially when the conflict is a ‘comfortable 
one’ with economic and social prosperity and no concrete reasons for physical insecurity. 
The Cyprus Problem however remained the focus of all major media and political agents 
even after three decades indicating once again how a pivotal event could lead at the 
beginning to an unchallenged period and later to routinized behavior. As argued in detail 
later, for the period 2003-2009 (i.e. over three decades after the 1974 event) the front 
page of the most circulated newspapers in the Greek Cypriot side dealt with the Cyprus 
problem on average every two out of three days. This pre-occupation with the conflict 
cannot therefore be attributed solely to the direct impact of the conflict – given that the 
conflict does not have an impact on the population on a daily basis – but rather to the way 
the conflict has influenced the development of the society and the people’s identities that 
have incorporated the conflict.   
 
This ‘conflict obsession’ creates a ‘chicken and egg’ question, namely whether people 
tend to desire constant briefing on the developments because the Cyprus problem is so 
important (central) to them, or whether it is important for them precisely because the 
papers and political elite pay so much attention to it. Regardless, the conflict remains so 
central, I argue, because of the constant and institutionalized securitization. The argument 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
National Council’ September 14, 2010 [www.available at www.greenpartycy.com] (accessed February 28, 
2012).	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therefore should not necessarily revolve around why institutionalization occurred but 
rather how the securitization processes are influenced once it has occurred. 
 
The unchallenged period of other events, such as the Annan Plan, cannot be equated with 
the 1974 event. However – and even though the Plan did not even come into effect – the 
(perceived) potential threats deriving from the Plan rendered the April 2004 period a 
pivotal event. As already noted, eight years later it is still the focal point for future 
presidential elections. In addition and more importantly the outcome of any future 
negotiations or even the perpetuation of the status quo is almost always compared to the 
Annan Plan in order to emphasize how good or bad alternatives they are. Indicatively, 
one of the most influential Greek Cypriots, Archbishop Chrysostomos, in an attempt to 
emphasize the negative developments of the negotiations noted in an interview on May 
2nd 2011 (i.e. 7 years after the referenda) that ‘if by chance anything comes out of these 
negotiations it will be three times worse than the Annan Plan’.83 In this case the 
Archbishop argues that the Annan Plan was extremely negative for Greek Cypriots and 
developments would be even worse, using thus the Plan as a ‘negative reference point’ 
with which future options should be compared. Similarly, but with a positive spin is 
President’s Christofias main political advisor, Tomazos Tsielepis, who argued during the 
2008 presidential race campaign that he does not believe ‘that it is possible for us [i.e. 
Greek Cypriots] to have in front of us a fundamentally better Plan’ [...].84 In this case the 
connotation is that the best option for Greek Cypriots was the Annan Plan and thus any 
future negotiation outcomes should be accepted if they resemble those of the Plan. In 
both cases the Annan Plan set the bar for future negotiations; for some the bar was very 
low and must be raised significantly while for others it was already quite high. The 
Annan Plan example demonstrates that during the second stage events may not be 
unchallenged per se, but they could be supported or opposed fervently.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  ‘Και αν παρελπίδα βγει κάτι από τις συνοµιλίες νοµίζω ότι θα είναι τρισχειρότερο από το Σχέδιο Ανάν’ 
(Sky, 2011, my translation).  	  84	  ‘Δεν πιστεύω ότι είναι δυνατόν να έρθει ένα ουσιωδώς καλύτερο Σχέδιο µπροστά µας’ (Apopsi 2009, 
my translation)	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Stage 3: Institutionalization  
 
The third stage commences during the ‘unchallenged period’, when threats start 
becoming internalized and conflict-related routines are created. This is done primarily 
through constant securitization, which in turn leads back to the perpetuation of those 
routines, therefore creating a vicious cycle of constant securitization and the inability to 
eliminate specific perceived threats from the political and social environment. The two 
together contribute towards the continuation of the unchallenged period as the constant 
securitization makes any challenge an even more difficult task. The third stage, which 
institutionalizes those routines, leads to the perpetuation of the second stage as well (i.e. 
certain issues remain unchallenged or are fervently supported or opposed). Similarly, 
unless there is a change in stage 2 (i.e. a challenge on the existing perceptions), it is 
highly unlikely that there can be any change in the institutionalization stage.   
 
Both communities, but especially the Greek Cypriot one, have been in the third phase for 
a number of decades. This is evident not only from the perpetuation of the official 
‘national discourse’ regarding the Problem as noted above, but also from the attention 
conflict-related issues receive in the papers. The fact that over three decades after the 
invasion 65% of the headline news are related to the Cyprus Problem is indicative of how 
necessary the conflict remains for the public; it is in other words the issue that attracts 
most public attention.85 For Greek Cypriots the most securitized issue is that of the 
Turkish guarantees; an issue that always occupies a top spot on the political elite agenda. 
The guarantees, as is evident from almost all opinion polls, is by far the most important 
reason for Greek Cypriots for rejecting or accepting a settlement, while it was also one of 
the primary factors for rejecting the Annan Plan.86 There are the kind of issues that 
become so internalized as threats that the audience may actually expect its elite to keep 
securitizing them because constant securitization creates a sense that they are treated with 
the importance they deserve.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85	  Statistics regarding the frequency of specific issues as they appear in the press are discussed in detail 
later in this chapter.	  
86 This issue is revisited in greater detail later in this chapter.  
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The internalization of issues such as the guarantees and potential TRNC recognition by 
the audience can be to a degree quantified as is evident from the opinion polls as well as 
from the academic survey conducted for this thesis. Opinion polls conducted by bi-
communal NGOs and major television stations over the period of 2009-2011 demonstrate 
clearly that certain issues remain of utmost importance for Greek Cypriots. Table 6.1. 
below demonstrates this argument using a 3-grade ranking system to summarize the 
findings of these polls with the ‘grades’ ranging from ‘Very Important’ to ‘Important’ 
‘Not Important’.87 It is worth noting that by far the most important concern for Greek 
Cypriots is that of security, which was ranked first in all opinion polls. 
 
Table 6.1. Opinion polls summary  
 
The summary above also demonstrates that the public diachronically perceives the same 
issues as more or less important. It is thus not a coincidence that the political and media 
elite constantly focus on them, making them part of their routinized securitization agenda. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Given that each opinion poll did not ask identical question, I grouped the issues based on the overall 
context. For instance questions pertinent to Turkish intervention guarantees and the presence of the Turkish 
army were grouped into the ‘security category’. Questions in these groups could be: “how important do you 
consider the abolition of the Turkish guarantees?”; or “how unacceptable/acceptable do you find the 
perpetuation of the Turkish guarantees as part of a settlement?”; or in a question that asked “what are you 
incentives for voting in favor of a settlement” and the answers included “the abolition of Turkish 
guarantees” or “the withdrawal of the Turkish army”. I then ranked the issues from Very Important to Not 
Important depending on their ‘ranking’ in the opinion polls. Some questions were ranked in the survey (e.g. 
in cases where the questions asked for the most important incentives; these issues were ranked based on 
importance). In other cases, I ranked them myself based on the data. For instance, if 96% of the people 
found the perpetuation of Turkish guarantees entirely unacceptable, but only 70% found territorial related 
issues unacceptable, then the former would be ranked as ‘Very Important’, while the latter as ‘Important’. 
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Indeed, as shown later these are issues that constantly appear as headline news in the 
Press and are constantly discussed in political debates, while parties make a conscious 
effort to frequently emphasize how important they are for them.88 The reverse argument 
could also be true, namely that the public is concerned with the same issues precisely 
because they are constantly securitized; this is a similar ‘chicken and egg’ question 
discussed earlier. The answer to this question remains unchanged: regardless of the 
‘causality direction’ some issues are being presented as threats in an institutionalized 
manner and the public seems to routinely and unquestionably accept them and even 
expect them. 
 
The argument of institutionalized securitization is corroborated by the academic survey 
conducted for the thesis that clearly indicates that many Greek Cypriot academics are 
unwilling to cooperate with Turkish Cypriot colleagues out of fear of recognizing the 
TRNC, while at the same time some of them even engage in horizontal securitization to 
stop other Greek Cypriot colleagues from cooperating with Turkish Cypriots.89 This is 
particularly interesting and indicative of how influential institutionalized securitization is. 
While it is impossible for individuals to recognize an entity or state (e.g. TRNC) – an 
issue that was also brought up in the focus groups discussions with academics – the 
subject of recognition has been so routinely securitized that even the most highly 
educated part of the population has internalized the threat and thus accepts and reiterates 
the relevant securitizing acts. Even the academics that have cooperated with Turkish 
Cypriots were not comfortable with the issue of recognition. Only half of them (51%) 
cooperated in the areas not controlled by the Republic. Of the remaining half that did not 
engage in any cooperation activities in the areas north of the Buffer Zone, 53% of them 
said they would not do so in the future. This is an indication that even those academics 
who are willing to have a more open relationship with the ‘other’ are influenced by the 
routinized securitization of specific issues.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  Several examples are provided later in this chapter that demonstrate the conscious efforts of elite and 
parties to demonstrate their ‘focus’ on the important issues.	  	  89	  Specifically, 65% of the academics who did not cooperate with Turkish Cypriots rated the option (out of 
8 possible options on why they did not cooperate with Turkish Cypriots) ‘I do not want to recognize the 
TRNC’ as very important. This was by far the most popular choice. It is worth noting that Greek Cypriots 
perceive recognition-related issues as part of the overall security issue. 	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In conclusion, once the process reaches the third stage the process of securitization 
becomes ‘automatic’ or heavily routinized in the sense that there is a repetitive behavior 
by the securitizing actors and audiences alike in an ‘automated’ manner. Furthermore, 
once issues are institutionalized they cannot easily be desecuritized. This is evident from 
the fact that even though the RoC became an EU member thereby strengthening its 
political power and security, Greek Cypriots are still deeply concerned about issues of 
security and recognition and ‘demand’ their securitization. Similarly, the change of 
leadership from so-called hardliner Papadopoullos to the pro-reconciliation leftist 
Christofias had no impact on the perpetuation of the dominating perceived threats. There 
was no change towards a desecuritized or less securitized environment; indeed, even 
Christofias and the ruling party AKEL securitize the same issues, which is an indication 
that they have adapted to the deeply securitized social context, despite their conciliatory 
and desecuritizing rhetoric. 
 
Having demonstrated that pivotal events could lead to institutionalized securitization the 
following section, using again the Cyprus conflict, examines in greater detail the 
conditions under which institutionalization could take place and the impact the latter has 
on the process. 
6.3. Institutionalization impact on the securitization process 
 
This section examines the importance of social context – with the focus on ethnic 
conflicts – as an integral variable in the development of institutionalized and the 
subsequent different forms of securitization. It deals therefore with the other two 
hypotheses, namely that i) once institutionalized, securitization need not be always a top-
down process but could also be (a) bottom-up and (b) horizontal; and ii) that the 
institutionalization of securitization induces actors and audience alike to engage in 
‘involuntary’ actions. 
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6.3.1. Ethnic conflict environments: providing the context for institutionalization  
 
The mainstream reading of securitization is all about ‘who can “do” or “speak” security 
successfully, under what conditions and with what effect’ (Buzan et al. 1998). This 
section deals with the ‘under what conditions’ part of this definition and more 
specifically with the context found in protracted ethnic conflicts. The latter are of 
particular importance precisely because they provide the necessary conditions for 
institutionalization to take place. These conditions include, inter alia, competing ethnic 
identities, zero sum mentalities and internalized negative perceptions about the ‘other’ 
and as Kelman (1997) points out inter-societal processes of ethnic struggles, which are 
part of the people’s daily lives even when there is no violence.  
 
Why intractable conflicts: As seen in chapter 5 three of the most important characteristics 
of intractable conflicts are: i) that they are ‘central’, meaning that members of society are 
constantly preoccupied by it; ii) that they are ‘total’, meaning that what is (perceived to 
be) at stake is the existence of one or both sides; and iii) that all parties involved have an 
interest in the conflict perpetuation (Bar-Tal 1998; 2000). All three are integral variables 
for the development of institutionalized securitization as they contribute to the emergence 
of a setting where actors such as political elite and media agents have a vested interest in 
perpetuating the securitized environment, contributing thus to the creation of conflict-
perpetuating routines. The next section provides empirical evidence from Cyprus 
demonstrating the existence of the three aforementioned characteristics and how they 
influence the development of institutionalized securitization.  
 
Centrality and constant pre-occupation of the conflict (characteristics i & ii): How 
‘central’ is the Cyprus conflict and how pre-occupied are Cypriots with it? Evidence 
shows that the answer to both questions is ‘very much’. The degree of ‘centrality’ could 
be determined through qualitative approaches (e.g. focus groups, interviews, etc.), as well 
as through quantitative ones; the thesis uses both approaches with particular emphasis on 
the latter. The quantification of ‘centrality’ took place through a press analysis for the 
period 2003-2009 and specifically by measuring the frequency and focus of Problem-
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related issues in the daily press and through an analysis of several public opinions. The 
quantitative findings are corroborated by data gathered from personal interviews and 
focus groups.  
 
Indicative of the centrality of the Problem is the fact that that all Greek Cypriot 
newspapers have a daily ‘permanent’ section on politics that is dedicated solely to the 
developments of the Cyprus problem. This section is within the first seven pages of the 
newspapers, indicating how important the conflict is for the papers and evidently for the 
readers as well. It is also interesting that this section occupies at least three full pages 
regardless if there are any significant developments or not. These facts alone are 
indicative of the centrality of the Problem. However, to test the ‘centrality’ of the 
Problem more concretely I examined the front pages of the three most widely circulated 
Greek Cypriot newspapers to measure how many times Problem-related issues appear as 
headline news.90  
 
Table 6.2. Frequency of Cyprus-conflict related headlines 
 Frequency 
(absolute numbers) 
Frequency 
(Percentage) 
Valid 
Percent 
NO Reference 
Reference 
Total 
 817 34.7% 35.1% 
 1,506 63.9% 64.7% 
 2,326 98.7% 100.0% 
No newspapers  30 1.3%  
Total 2,356 100.0%  
 
As summarized in Table 6.2.91 above the 2003-2009 examination period amounts to a 
total of 2,356 days, out of which 2,326 (or 99%) were ‘valid’ days, meaning there were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  For methodological details and the reasoning behind the choice of the three papers see chapter 4.	  	  
91 As noted in the methodology chapter the headlines analysis did not examine all three papers for each day. 
Each day the focus was on one of the three papers, rotating every two months  - e.g. Phileleftheros January 
and February 2004; Simerini March and April 2004; Politis May and June 2004. The rotation then extended 
to the years – e.g. Simerini January and February 2005; Politis March and April 2005 and Phileleftheros 
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newspapers available for those days.92 Approximately 65% of the 2,326 days, the three 
major newspapers had Cyprus conflict related issues as headline news. 93  This is a 
particularly significant percentage, considering that the examination period is over three 
decades after the pivotal event of 1974, demonstrating clearly how central and total the 
Problem is for Greek Cypriots. The percentage would have been even higher if it were 
not for some ‘non-regular’ events that temporarily received a lot of front-page attention. 
Indicative examples of such irregular events were the Helios airline crash in 2005, which 
killed 121 Greek Cypriots and the elections in 2006 for a new Archbishop.94 It must be 
noted that the argument made here is not that the newspapers focus on the 1974 invasion 
per se every day. The focus is instead on the consequences of that event, some of which 
are still very real today. That said, what is argued here is that those consequences and the 
negotiations developments receive disproportionate attention in the media compared to 
the impact they actually have on the people’s daily lives. This is an indication that the 
Problem is part of the people’s identity and that the constant focus on it is, more than 
anything else, the outcome of institutionalized routines. 
 
Table 6.3. below shows a more detailed analysis of the frequency of conflict-related news 
for each paper. While all newspapers have regular referencing to the Problem in their first 
page Phileleftheros, the most popular paper, stands out.95 Whether Phileleftheros is the 
most popular paper because it makes more reference to the Cyprus conflict cannot be 
determined from this analysis, but it is certainly an interesting outcome. However, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
May and June 2005. This way it was assured that each paper would be examined at least two times for each 
month during this period. 92	  The days after major holidays such May 1st and January 1st there are no newspapers. 
93 For more details on the methodology, especially on what qualifies as ‘headlines’ and examples of 
‘qualified’ and ‘unqualified’ days’ see chapter 4. 
94 The elections for a new Archbishop are ‘irregular’ events as they only take place when an Archbishop 
passes away. Indicative of how rare such elections are is the fact that since the Cyprus independence in 
1960 there have been only two elections – the first in 1977 and the second in 2006. 
95 These percentages in a much bigger sample could have been somewhat different. For instance, the 
random selection of Politis for August 2005 (the month of the Helios airline crash) yielded many ‘negative’ 
results for that paper, reducing thus the Politis positive ‘reference percentage’ – specifically the Helios case 
reduced the percentage by approximately 2-3%. Had Phileleftheros or Simerini been selected for that 
year/month, they too would have yielded many negative results as such events were front-page news in all 
papers. However, the overall percentage for all three papers (65%) would not have been significantly 
different.  
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fact that it remains the most circulated paper is an indication that it offers what the 
majority wants, which evidently is a focus on the Cyprus problem. 
 
Table 6.3. Cross-tabulation of newspapers and frequency96 
Newspaper 
NO / YES 
Total 
Reference 
Frequency 0 1 
Phileleftheros 
Politis 
Simerini  
 182 587 769 76% 
 304 504 808 63% 
 331 415 746 56% 
Total 817 1,506 2,323  
 
Phileleftheros has been the newspaper that over the years supported the government 
positions on the Cyprus problem. The only exception has been the period during the 
Christofias Presidency (2008-2013) when this paper along with all the other ones harshly 
criticizes the President’s handling of the negotiations.97 The owner of the specific paper is 
not a member of and does not openly support a specific political party. Similarly, none of 
the major political journalists are members or have expressed openly any preference to 
any political party. That said, they were openly against the Annan Plan during that period 
and supported any elite who shared their views on the Plan. Politis newspaper is also not 
affiliated with any party and neither are its political journalists. However, unlike the ones 
in Phileleftheros, they were openly in favor of the Annan Plan and supported any elite 
who shared their views and harshly criticized the previous President, Tassos 
Papadopoulos – who was described as a hardliner and nationalist – and any other elites 
and non-elites who opposed the Plan. Simerini is very different than the other two. It 
clearly holds a much harder line on the Cyprus problem. The owner as well as the 
political journalists frequently and openly support specific candidates based on their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Value “0” indicates that there was no reference in the first page (i.e. the particular day did not ‘qualify) 
and value “1” that there was (i.e. that it ‘qualified’) as relevant front-page news as defined in chapter 4. 
97 The only paper that is clearly in favor of President Christofias and the governing party AKEL, is 
Haravgi, which is, however, ‘the organ expressing the views of the Central Committee of AKEL’  [το 
εκφραστικό όργανο της Κ.Ε του ΑΚΕΛ] (http://www.haravgi.com.cy/). AKEL is the political party that 
Christofias was leading for several years and the only Party that openly supports the specific President.	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views on the Problem even though they are not associated with any specific party. They 
are clearly opposing the leftist Party AKEL and President Christofias.98 The three papers 
together therefore cover to a significant degree the entire political spectrum. 
 
The extensive focus on the Problem is not limited to the printed media. On the contrary, it 
enjoys a central position on television and radio news and debates. Specifically all 
national television stations dedicate on a daily basis significant time to cover the 
developments of the conflict in their main evening news shows.99 The same applies for 
radio stations. As is the case with the newspapers, unless there are other major news such 
as a local or international tragedy – e.g. airline crash, tsunamis, earthquakes, etc. – the 
developments of the Cyprus problem are the headline news and political elite are 
frequently invited to participate and offer their assessments on the issues at hand. It is 
worth noting that the political coverage is not limited to factual developments (e.g. the 
President met with UN envoy in Cyprus and discussed “X” or “Y” issue), but also 
extends to the reactions and assessments from all political parties. This means that all 
elites are actually expected to be (and are) constantly ready to discuss and criticize the 
developments and the other elites’ handling of the issues. The constant focus of all media 
outlets with the Problem makes it essentially impossible for the audiences to remain 
uninfluenced. On the contrary, the continuous news ‘bombardment’ allows the conflict to 
maintain a central position among the public, making it at the same time part of people’s 
routines. 
 
The latter argument, namely the centrality of the conflict among the public, is 
corroborated by several opinion polls which indicate that almost four decades years after 
1974 the most central issue for Greek Cypriots remains the conflict. Specifically, the 
main deciding factor (57%) for voting any MP in parliamentary elections is ‘the political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 The fact that the most hardline paper has less front-page references has to do with the structure of its 
front page that presents many times only one issue. The internal pages of the paper pay particular attention 
to the Problem; indeed Simerini, unlike the other two major papers that offer a relatively wide-range of 
news, is ‘known’ only for its position on the Problem. 99	  In Cyprus there are no television channels dedicated to news (e.g. like CNN or BBC). However, the four 
major local channels (CYBC1, MEGA, SIGMA, ANT1) – which are also free and available in all the RoC-
controlled areas – dedicate on a daily basis approximately 2 hours on covering the news.	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party’s position on the Cyprus Problem’; 19.1% find the party’s position on the economy 
as more important; 10.5% said that their decision would be influenced by the party’s 
candidate; 7.4% on the party’s position on other governance issues and 4.7% did not 
respond or said they do not know (Ant1, January 2011). It is worth recalling that 2010 
and 2011 has been a period of financial crisis with rising unemployment rates and 
decreasing investment activities; one would thus expect that Cypriots would pay 
particular attention to the country’s economy. Yet the economic management of the state 
is not nearly as important as the management of the conflict, even if the vast majority 
(approximately 65%) does not expect that negotiations will lead to a positive outcome in 
the near future (Cyprus2015, December 2010; CEPS 2009). It is also worth noting that 
MPs do not directly deal with the conflict developments (e.g. negotiations); yet it is still 
the conflict that determines who will enter the Parliament.  
 
The media analysis, coupled with the data from opinion polls, provide a clear indication 
of both the centrality and the totality of the conflict in Cyprus. The two together 
inevitably and perhaps inadvertently create an environment that fosters the promotion of 
institutionalized securitization, given that it is in the best interest of elite and media to 
promote the conflict in a way that is constantly interesting to the audiences. This is 
primarily achieved by persistently securitizing developments and potential threats.  
 
 (iii) Interest in conflict-perpetuation: The third major characteristic of intractable 
conflicts is that of personal and public interest in seeing the conflict continue. As 
discussed in chapter 5, when facing decision dilemmas people tend to overweigh possible 
losses relative to comparable gains and thus engage in risk-averse behavior (Levy 1992). 
In Cyprus the risk-averse choice is that of the status quo and subsequently the 
perpetuation of the conflict. This is an attractive option, especially for Greek Cypriots, 
because the conflict is non-violent and rather comfortable (Adamides and Constantinou 
2012). A resolution, or even a proposed one (e.g. like the Annan Plan), has risks and 
given that a settlement of such protracted conflicts requires significant sacrifices on a 
political and social level. These sacrifices create uneasiness and a sense of dissatisfaction 
within the community, making thus a settlement an unpopular option for elite and public 
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alike. This is obviously a particularly difficult argument to prove empirically, not least 
because no elite would ever be willing to admit that they have an interest in perpetuating 
the conflict. On the contrary, they would argue that their ultimate aim is to find a 
settlement, as long as it safeguards the community from future threats. Even the former 
President Tassos Papadopoulos, considered by many to be a very hardline leader, 
repeatedly said that ‘by rejecting the Annan Plan we did not reject a “solution” [to the 
Problem]’ (Interview in Simerini, December 9 2007). He also clarified that he wants a 
settlement that would ‘save Cyprus’ [Η λύση που θέλω για να σώσω την Κύπρο]’ (ibid). 
The word ‘save’ connotes that other forms of settlement are a threat and could potentially 
lead to the loss of Cyprus (for Greek Cypriots). Equally importantly is that the phrase ‘I 
want to save’ Cyprus also connotes that it is up to him (as President) to save Cyprus. 
Accepting or rejecting any given settlement or a specific position on any particular issue 
(e.g. settlers) is a responsibility that is personalized and linked (in the eyes of elites and 
public) to the negotiator and his/her political party for decades. This personalized 
responsibility is not limited to the President. Political elites do not hesitate to 
opportunistically remind the media and analysts of their positions on particular issues. 
When asked about the ongoing negotiations political elites from DIKO, EDEK, 
EVROKO and DISY (the four parties that are not in the government) were keen to 
emphasize that they have personally ‘warned’ the President about the consequences 
deriving from his soft approach towards the issue of settlers and political equality and 
were keen to remind me what their ‘correct’ and more importantly safer positions are on 
the issues.100 Elite and parties are particularly clearly very careful in not deviating from 
the ‘accepted discourse’ as the potential cost is not necessarily temporary, but one that 
could hurt themselves and their party for long periods. With the same token they also 
choose to express positions on which they can capitalize in the future.101 These positions 
however frequently lead to the perpetuation of the conflict as they inadvertently advocate 
for the perpetuation of the status quo and of a securitized environment.   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Personal interviews: DISY (May 4, 2011); DIKO (May 10, 2011), EVROKO (May 12, 2011) and 
EDEK (May 12, 2011). Such responses are also articulated on public settings as well since elites want the 
public to know what their positions are vis-à-vis specific conflict-related issues.  
101 As demonstrated later in this chapter, the capitalization of specific positions also occurs with the use of 
visual images.	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It is not just elites that cannot argue that they want the perpetuation of the conflict. Non-
elites may also be skeptical to express such as positions as they could be perceived as 
unpatriotic. Despite such potential social costs, opinion polls show that only two thirds 
(approximately) of the population actually wants the negotiations to lead to a settlement, 
clearly indicating some preference for the continuation of the status quo.102 What must be 
noted is that the question in the opinion polls did not evaluate any particular settlement. 
The responses therefore were in regards to a general preference for any settlement (even a 
potentially favorable one). It is thus expected that this percentage would be much lower if 
it was in reference to a specific settlement (e.g. Annan Plan) and if the proposed 
resolution was portrayed as ‘costly’ for one or the other side; indeed this was the case 
with the Annan Plan referenda where 76% voted against it. Similarly, in a hypothetical 
question for a 2012 referendum (for a settlement), only 23% of Greek Cypriots would 
vote positively or leans towards a ‘yes’ vote, as opposed to 42% who would certainly or 
likely vote ‘no’ (Cyprus2015, Spring 2012). If these numbers are juxtaposed with those 
of 2009 we see that there is a decreasing desire for a settlement. Specifically the 
equivalent ‘yes’ and ‘no’ percentages for 2009 were 26% and 34% respectively 
(Cyprus2015, December 2009), which means that the potential ‘yes’ votes decreased by 
3% and the potential ‘no’ increased by 8%. 
 
Earlier opinion polls (Cyprus2015, December 2009) indicate that the age group was also 
a factor in the decision-making process.103 In a question whether they would vote ‘no’, or 
lean towards voting ‘no’ in a future referendum the positive response percentage became 
bigger as the age group of the responders got smaller (see Table 6.4 below).104 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  102	  CEPS (2009) opinion poll indicate that only 64% and 65% of Greek and Turkish Cypriots respectively 
have a ‘high desire’ for a settlement. Cyprus2015 (2010) poll estimates the percentages for Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots at 68% and 65% respectively.	  103	  I specifically refer to a 2009 opinion polls as the more recent polls did not include age-related data.	  	  104	  There is no available data for 2012.	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Table 6.4.  Voting preference for potential settlement by age group 
Age group  
(Greek Cypriots) 
Certainly or likely 
to vote "No" 
18-24 42% 
25-34 40% 
35-44 35% 
45-54 34% 
55-65 28% 
65+ 29% 
 
The fact that the younger generation is less keen to seek settlement is not surprising. The 
younger generations have no co-existence experiences or positive memories of the 
‘other’; their perceptions are mostly shaped by the official (e.g. education) and unofficial 
narratives (e.g. family) which emphasize the invasion and other bi-communal violent acts 
and the subsequent negative consequences. As a result, the perceived risk (for the 
younger generation) to live with the ‘other’ is much higher, meaning that the incentive 
for a settlement is lower. The younger generation – as an audience – is also more likely to 
accept acts securitizing proposed settlements given that they do not have personal 
experiences that could help them question the validity of the threats when those are 
linked to the ‘enemy other’. 
 
Leaving aside whether or not political elite and other actors would truly like to see a 
settlement, it is clear that the Cyprus problem ‘sells’ commercially (i.e. papers, television, 
radio) as well as politically (i.e. major issue for voters). Precisely because it is beneficial 
there is sufficient motivation for these securitizing actors to perpetuate the conflict and 
even become identified with specific positions vis-à-vis potential settlements.105 As the 
argument goes, a resolution would make these securitizing actors less important for the 
public. That said, elites may also become less important even if there is no resolution. 
Specifically, this could happen if they choose to completely or partially detach 
themselves from the conflict and focus on other issues such as the economy. For as long 
as the Cyprus Problem is the primary concern for Cypriots (as demonstrated by polls), 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  105	  Specific positions could include, inter alia, issues related to the number of settlers, the treaty of 
guarantees, governance issues, terms of bi-zonality, etc.	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any securitizing actors’ detachment would lead political or financial costs. Subsequently, 
there is little incentive for any elite or media agents to voluntarily and unilaterally (i.e. 
without other actors doing the same) ‘withdraw’ their attention from the conflict. 
Simultaneous detachment by all actors, so as not one particular agent will suffer the costs, 
is not a feasible or realistic scenario. They all thus have a vested interest in the 
perpetuation of the conflict, which is essentially the only real option for them.  
 
To demonstrate vested interest in the continuation of the conflict on a public level is even 
more difficult. As discussed in chapter 3, one of the possible incentives for people to 
want the perpetuation of the conflict is the need for ontological security (Mitzen 2006). 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots have, since 1974 (and in some areas after 1963), maintained 
their identities through routines that did not include the ‘other’; indeed, the foundation of 
those routines was the exclusion of the ‘other’ from their daily lives. This is especially 
the case for the younger Greek Cypriots who never had the opportunity to live with 
Turkish Cypriots or in any way include them in their daily routines and thus their 
identities. A settlement that would bring Turkish Cypriots (and Turks) into their lives is 
an unknown experience and would unquestionably interrupt the Greek Cypriot routines, 
creating thus anxiety and fears for ontological insecurity. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that younger generations (as seen above) are more hesitant towards a settlement. 
 
The argument of settlement-related fears is also supported from data indicating that 
Greek Cypriots are unwilling to accept a settlement despite the fact that reunification 
would improve the island’s economy and the people’s standard of living (see e.g. Ayres 
2003; Watson 2007; Cilsal, Antoniadou and Mullen 2008, 2009). This indirect rejection 
of a settlement ‘carrot’ is witness to the fear of ontological insecurity and the subsequent 
preference for conflict perpetuation. The settlement ‘stick’ – namely the threat that any 
proposed settlement may be the last chance for a resolution – also seems to be ineffective. 
In a January 2012 (Ant1) opinion poll 86% of the Greek Cypriot respondents answered 
that they would not accept a settlement simply because it would be the last chance for a 
resolution, as opposed to only 4.7% who said they would (the rest said they do not know).  
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The need for ontological security seems to be a valid reason for the public to require the 
perpetuation of the conflict. However, it may not be the only one. What is argued here is 
that the lack of desire for a resolution is a combination of factors, namely the need for 
ontological security, collective fear of the future (i.e. uncertainty deriving from a 
settlement) and the deeply institutionalized securitization procedures that limit the 
options of both elite and public to make concessions that are necessary in order to reach a 
settlement or at least to desecuritize the environment. Indeed it is the last variable that 
leads to the first two. Routine securitization perpetuates the perceived threats and risks 
and maintains a low level of desire for resolution and a high level of fear for the future. 
 
The fears and perceived threats and the ‘obsession’ of Cypriots with the conflict are part 
of the social context in which securitization occurs. The following section examines in 
detail the Greek Cypriot habitus and the subsequent psycho-cultural predispositions of 
the population and how the two together influence the process of securitization.   
 
6.3.2. Greek Cypriot Habitus: Social context and psycho-cultural predispositions  
 
Chapter 3 discussed how the social context in which securitization takes place could 
influence the process. Balzacq for instance argues that the success or failure of the 
securitizing actor to persuade an audience is based to a degree on the latter’s point of 
reference (i.e. what it [audience] knows about the world) (2005: 173). Furthermore, it 
was argued that the point of reference depends on the dominant belief systems and thus 
on the psycho-cultural pre-disposition of the audience which, in ethnic conflicts, are 
particularly strong and resistant to change. The Greek Cypriot habitus is no exception and 
the dominating psycho-cultural pre-dispositions contribute to the development of 
routinized behavior regarding the existence and handling of specific threats. With this in 
mind, the thesis is in line with Stritzel’s (2007) suggestion that the process should have a 
more externalist approach, as the success or failure of speech acts should be examined in 
the wider social context – which includes the people’s pre-dispositions – and not in 
isolation (i.e. in an internalist way) as the Copenhagen School does. The Cypriot social 
context provides solid evidence on how the social context could influence the 
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development of both ‘mainstream’ and other modes of securitization (i.e. horizontal, 
bottom-up and ‘involuntary’). 
 
The Greek Cypriot habitus has been shaped primarily by the pivotal events of 1974 and 
by the several attempts to resolve the conflict, with the most prominent one being the 
Annan Plan in 2004. As mentioned, the events and the subsequent routines created very 
specific pre-dispositions vis-à-vis the conflict, most of which revolve primarily around 
the issue of security. Indicatively, in a December 2010 opinion poll, the principal 
motivating factors for Greek Cypriots to find a settlement are i) to bring Cyprus to a 
sustainable state of peace; ii) to recover control of the villages/towns lost in 1974; iii) to 
reduce the chance of armed conflict; iv) to achieve the termination of guarantees; v) to 
achieve the departure of foreign troops; and vi) the return of refugees (Cyprus2015, 2010). 
Out of the top six factors, four are directly related to security issues and the threat of 
Turkey and two are related to the loss of sovereignty, which also has to do with the 
presence of Turkish troops in the island. The fact that other factors such as the 
improvement of the economy, crime fighting, the reduction of defense expenditures, etc. 
are relatively unimportant (as indicated in those polls), is an indication how pre-disposed 
Greek Cypriots are when it comes to certain issues and to the ‘source of threat’ for these 
issues, namely Turkey.   
 
One of the reasons the public focuses on the Problem to the degree and way it does could 
be attributed to the role of the media. As Vultee notes, ‘industrial routines of news tend to 
reinforce a bias toward the status quo’ and the existing social routines (2011: 83). Vultee 
explains this argument using the US as an example, by pointing out that even if news did 
not conflate the war on terror with the war in Iraq (which were two separate issues), it 
would still be hard to challenge the people’s views (who did conflate the two), if these 
people have loved ones ‘fighting the war on terror in Iraq’ (ibid). A similar case applies 
in ethnic conflicts such as in Cyprus. Even if issues pertinent to Turkey are not conflated 
with the loss of loved ones or property, it is still particularly difficult for Greek Cypriots 
to be convinced that they are not connected. Indeed, as Christophorou, Sahin and Pavlou 
(2010: 63) point out, the Greek Cypriot press always portrays Turkey in negative terms 
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and as a threat to Greek Cypriots not only in military terms, but also in societal. Among 
other things constant arguments are presented with Turkish plans for a separatist status 
quo in Cyprus by altering the demography of the island (ibid). To emphasize the potential 
threat of Turkey, the latter is also portrayed as negative even for Turkish Cypriots, as it 
does not allow (according to the media) the latter to decide their own fate (ibid).  
 
Below is a more detailed analysis of the Press’ focus, which allows for a more elaborate 
juxtaposition between media news, opinion polls and political discourses. The press 
analysis for the 2003-2009 period yielded 1,506 days with headline reference to the 
‘national problem’ and a total of 1,907 conflict-related issues, meaning that occasionally 
some papers hosted more than one relevant headline news. The 1,907 references were 
categorized into 14 different groups as summarized in Table 6.5.  
 
Table 6.5. Categories of newspapers headline news 
Code Relevant to (category): Frequency Percentage 
1 
Negotiations developments between Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots (or Turkey) 483 25% 
2 Negotiations developments, but with foreign intervention 400 21% 
3 Turkey and TRNC relations 26 1% 
4 EU-Turkey relations (vis-à-vis the Cyprus Problem) 100 5% 
5 Annan Plan and Kofi Annan 125 7% 
6 Recognition / Direct Trade / Division 167 9% 
7 Settlers 26 1% 
8 Property aspect of the Problem 107 6% 
9 
Area aspect of the Problem (i.e. how much area side should 
control) 14 1% 
10 Security issues 138 7% 
11 Economy (vis-à-vis the Problem) 25 1% 
12 Societal issues (vis-à-vis the Problem) 163 9% 
13 Refugees and missing people 64 3% 
14 Other (e.g. interviews) 69 4% 
  
1,907 100% 
 
What is worth noting is that all three major newspapers analyzed operate in a similar 
manner when it comes to their focus on the Problem. All papers deal with the same issues 
to some degree and regardless of the wording the sub-text is the same, namely that there 
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are specific threats and sources of threats (e.g. Turkey, US, UK, etc.). Table 6.6. below 
provides a summary of the headlines distribution across newspapers and categories. Table 
6.7. presents each of the 14 categories as a percentage of the total references for that 
paper, indicating clearly that each category receives approximately the same attention in 
each of the three papers.106 In other words newspapers do not ‘specialize’ on some issues, 
but rather examine everything across the board in a similar manner. This is a clear 
indication of universally accepted perceptions regarding the importance of the specific 
issues and more importantly of the fact that the same issues are securitized in an 
institutionalized manner by all media agents, and as discussed later, by all elite. 
 
Table 6.6. Categories of headlines across newspapers 
News Category 
(see Table 6.5. for corresponding categories) Phileleftheros Politis Simerini Total 
1 39% 37% 24% 100% 
2 44% 29% 28% 100% 
3 65% 15% 19% 100% 
4 41% 39% 20% 100% 
5 35% 30% 35% 100% 
6 47% 26% 28% 100% 
7 27% 23% 50% 100% 
8 32% 50% 19% 100% 
9 29% 36% 36% 100% 
10 47% 25% 28% 100% 
11 48% 12% 40% 100% 
12 24% 37% 39% 100% 
13 33% 42% 25% 100% 
14 39% 36% 25% 100% 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106	  Taking category 1 as an example, we see that it appeared as front-page news 483 times, amounting to 
25% of the total 1,907 references. This is not the outcome of constant reference of one paper. What Table 
6.7. shows is that all three papers approximately focus on the same issues with approximately the same 
frequency. Phileleftheros’ focus on category 1 reached 25%, Politis 28% and Simerini 22%, indicating that 
all three papers focus on this issue (and all the others) relatively equally.	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Table 6.7. Categories of headlines across newspapers as a percentage of their total  
News Category 
(see Table 6.5. for corresponding categories) Phileleftheros Politis Simerini 
1 25% 28% 22% 
2 23% 18% 21% 
3 2% 1% 1% 
4 5% 6% 4% 
5 6% 6% 8% 
6 10% 7% 9% 
7 1% 1% 2% 
8 5% 8% 4% 
9 1% 1% 1% 
10 9% 5% 7% 
11 2% 0% 2% 
12 5% 10% 12% 
13 3% 4% 3% 
14 4% 4% 3% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
 
As shown in Table 6.5. above, approximately 25% of the headlines were about the 
development of the conflict (i.e. category 1) and specifically the negotiations between the 
two sides; these references were essentially updates on the meetings between the Greek 
and Turkish Cypriot negotiators. These updates were frequently (but not always) 
presented in a securitized way as they were portrayed as potential threats. Indicative titles 
(from all three papers) that fall in this category are: ‘Falling in the trap of Denktaş’107 
‘Turkish tricks: promoting an interim agreement with the goal of non-solution and the 
dissolution of the Republic of Cyprus’; 108 ‘Turkish attempts to cancel the July 8 
agreements’;109 ‘Between a solution and partition’.110   
 
The second category enjoyed 21% of the headline news and dealt with the developments 
again, albeit the focus was on foreign interventions and involved almost always the same 
actors, namely the UK, the US and the UN. As was the case above, these developments 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 [Στην παγίδα του Ντεκτάς] (Phileleftheros, August 8, 2003). 
108 [Τουρκική τρικλοποδιά: Προοθούν ενδιάµεση συµφωνία µε στόχο τη µη λύση και τη διάλυση της 
Κυπριακής Δηµοκρατίας] (Phileleftheros, January 28, 2004).	  
109 [Τουρκική προσπάθεια να ακυρωθεί η 8η Ιουλίου] (Simerini, July 20, 2006). 
110 [Μεταξύ λύσης και διχοτόµησης] (Politis, December 17, 2006).	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were often presented in terms of threats. Indicative titles are: ‘Warnings from Weston if 
Cyprus vetoes’111 and ‘Suspicious games from internal and external circles’.112 The 
negotiation developments, with or without foreign intervention, are rarely discussed in a 
positive spin in the press. Exceptions to this are ‘judicial victories’ at European 
institutions (e.g. ECJ and ECHR) and foreign diplomats’ comments that support the 
Greek Cypriot positions, especially on issues of recognition. Even those however receive 
less attention and for shorter periods than the perceived negative news. 
 
An interesting observation is also how the news connote the presence of threats without 
however always clarifying what these threats are.113  There is in other words a deliberate 
vagueness in the reporting of the developments. The credibility of the news or the 
agencies that report them does not seem to be hurt from the lack of concrete evidence and 
the deliberate ambiguities because of the existing context and the internalized negative 
perceptions of the ‘other’. Specifically, the deeply securitized environment is such where 
vague potential threats are easily accepted as the ‘truth’ or at least as very ‘plausible’. 
What is even more interesting is the easiness with which the same issues are constantly 
re-securitized even if past evidence indicates that similar threats were never implemented. 
The most obvious example of such repetitive discourse is that of recognition, which 
appeared as headline news 167 times (or 9%). While the TRNC has not yet been 
recognized and all related threats proved to be ‘empty’, the issue continues to appear as 
an imminent threat and the public seems to accept it as such.  
 
The rest of the headline categories, with the exception of the last one (number 14), 
include news with reference to specific issues. The category with recognition-related 
issues (category 6) almost always presented the news in terms of direct or indirect threats 
that derived from either the abovementioned foreign actors, or by Arab states and 
primarily Syria. References to ‘direct’ recognition include news related to alleged foreign 
attempts to recognize the TRNC, while ‘indirect’ ones primarily refer to attempts for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 [Απειλές από Γούεστον αν βάλει βέτο η Κύπρος] (Phileleftheros, October 30, 2004). This title refers to 
Thomas Weston, the US diplomat responsible for the Cyprus question.  112	  [Ύποπτα παιχνίδια από κύκλους εντός και εκτός] (Simerini, February 15, 2005).	  113	  I	  discuss	  the	  issue	  of	  phrasing	  in	  the	  next	  section.	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direct trade with (or direct flights to) the TRNC. The headlines frequently utilized ‘loaded’ 
terms (for Greek Cypriots) such as ‘partition’, ‘direct trade’, and ‘recognition’, linking 
thus automatically any such news to internalized threats.  
 
Societal-related news (number 12) are also significant as they constitute 9% of the total 
references. This category is particularly interesting as the aim of these news is not so 
much to ‘terrify’ the Greek Cypriots of potential existential threats, but rather to 
emphasize the several tangential threats that derive from either the occupation or 
potential attempts for cooperation with the ‘other’ and thus apply pressure on individuals 
who are tempted to be more closely associated with the ‘enemy’.114 The other major 
category is that of security (number 10), which as the title suggests refers to news that 
dealt directly and explicitly with issues of security. Given the absence of violence, these 
news were mostly in relation with developments pertinent to issues of the Treaty of 
Guarantees, military troops in Cyprus and occasionally to military updates for either the 
Greek or the Turkish Cypriot side. It is particularly interesting that while security is of 
utmost importance for the people (as demonstrated by the opinion polls mentioned 
earlier), the media does not seem to pay a lot of direct attention to this issue. This could 
be attributed primarily to the lack of directly relevant news, which makes the opinion poll 
results all the more interesting, as they demonstrate further that security threats are deeply 
internalized.  
 
What must be noted is that 88% of the 1,907 headlines could be categorized in just eight 
different groups, indicating clearly that there are very clear perceptions in the media, and 
inevitably among the public, of what is considered to be important and central. It is also 
clear that there is a form of institutionalized behavior in terms of focus – i.e. the focus is 
on the same or very similar issues – and in terms of presentation – i.e. the news are 
portrayed as a threat and essentially securitized.  
 
As mentioned, the media influence and are influenced by securitization; specifically, 
securitization is both an effect in the media and an effect of the media (Vultee 2011: 78). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Social pressure through the media is discussed in detail later in this chapter. 
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There is therefore a bilateral relationship between the media and the audience as they 
learn from each other; they give and receive a series of cues with which they build an 
interpretation of their exchange (ibid: 78-9). Thus, media’s routine behavior contributes 
to the institutionalization of securitization and the latter contribute to the repetition of the 
same issues in the news. This repetition in the media is therefore an indication of 
successful securitizing acts. In other words the reason there is so much repetition is 
precisely because those issues have been successfully securitized at some point in time, 
which subsequently means, by definition, they are deemed as extremely important. What 
is argued here is that when some successfully securitized issues become part of the media 
(and political) routines they could eventually become part of an institutionalized and 
‘fixed’ securitization framework. Once institutionalized desecuritization or less 
securitization becomes more unlikely; instead the constant re-securitization of the same 
issues is the most likely scenario. 
 
Part of this institutionalization is the repetitive discourse with the specific phrasing, 
which contributes to the incorporation of specific conflict-related threats into the Greek 
Cypriots’ identity. Furthermore, and provided that the threats are always presented vis-à-
vis the same enemy ‘other’, this repetition also contributes to the creation and 
perpetuation of strong zero-sum mentalities as is evident from opinion polls which 
indicate that only 6.4% of Greek Cypriots believe that their side gained more from 
negotiations, as opposed to 67.5% who believe that Turkish Cypriots gained more (Ant1, 
January 2010). This environment leads to the ‘conditioning’ of the audiences to accept 
routinized securitization unquestionably, while it also allows for the development of other 
modes of securitization, such as horizontal and bottom-up.  
 
6.3.3. Conflict perpetuating routines and the phrasing of threats 
 
Having discussed the repetition found in the press, this section deals with the phrasing of 
issues and how that too is the outcome of routinized and eventually institutionalized 
behavior. 
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In the post 1974 period several routines developed aiming to solidify the Greek Cypriot 
position on an international level, namely that they were the victims of a violent Turkish 
invasion and that the threat still exists, albeit not only in terms of military conflict. These 
routine efforts, while aiming at an international audience, had a domestic impact too as 
they solidified the Greek Cypriot perceptions and discourse regarding the potential 
threats to the community. This solidification took place with the frequent use of specific 
phrases and images, which were occasionally connected to past pivotal events such as the 
invasion and the Annan Plan. Specific discourses inevitably became part of the Greek 
Cypriot political and social routines and were institutionalized to the degree that they are 
constantly reiterated by elite, media and public in exactly the same manner and frequently 
with the exact same phrasing. The impact of this institutionalization, besides the 
internalization of specific threats, is the constraints individuals have in not using a 
specific discourse.  
 
The following sections examine the phrasing used by the media in each of the news 
categories mentioned above to determine how the use of loaded terms within specific 
contexts is used to successfully securitize issues. 
  
6.3.3.1 Domestic and foreign interventions (categories 1 and 2 in media headlines) 
 
The first category, negotiation developments between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot 
sides, received most of the attention in the press and almost always in a securitized 
manner. Turkish Cypriot suggestions were usually perceived as ‘tricks’ or deliberately 
vague for the purpose of achieving the Turkish goals ‘through the back door’. For the 
issues on the area redistribution and property, for instance, the media perceived them as 
dangerous machinations – see e.g. ‘In Denktaş Trap’, 115  ‘New Turkish tricks’, 116 
‘Ankara’s trap with the agreement,117 ‘Several interpretations for issues of substance’.118 
The choice of the words ‘trap’, ‘tricks’ and ‘several interpretations’ connotes uncertainty 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Phileleftheros, August 8, 2003 
116 Politis, October 6, 2003 
117 Phileleftheros, February 22, 2004 
118 Simerini, July 2, 2008	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and suspicion and promotes a perception of potential threats. The impact of such phrasing 
is exacerbated when repeated frequently as it creates a negative mental association that 
links specific issues (e.g. property, agreements, etc.) with threats rather than potential 
settlement. This link is possible because of the social context in which these acts take 
place. The zero sum mentalities dominating the environment makes ‘tricks’ and 
‘machinations’ from the ‘other’ appear in the eyes of the population as possible and 
rather likely.  
 
The frequent use of the same discourse linking specific issues (e.g. property) and 
proposals from the ‘other’ as threats lead to two interconnected problems that make 
desecuritization particularly difficult. The first is that the phrasing could become 
institutionalized limiting thus the options of elites and media in case they do not to use 
the same phrasing or following the same ‘connections’ between Problem-related issues 
and threats. This mild form of institutionalized securitization limits the options for, and 
increases the cost of, elites who might want to desecuritize an issue or leave it un-
securitized. It is for instance very ‘costly’ for any elite to argue that a Turkish / Turkish 
Cypriot suggestion is not a trap – and even costlier to argue that the Turkish proposition 
might be positive – when the media frequently portrays it as such and the public has 
internalized this belief (as is evident from opinion polls that shows great distrust towards 
the other side).  
 
The second issue is that the routinized phrasing and the linking of the ‘other’ with threats 
creates cognitive shortcuts for the public who might perceive something as a threat even 
if the intention of the elite or media is not to securitize it. In other words, the 
issues/developments that are frequently securitized in an institutionalized manner could 
eventually become securitized even without the explicit intervention of an actor, meaning 
that even if the media simply reports a development (e.g. a Turkish proposition) the 
audience is likely to perceive it as dangerous and negative, even if journalists do not use 
‘loaded’ terms such as those above.  
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The environment is similar for news on foreign interventions. It is worth noting again that 
there is an internalized Greek Cypriot belief that Cyprus is a victim of foreign powers, 
which is not surprising given how much external actors are being securitized. Almost all 
of the 400 references made to foreign interventions during the period 2003-2009 were 
linked to four key players: the UK, the US, the UN and the EU. Any reference to the first 
two (UK and US) was almost always couched negatively for Greek Cypriot interests and 
positive for Turkey and Turkish Cypriots. Routinely the US and the UK have been – and 
still are – portrayed as a source of threat of Greek Cypriots, but not in a direct way as is 
Turkey for instance.119 This is done indirectly by arguing that they hold a positive stance 
towards Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots and a negative one towards Greek Cypriots. 
The media focus is on the efforts these two actors make towards helping the TRNC gain 
recognition, directly or indirectly, or on the help they give to Turkey in order to enter the 
EU without making the necessary concessions towards the RoC.120  
 
Any intervention by these actors is thus securitized with the repeated use of key words 
and phrases. Regarding US and UK interventions, the media speech acts focus on the 
element of ‘mystery’ and ‘uncertainty’, making thus the certainty that the status quo 
supplies an attractive option. Vagueness is a particularly useful tool in the absence of any 
concrete evidence that a development or an intervention is indeed a threat. British and US 
initiatives are thus frequently portrayed as ‘cunning’ and ‘tricky’– see e.g. ‘Cunning 
package from the British’.121 Similarly, there is frequent referencing of words and phrases 
such as ‘trip up’ (τρικλοποδιά) and ‘tricky’ preparations – e.g. ‘British “trip up” the 
Greek Cypriot side: the international status of Cyprus will become questionable [if the 
Annan Plan is accepted]’;122 ‘The British are preparing tricks: permanent deviations from 
the EU acquis’;123 ‘The worst plan (delusion): the Americans prepare plans’.124 It is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 These perceptions have remained unchanged for over 6 decades. In chapter 5 I discussed and presented 
some evidence from the press on how Greek Cypriots perceived the role of the UK and US – i.e. as Turkey-
serving agents.  120	  A major Greek Cypriot argument is that Turkey is yet to recognize the Republic of Cyprus and it has 
not yet opened the ports and airports to Cypriot planes and ships.	  121	  Simerini, August 15, 2004	  122	  Simerini, March 14, 2004	  123	  Simerini, March 3, 2004	  124	  Simerini, December 3, 2003	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irrelevant that it is not always clear what these ‘tricky’ plans are; the perception is that if 
the Americans or British are preparing something, it must be tricky, cunning and almost 
certainly against Greek Cypriots. This creates self-fulfilling prophecies: if the public 
constantly reads that someone is planning something cunning, it expects something 
cunning and when a proposal comes along from these agents it is automatically perceived 
as negative and a threat as it ‘must be’ the outcome of cunning foreign machinations. As 
a result the public ‘demands’ that any such proposals be treated as threats leading again 
to the same problem mentioned above.  
 
Indicative of how the media and the public perceives the British and American 
interventions are also depicted in the daily cartoons of Phileleftheros, the most widely 
distributed newspaper. 
 
Figure 6. 1 Britain 'butchering' Cyprus  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: philenews.com (February 23 2004) and http://pincartoons.com.cy/bAnnanes/index.html) 
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Figure 6. 2. America's hidden Turkish interests 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: philenews.com (March 26, 2006) and http://pincartoons.com.cy/bAnnanes/index.html) 
 
Figure 6.1. above connotes that Britain acts as a butcher that will divide Cyprus as it 
wants with the blessing (and even request) of the EU. Figure 6.2. shows that behind the 
American behavior regarding Cyprus there is a hidden Turkish agenda. In both cases, the 
British and Americans are depicted as serving Turkey’s interests at the expense of Greek 
Cypriots. 
 
The examples above are an indication of the social context in Cyprus, which is such that 
people tend to see security issues everywhere, even when threats are not real or when past 
evidence does not corroborate the concerns. That said, it is not argued here that all 
foreign proposals are prepared in good faith and with the Greek Cypriot well-being in 
mind. On the contrary there is abundant evidence that supports the opposite; evidence 
that supports the constant securitization of issues and agents. Leaked documents with 
private electronic exchanges between UN officials indicate that there is indeed the 
element of trickiness when it comes to foreign interventions. An indicative example is 
Carl Bildt’s (former Swedish Prime Minister) discussion with the UN Special 
Representative Tayé-Brook Zerihoun regarding the negotiation developments at the time. 
The former stated that they cannot move too much beyond the Annan Plan, so to 
convince the Greek Cypriots ‘an element of theater is inevitable’ (Emilianides et. al. 
2010: 61). Such statements (i.e. element of theater, connoting obviously trickery) when 
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leaked, and regardless if they took place in private settings, only add to the distrust and 
the existing negative perceptions about foreign actors and allows for obstacle-free 
securitization.125  
 
Particular attention is also given to foreign attempts for direct and indirect recognition of 
the TRNC or the ‘downgrading’ of the RoC to the same status as the TRNC. Indicative 
examples used to emphasize these threats are: ‘Blair promises direct flights to the 
occupied areas’;126 ‘USA: de facto recognition’;127 ‘USA gave flight codes to Ertzian 
Airport [in TRNC]’ (Politis, December 2, 2004); ‘British belittle Tassos [Papadopoulos] 
and call Talat President’.128 
 
Figure 6. 3 Condoleeza Rice and 'South Cyprus' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: philenews.com (April 27, 2006) and http://pincartoons.com.cy/bAnnanes/index.html) 
 
The figure above shows Condoleeza Rice (former US Secretary of State) downgrading 
the RoC status and indirectly upgrading that of TRNC, by equating the status of the two 
sides. This drawing appeared after Ms. Rice, in a public statement, used the phrase ‘South 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 It is not argued here that foreigners might not have similar positions vis-à-vis the Turkish side. Indeed, 
the Turkish side also complains about biased foreign agents. 126	  Politis, May 18, 2004.	  127	  Politis, November 24, 2004.	  128	  Simerini, October 22, 2005	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Cyprus’ instead of RoC.129 In the background there is a sign saying ‘SOUTH CYPRUS’, 
connoting of course that there are two states in Cyprus, the South and North. Whether 
Condoleeza Rice deliberately wanted to make this distinction cannot be determined, but it 
is not likely given that the US government frequently reiterates its official position that 
there is only one recognized state in Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot reaction is indicative of 
how internalized certain potential threats and agents. Similarly, the fact that all elite and 
media reacted to Rice’s ‘mistake’ in a similar manner is also indicative of the 
institutionalization of reactions when it comes to specific issues (e.g. recognition) and 
agents (e.g. US). 
 
Other headlines revolve around ‘biased’ behavior, focusing on foreign intervention 
pressures towards the Greek Cypriot side and favorable behavior towards Turkey. For 
instance, ‘Bush is pressuring Tassos [Papadopoulos]’;130 ‘US gift to Talat and Ankara’;131 
‘Matthew Braiza: we should help Turkey [with EU accession]’.132 Indicative of the latter 
statement is also the cartoon drawing below, which depicts the US forcefully pushing 
Turkey into the EU while at the same time ‘squeezing’ Cyprus, connoting that Cyprus 
cannot and should not be an obstacle to Turkey’s accession. 
 
Figure 6. 4. US helping Turkey enter the EU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: philenews.com (June 9, 2008) and http://pincartoons.com.cy/bAnnanes/index.html) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  129	  http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/cna/2006/06-­‐04-­‐26_1.cna.html	  130	  Phileleftheros, February 4, 2004	  131	  Phileleftheros, May 30, 2005	  132	  Phileleftheros, July 19, 2006	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The negative perceptions towards foreign actors and the prospects of successful 
securitization are further strengthened when they are connected with the Turkish army, 
the source of the biggest Greek Cypriot fear. For instance, while it is well known that the 
Turkish army is comprised primarily of US-made weapons, there is still explicit reference 
with the use of ‘loaded’ words such as ‘occupation’ to connect the Greek Cypriot tragedy 
(i.e. ongoing occupation) with a specific agent (i.e. USA) – see e.g. ‘Occupation weapons 
with an American identity’.133 The coupling of the words ‘occupation’, ‘Turkish weapons’ 
and ‘American’ creates very negative perceptions in the Greek Cypriot community about 
the role the US has had and still has in the conflict. For the reasons mentioned above, 
these ‘reminders’ of the role the US has had in the Greek Cypriot tragedy allows for 
easier securitization of any American-related propositions for settlement. 
 
The EU and the UN also often receive similarly negative ‘treatment’ in the media. There 
are also however many occasions where interventions from these actors are portrayed as 
positive, but only if they clearly support the Greek Cypriot positions, namely that Turkey 
‘misbehaves’ or is accused of being at fault for a particular development. If an EU 
institution (e.g. ECJ or ECHR) supports a specific Greek Cypriot position, then the media 
headlines portray the development not only as positive, but also as something that 
supports the diachronic struggle of Greek Cypriots for justice and recognition that Turkey 
is to be blamed for all the problems. In such cases words such as ‘condemnation’ and 
‘justice’ are used – see e.g. ‘European Court of Human Rights condemns Turkey’.134 On 
the contrary, if an institution’s position is against Greek Cypriots, then the media portrays 
this development as either the outcome of a conspiracy or that of foreign pressures. 
Indicatively, ‘Turkish judge influences the ECHR;135 ‘Backstabbing from 4 judges of the 
ECHR’;136 ‘Commission report: removes all blame from Turkey [because it accepted the 
Annan Plan]’.137  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  133	  Simerini, July 15, 2004	  134	  Phileleftheros, January 10, 2007	  135	  Politis, October 1, 2003	  136	  Politis, September 8, 2003	  137	  Phileleftheros, October 6, 2004	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Figure 6. 5. ECHR and Turkey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: philenews.com and http://pincartoons.com.cy/bAnnanes/index.html) 
 
The figure above summarizes the abovementioned argument. The statue depicts the 
European Court of Human Rights (acronym ΕΔΑΔ in Greek). The little girl is supposed 
to be Cyprus,138 who says: ‘if she [i.e. justice] is blind, I am an Archbishop’, connoting of 
course, as the hood suggests, that the ECHR is influenced or even controlled by Turkey. 
 
6.3.3.2. References to individuals and the Annan Plan 
 
The media focus on foreign interventions is not limited to states; often interventions are 
personalized and the focus shifts to specific individuals such as the UN Special 
Representative, EU officials, foreign Ambassadors or even the UN Secretary General. 
This means that individuals are perceived as a ‘source of threat’ (just like states are) and 
thus become part of an institutionalized securitization framework. Specific examples of 
such actors who are constantly portrayed as ‘friends of the Turks’ (φιλότουρκοι) and their 
neutrality as mediators is questioned, are Günter Verheugen;139 Lord Hanney140 and 
Alexander Downer.141  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 The image of a little girl as Cyprus is also important as it connotes how unprotected Cyprus is. 
139 German EU Commissioner. Greek Cypriots do not like Verheugen for a number of reasons with the 
primary ones being his suggestions that there should be direct trade between the EU and the Turkish 
Cypriots and for saying  that he ‘felt cheated by the Greek Cypriot government [for not supporting the 
Annan Plan]’ (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/cyprus/1460004/EU-accuses-Greek-
Cypriots-of-betrayal-over-islands-peace-plan.html [ accessed 23 June 2010]. 
140 UK Special representative to Cyprus for the period 1996-2003.	  
141 Former Australian Prime Minister and UN Special Representative for Cyprus since 2008. I discuss how 
the media focuses on UN-related individuals below. 
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Due to their active roles Lord Hanney and Alexander Downer receive particular attention, 
with the latter being constantly presented by the media, the church and political elite as 
biased and untrustworthy and even request their withdrawal. Archbishop Chrysostomos 
for instance stated that Alexander Downer is ‘untrustworthy and must leave’.142 Similarly, 
the entire Greek Cypriot political elite, through a Parliamentary vote, is drafting a 
proposal requesting that the UN Secretary General relieves Downer from his duties as a 
Special Envoy.143 In this case therefore it is not the UN that is questioned, but rather the 
individual representing the UN. The case of Lord Hanney is very different: he is almost 
always portrayed as an individual who is supportive of the Turkish positions, but also as 
an individual who pursues the British interests, again always at the expense of Greek 
Cypriots.144 Any comments or proposals deriving from such individuals are immediately 
perceived as potential threats and elites and media are quick to securitize them. Indeed, 
securitization is almost an automatic reaction, which as explained earlier might be 
necessary in order to satisfy the public demands and provide a feeling that proposals from 
such ‘enemies’ are treated with the utmost importance (i.e. treated as potentially 
existential threats). Within this context there is a form of ‘involuntary’ securitization, 
given that elite have few options but to constantly treat such individuals as potential 
threats.  
 
The last category presented here is one that deals specifically with the former UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan, his associates and the UN-sponsored Plan.  This Plan, 
being by far the closest the two sides ever got to a settlement, received particular 
attention in the press and in political discourses and it was severely securitized. As was 
the case with the Americans and British mentioned above, the media who were opposing 
the Plan securitized or better yet ‘pre-securitized’ any actions from specific individuals, 
meaning that the media speculated how these individuals’ positions would pose a threat 
for Greek Cypriots – see e.g. ‘[Alvaro] De Soto sets us up’,145 connoting obviously that 
future actions will be in a form of a ‘trap’ and subsequently dangerous for ‘us’. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  142	  Offsite, July 13, 2010 (http://offsite.com.cy/arxeio-offsite/2918-23-01-2012.html).	  143	  http://www.sigmalive.com/simerini/politics/reportaz/459197 [accessed 30 January 2012]  144	  See e.g. Venizelos (2004); Emilianides et al. (2010)	  145	  Simerini, march 17, 2004	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social context, the routinized or even institutionalized securitization coupled with the 
internalized perceptions regarding some individuals allow for the development of 
successful securitization based just on speculations.  
 
The most common headline news during that period (2003-2004) were those emphasizing 
the Plan’s bias and the subsequent threats for Greek Cypriots – e.g. ‘Annan gives 
everything to the Turks: building up a state in the north’. 146  Indicative of these 
perceptions is also the figure below, which argues that while the population of Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots is 82% and 18% respectively this has no bearing on what each side 
receives from the Plan. 
 
Figure 6. 6. Biased Plan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: philenews.com and http://pincartoons.com.cy/bAnnanes/index.html) 
 
The securitization of specific aspects of the Plan is indicative of the necessity for 
incorporating the idea of multiple audiences into the theory. Frequently, during the 2003-
2004 period the securitizing actors’ focus was limited to only specific parts of the Plan as 
the goal was to ‘win over’ one specific audience that was directly influenced and not 
necessarily the entire population. An indicative example of a specific audience are the 
public servants, who according to the Press could lose their jobs had the Plan gone 
through – see e.g. ‘Public servants’ status is questionable with Annan Plan’.147 Successful 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  146	  Simerini, march 30, 2004	  147	  Simerini, April 10, 2004	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securitization of the job security of a large percentage of the population, as is the public 
sector, could and was a very successful approach to securitizing the entire Plan, provided 
that Plan had to be accepted or rejected in its entirety.  
 
What is more important is that if the media or other actors successfully securitize such an 
issue for such a large audience, the political elites’ actions become extremely limited. 
Provided that job insecurity is particularly important and could lead to anxiety, people are 
likely to choose the less risky path, which in this case would be treating the Plan as a 
threat and thus reject it.  
 
As demonstrated with the examples above, the frequent use of ‘loaded’ terms and the 
routine reference to potential threats from states, organizations and individuals contribute 
to the creation of an environment where securitization is so routinized that it becomes 
part of an institutionalized framework for elite, media and public alike. In turn this 
creates ‘automated’ reactions from actors and audiences that lead to involuntary 
securitization activities as defined earlier. Desecuritization or even less securitization 
becomes particularly difficult as the public is unwilling or not conditioned to accept any 
propositions deriving from specific non-Greek Cypriot sources; on the contrary they are 
conditioned to perceive such propositions as potential threats. In such social contexts 
elites have little incentive and much risk to attempt to desecuritize foreign interventions 
or specific proposals (as was the case with the job security in the Annan Plan). Instead, 
following the constant securitization path becomes the safest and least costly path. This 
‘safe’ path is also evident from the official routinized discourse of the political elite, 
which is discussed in the next section. 
 
6.4. Political elite and routinized securitization  
 
I have already discussed how elites choose (or are ‘forced’ to choose) discourses that 
echo the people’s perceptions of threats. What is more interesting is that all parties focus 
on the same issues and even use very similar phrasing. Elites are, in other words, 
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unwilling not to be part of the securitization discourses due to the high costs discussed 
earlier. Instead they choose to institutionalize responses to specific issues. The most 
indicative example is the issue of the Turkish guarantees, which as demonstrated in the 
following statements is part of all parties’ political discourse:  
 
President Christofias (AKEL): ‘The Greek Cypriot public has every reason not to want 
the Turkish guarantees, especially now the RoC is a full member of the EU’. 148 He then 
emphasized how the Turkish guarantees are a red line for Greek Cypriots.  
- DISY (Averof Neophytou – Vice president of DISY): ‘The Party does not accept the 
Turkish guarantees or the unilateral rights of intervention.149  
- DISY (Tasos Yiapanis): ‘The Turkish guarantees are a red line for the vast majority of 
Greek Cypriots’.150 
- EDEK (Koulis Mavronikolas – EMP): ‘The presence of the Turkish occupying army on 
the island is a source of tension and threat’.151 
- DIKO (Photis Photiou – Party’s spokesperson): ‘For DIKO the issue of Turkish 
guarantees and intervention in Cyprus is a red line’.152  
 
What is worth noting from the examples above is how all parties use the same or very 
similar expressions, such as the term ‘red line’ and the word ‘intervention’. Such 
expressions are part of the regular discourse and an integral part of institutionalized 
securitization. Issues such as the Turkish guarantees have been so deeply securitized that 
elite must now always treat them as an existential threat; hence the necessity to always 
mention how they are a ‘red line’. As the argument goes, the reason elite need to use 
these expressions is precisely because the issues are already so deeply securitized that the 
audience has expectations that its elite will treat them with the utmost care and priority. 
As a result, some expressions regarding threats (as shown above), as well some that refer 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  148	  http://www.typos.com.cy/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=98162	  [accessed	  March	  4,	  2011]	  149	  http://www.sigmalive.com/simerini/politics/interviews/88240	  [accessed	  June	  2	  2011].	  150 	  (http://www.kathimerini.com.cy/index.php?pageaction=kat&modid=1&artid=46198	   [accessed	  June	  2	  2011])	  151	  (http://www.mavronikolas.net/	  [accessed	  July	  5	  2011])	  152	  (http://sigmalive.com/news/politics/156559	  [accessed	  June	  3	  2011]	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to the goal of the Greek Cypriot side (see below) have become an ‘automatic’ (routine) 
choice for elite and media.  
 
The most frequently used phrase in regards to the Greek Cypriot goals is the ‘fair and 
viable solution to the Cyprus problem’ (δίκαιη και βιώσιµη λύση του Κυπριακού 
προβλήµατος).153 This is an expression that has been used by elite for over three decades, 
which subsequently (and inevitably) means that the public has accepted it and 
internalized it. Indeed, it is so internalized that even academics and foreign elite have 
adopted it. 154  
 
The frequent use of expressions, even ‘positive’ (i.e. not threat-related) ones, could also 
be used as securitization tools if they become part of the institutionalized political 
discourse. The choice of ‘fair’ and ‘viable’ for instance are subjective words and open to 
interpretation, making them thus useful tools if the need arises. Specifically, any 
development that needs to be securitized could easily be presented as a threat to the 
viability of a (proposed) settlement. The perceptions of fairness are heavily influenced by 
the repeated elite and media discourse and the specific phrasing used to describe a fair 
solution, namely that ‘all refugees should return home’ (όλοι πρόσφυγες στα σπίτια 
τους),155 ‘all settlers should leave’ (να φύγουν όλοι οι έποικοι), ‘all occupation troops 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  153	  Recently	  the	  term	  ‘functional’	  (λειτουργική)	  has	  also	  been	  added	  along	  side	  fair	  and	  viable.	  For	  indicative	  examples	  see:	  -­‐	   President	   Christofias	   (2010):	   ‘I	   outlined	   to	   Mr.	   Roboy	   our	   will	   for	   a	   fair,	   viable	   and	   functional	  solution	  to	  the	  Cyprus	  problem	  as	  soon	  as	  possible’	  (http://www.presidency.gov.cy/)	  [accessed	  May	  23,	  2010]	  -­‐	  President	  Papadopoulos	  (2005):	  ‘[…	  the	  Greek	  Cypriots	  abroad…]	  maintain	  a	  strong	  interest	  for	  fair	  and	  viable	  solution	  to	  the	  problem’	  	  (http://www.greeknewsonline.com/?p=3651)	  [accessed	  May	  23,	  2010].	  -­‐	   President	   Clerides	   (2002):	   ‘I	   informed	   the	   Prime	   Minster	   [of	   Greece]	   that	   our	   goal	   remains	  unchanged.	   To	   find	   a	   viable,	   fair	   and	   functional	   solution	   to	   the	   Cyprus	   problem’	  (www.philenews.com/afieromata/news/alitheia.htm)	  [	  accessed	  May	  23,	  2010].	  
154 See for example ‘The Hungarian President expressed the hope that there will be a fair and viable 
solution to the Cyprus problem’ (http://news.pathfinder.gr/greece/cyprus/40042.html [accessed May 23, 
2010]. For academics see for instance ‘A principled basis for a just and lasting Cyprus settlement in the 
light of International and European Law’ (Ifestos P.) (available at 
http://www.ifestos.edu.gr/32RuleofLaw.htm#INTERNATIONAL%20EXPERT%20PANEL) [accessed 
May 20, 2010]. 
155 This particular expression has been maintained since 1974 by all political elite. Indicatively, when the 
former President of Cyprus of Cyprus, Spyros Kyprianou, created the Democratic Party (DIKO), the motto 
and essence of his proclamation speech in 1976 was “All refugees to their homes’ (όλοι οι πρόσφυγες στα 
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must be withdrawn’ (να φύγουν τα στρατεύµατα κατοχής), ‘our borders are in Kyrenia’ 
(τα σύνορα µας είναι στην Κερύνεια), etc. These are expressions used in the education 
system as well, thereby creating internalized perceptions of fairness from a very young 
age. Anything less than those positions (e.g. withdrawal of all settlers) could therefore 
easily be successfully securitized as ‘not fair’, provided how internalized the perception 
of fairness is within each community. 
 
Even though the specific idea of fairness is embedded in the people’s identities, there is 
still a common understanding that it is impossible to achieve a settlement that includes all 
the ‘fair’ positions mentioned above; indeed, some positions are no longer even 
negotiated (e.g. that all refugees will return to their homes). It would thus be expected 
that the internalized element of fairness should have been ‘diluted’. Yet, elite still choose 
to pursue a ‘fair’ solution as defined above, not because they actually believe that they 
will be successful, but rather because of the need to maintain a patriotic image. This 
strategy (i.e. adoption of such discourse) is also useful as because it allows for convenient 
‘exit’ in cases when the negotiations do not develop as planned. Elites can justify 
rejectionist positions based on the unfairness of a proposal or development. Given the 
internalized perceptions of fairness, it is not at all difficult for elite to convince audiences 
and the media that a particular solution or proposal is unfair and thus a rejectionist 
position is justified. In addition, it is almost impossible for political opponents to support 
a Turkish or foreign position at the expense of the Greek Cypriot one, leaving thus any 
securitization attempts by the ruling elite unopposed.  
 
Even though it is tacitly acknowledged that the settlement will not be fair (as per the 
Greek Cypriot definition) the ‘fairness variable’ was never abandoned from the official 
discourse. There is however a shift in the focus towards the viability of the solution 
which can be more objectively defined but also more easily securitized. While ready to 
accept the lack of fairness from any settlement, Greek Cypriots are unwilling to accept 
that it may not be viable and it is the viability of plan or proposal (and not the fairness so 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
σπίτια τους). Available at: http://www.sigmalive.com/simerini/politics/reportaz/405441 [accessed January 
2, 2012]	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much) that actors use for securitization purposes. Indicative of this position is President 
Papadopoulos’ well-known speech a few days prior to the Annan Plan referenda in 2004, 
when he asked Greek Cypriots to reject the Plan. Among other things he said that ‘if the 
solution could not be fair, we had to at least aim to make it functional so as to be viable’. 
The connotation was that Greek Cypriots understand and deep down do not expect a fair 
solution, but they should not settle for non-viable one. 156  The expectations for a viable 
solution are particularly high given that the conflict in Cyprus is a comfortable one and 
the stalemate is not hurting either side (but even less the Greek Cypriots). This means that 
the prospects for settlement could potentially be perceived as more of a threat for 
Cypriots than the perpetuation of the conflict, especially if a settlement is identified as 
non-viable. More importantly the viability of the conflict is an issue that can be and 
indeed is easily securitized given the social context dominating the comfortable Cypriot 
conflict.  
 
The social context and the institutionalized referencing to particular threats also influence 
the security grammar (i.e. speech acts) necessary for the securitization process. As the 
argument goes a specific security grammar, dramatization and negotiations are no longer 
necessary to securitize an issue. A simple reference, even a visual one suffices as the 
audience is already ‘convinced’ of the potential threat. Therefore the goal of the actors in 
such environments – where securitization is institutionalized – frequently shifts from 
convincing the audience to simply reminding it of the particular threats. Similarly the 
goal becomes to remind the audience that they (i.e. specific actors, party, media agent, 
etc.) are in line with the people’s perceptions of threats and that they are the suitable 
agents to handle them.  
 
Below are indicative visual images that act as ‘reminders’. The use of visual images is an 
indication that the ‘mainstream’ speech acts that follow a specific security grammar are 
not necessary in some cases. Indeed, the connotations are clear because the perceived 
threats have been routinely securitized in the past and have become internalized.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 The speech is available at http://www.tassospapadopoulos.com/easyconsole.cfm/id/46 [accessed on 
December 7 2010] 
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Picture 6. 1. No to Turkish Guarantees 	  	  	  	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: www.diko.org.cy 
 
The picture above says “Send a clear message to Europe: No to the Turkish guarantees” 
and includes a military helmet with the Turkish flag. This advertisement found on 
billboards was for the European Parliament elections in 2009. The connotation here is 
that Turkish guarantees should be equated with the Turkish military and thus the 
prospects for another military intervention.  There is no need to explain this any further; 
the ‘link’ between guarantees and violence is part of the existing psycho-cultural 
predisposition of the Greek Cypriot audience. In addition, the advertisement connotes 
that ‘we’ (i.e. DIKO – the specific political party) says ‘No’ to the guarantees connoting 
on one hand that ‘we’ share your fears and will not accept anything that could jeopardize 
our community’s security, and on the other that the other parties might not be doing that, 
or at least not to the degree that ‘we’ do (i.e. you are safer with ‘us’).157 
 
What is even more interesting is the fact that years after the referenda political parties 
still base their election campaigns on their positions on the Plan. The idea is that parties 
that have successfully ‘saved the country from the Plan’ can safeguard Greek Cypriots 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 In the respective television ad, the helmet and the ‘No to Turkish guarantees’ is the same, but in the very 
end of the ad, there is a voice saying ‘what do the others say’? This advertisement is available at 
http://www.diko.org.cy/easyconsole.cfm/id/192 
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from any similar future threats.  
 
Picture 6. 2. We say "NO" again to those who said "YES" 
 
Source: www.diko.org.cy 
 
Another indicative example of the abovementioned argument is the billboard 
advertisement above which says (in orange): ‘We say NO to those who supported the 
‘YES’. We say YES to DIKO’. The message is that the voter must not support those who 
supported the Annan Plan, connoting that the ‘YES’ supporters would have exposed the 
country to dangers. What DIKO does here is attempt to securitize the alternative options 
(i.e. other parties) by saying that if you vote for ‘them’ you will bring to power those who 
supported the Plan (and who might do so again in the future). It is worth noting that the 
word ‘Annan’ or ‘Plan’ is not even mentioned here. The words ‘yes’ and ‘no’ are 
sufficient for every Greek Cypriot to make the connection, indicating again how much of 
a pivotal event the Plan was, how integrated the Plan is to the political and social routines 
and how securitized it is (especially by some parties).  
 
What is also worth noting is that this advertisement was again for the European 
Parliamentary elections, which means that the elected individuals will not in theory have 
anything to do with the negotiations of the Cyprus Problem. Yet, this Party asks for the 
people to vote MEPs based on the party’s position on the Annan Plan (which took place 
seven years after the referenda). 
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The last example below is again for the 2011 local Parliament elections, but this time is 
for an individual of the DISY party.  This candidate attempts to take advantage of another 
deeply securitized issue in the societal sector, namely the Greek identity. The 
advertisement includes his name ‘Kyriakos Anastasiades’, his profession ‘Teacher’ 
followed by his slogan which reads ‘Stable strength:  For the Greek education’. One of 
the Greek Cypriot fears is the loss of their identity, not only because of the increasing 
numbers of the Turkish settlers, but also because of the Christofias’ rapprochement 
efforts that includes the revision of education material history books. This individual does 
not need to explain why he would ‘fight’ for the Greek education and why it is important. 
The audience knows that this specific referent object (Greek identity) is under threat with 
the specific government’s approaches. 
 
Picture 6. 3. Greek education 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Picture taken by the author 
 
The examples above indicate that depending on the social context securitization could 
occur without following the security grammar and ‘mainstream’ speech act methods and 
even without any negotiation between actors and audiences. Interestingly, the same 
environment could be the answer to one of the criticisms leveled against the theory, 
namely that securitization cannot be the outcome of both just a speech act (i.e. after the 
198	  	  
utterance something is done) and a negotiation process (Stritzel 2007). What is argued 
here is that in areas where securitization processes become institutionalized and threats 
are internalized and unquestionably accepted by the public, the negotiation between 
actors and audiences are ongoing (decades-long) processes. During these negotiations the 
audiences accept and internalize the referent objects under threat, but more importantly 
they form perceptions about the sources of threat. Thus, in such environments a simple 
speech act regarding any new referent object could lead to successful securitization (i.e. 
something is done), as long as the threat and object is linked to the internalized 
perceptions of the audiences. 158  In institutionalized environments therefore securitization 
could be the outcome of both a speech act and a negotiation at the same time. 
 
An indicative example of such a scenario, where the source of threat is securitized in an 
institutionalized manner but the referent object is new, is the natural gas found in the 
southeast area of Cyprus. The RoC’s decision to sign exploration agreements with 
neighboring countries (Israel, Egypt and Lebanon) and foreign companies (e.g. Noble 
Energy) was not taken lightly by Turkey, which threatened to intervene should the RoC 
proceed with exploration.159 While gas has never been a referent object for Greek 
Cypriots, it became very easily securitized without much negotiation. Precisely because 
the source of threat (i.e. Turkey) is already accepted as ‘real’, a few speech acts regarding 
this referent object were enough to convince the audience immediately without any 
negotiation either among the elite or between the elite and the public. Indeed, the new 
object was not just accepted as being under threat, but almost immediately became part of 
the elite’s and media’s securitization routines. Once again therefore the elite struggle was 
not so much to convince anyone about the threat, but rather to convince the audience that 
they are better suited to handle it.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 The term ‘new referent object’ refers to objects that have not been securitized in the past (e.g. settlers, 
guarantees, etc.), such as for instance the newly found gas reserves found near Cyprus. 
159 The Turkish EU minister and Chief negotiator Egemen Bagis warned Greek Cypriots that Turkey will 
not allow for gas exploration, noting that ‘this is why we [Turkey] have the navy for’ (connoting that 
Turkey might use tis navy to prevent any gas exploration from taking place without Turkey’s consent) 
http://www.europolitics.info/external-policies/ankara-warns-nicosia-over-gas-and-oil-exploration-plans-
art312151-41.html [accessed October 3, 2011]. 
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6.5. Horizontal securitization  
 
Chapter 3 developed the hypothesis that in an institutionalized environment the 
securitization process could take place on a horizontal level as well, meaning that the 
actors’ goal is not to influence large audiences – as is the case with mainstream top-down 
securitization – but rather only their immediate periphery such as family and peers. This 
process therefore could be understood as a form of ‘micro-securitization’ since the aim is 
to influence a small number of individuals rather than the entire or big parts of the society. 
Furthermore, on a horizontal level any individual can become a securitizing actor 
regardless of his/her social capital. Indeed, peers and family members may have more 
impact on their periphery than ‘mainstream’ securitizing actors such as political elite 
because the former have more ‘relative’ capital compared to the latter. A family member 
for instance may be able to apply more efficiently pressure on other members of the 
family (compared to an elite) and subsequently successfully convince their ‘micro-
audience’ of the presence of an existential threat.  
 
Horizontal securitization occurs when there is deviation, or prospects for deviation, from 
the accepted and internalized discourse on threats and from the potential disruption of the 
social routines (even conflict-perpetuating ones) that maintain the community’s identity 
and way of life. Horizontal actions therefore are most evident during periods of imminent 
pivotal events or in the period immediately following them, given that such events 
jeopardize the continuation of the routines and the established discourses. The ‘hyper-
securitization’ of such periods – characterized by constant and multi-directional 
securitization from several different actors, such as politicians, media, religious 
institutions, NGOs, academics, etc. – inevitably makes the audiences much more active 
and involved in the process, not only as ‘recipients’ that need to accept or reject an act 
but also as advocates of those positions.  
 
Horizontal securitization could take place in subtle and ‘aggressive' ways. Both are the 
outcome of peer and social pressure with the difference being in the degree of pressure 
and the level of dramatization. In the latter case, securitization takes place through 
200	  	  
extreme dramatization, guilt, name-calling, ‘character assassinations’ and threats for 
social exclusion. Securitization on a horizontal level takes place through the 
personalization of (potential) existential threats, meaning that a psychological burden is 
placed on individuals for i) the collective security of the community and ii) the personal 
suffering of peers. It is this personal burden and sense of shame and guilt that could 
‘force’ people to accept the institutionalized securitized positions in regards to specific 
referent objects (e.g. sovereignty or Greek identity) and reject any desecuritizing acts.  
 
The Annan Plan period provides evidence for these forms of horizontal pressures. As 
most of the focus groups participants in favor of the Annan Plan pointed out, their peers 
frequently told them that ‘voting “yes” will lead to the end of Greek Cypriots’, and asked 
‘how can you contribute to the destruction of our country?’ These ‘horizontal securitizing 
actors’ were personalizing the collective security, connoting that the security of the entire 
community was subject to the specific individuals’ choices, applying thus substantial 
psychological and emotional pressure on their peers to accept something (e.g. Annan 
Plan) as an existential threat. 
 
Others were subjected to more indirect pressures through guilt and shame. This was done 
primarily by linking personal stories and tragedies to contemporary events and 
developments, creating thereby emotional pressure to peers who, through their deviating 
behavior, were considered as disrespectful of their peer’s personal drama. For instance, a 
peer or family member who is a refugee talks about how he had to let go of all his 
property and forcefully leave his house; a mother talks about how her brother is a missing 
person; a grandfather talks about how he lost his neighbor during the invasion, etc. These 
individuals will then link their personal stories to a general issue that has to do with trust 
(for instance), and specifically how Turkey cannot be trusted to implement X or Y plan, 
or that it will take advantage of any weaknesses in any settlement proposal. When focus 
group participants were asked how family members and peers tried to influence them into 
voting ‘no’, almost all mentioned the aforementioned expressions. The threat for those 
actors did not derive from ‘facts’ or ‘evidence’ but was based on distrust towards the 
‘other’ which in turn was based on their personal experiences, which however were 
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unrelated to the Plan per se. It was in other words their predispositions and internalized 
beliefs that dictated why something was a potential threat and not their exposure to 
political discourses. The mechanisms used to securitize the Plan therefore were not based 
on evidence or the plausibility of a threat per se but rather on the personal experiences 
with the ‘other’. Similarly, the mechanisms used to convince their immediate periphery 
were based on guilt, shame and the expectations that a family and friend will respect the 
concerns and personal suffering of his/her friend or family member and not on the fear of 
reaching a ‘point of no return’ because of the potential existential threat.  
 
This approach seems to have a significant impact on the population as individuals who 
never had such experiences themselves frequently reiterate these personal stories. 
Indicative of this argument are some of the focus groups high school students – who were 
born two decades after the invasion – who argued that they could never trust the Turks 
who forcefully drove their parents and grandparents out of their villages, and they could 
never understand the people who believe that Turks could be trusted. It is worth noting 
while the majority of the students who participated in the focus groups did not share this 
opinion they all acknowledged that their peers constantly used such expressions (e.g. how 
can you trust the ‘Turks’ who drove us out of our homes) to apply pressure on them.160 
The students who were opposed to the Plan perceived it as an existential threat not 
because they have read it, but rather because of the social environment in which they 
grew up. The securitization of the Plan in these cases was successful for this particular 
audience (e.g. students and generally young people) without the direct intervention of a 
‘mainstream’ actor (e.g. elite) and without following the ‘security grammar’. Instead 
success is attributed to the audience’s social context and the horizontal forces dominating 
the environment.  
 
Religion is also part of any social context and the role religious institutions have in the 
securitization processes should not be left under-examined. The latter are certainly 
significant actors in any country, but more so in an environment where the population is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  160	  As discussed in chapter 4 most of the students who participated in the specific focus group were taken 
to the US for a month to live with Turkish Cypriots as a rapprochement project. They had in other words 
experiences that the ‘average’ Greek Cypriot student would not.	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particularly religious, as is the case in Cyprus (Greek Cypriot community).161 Especially 
in such environments representatives of religious institutions could use the audiences’ 
faith as a mechanism to securitize specific issues such as the Annan Plan. An indicative 
example is the Kyrenia Bishop, Pavlos, who argued prior to the referenda that those who 
vote ‘yes’ will not be able to enter the gates of paradise as opposed to those who vote 
‘ no’. While for some this threat may be ‘empty’, for deeply religious people, especially 
the elderly, this approach might be much more effective than the traditional security 
grammar approach used by political elite. It must be noted that the Church is the most 
trusted institution in the Greek Cypriot community (Cyprus2015 2009). Indeed, opinion 
polls indicate that 45% trust the Church ‘completely’ or ‘sufficiently’; the respective 
percentages for the Justice system (courts) are 43%, follow by the trust in the government 
(39%), armed forces (36%), the police (30%) and the political parties (13%) (ibid). The 
Church may therefore have a significant role to play in formulating the perceptions of 
people regarding political matters, such as the Annan Plan.  
 
As was the case above with the students, securitization from religious actors was not 
based on the objective ‘facts’ on the Plan, but rather on the people’s identities. The 
Kyrenia Bishop used the people’s beliefs and religious identity to indirectly securitize the 
Plan by directly securitizing something else, namely the ‘after life’. In other words, a 
deeply religious person might be unwilling to take a chance of not ‘entering the gates of 
paradise’ for the sake of supporting the ‘evil’ Annan Plan. In this case therefore the social 
context allows for the securitization of an issue without the articulation of a security 
grammar that would revolve around the perceived existential threat per se (e.g. the Annan 
Plan). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 The vast majority of Cypriots (81%) believe that the place of religion in our society is very important. It 
must be noted that Cyprus is ranked 1st among all EU member states, with the average being at only 46% 
(Eurobarometer 2006, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_highlights_en.pdf [accessed September 23, 
2008]). See also, a 2009 opinion poll, which indicates that 45% of Greek Cypriots trust the Church 
completely or very much. They trust it more than any other institution including the RoC government 
(39%), the courts (43%), National Guard (36%), police (30%) and political parties (13%) (Cyprus2015, 
December 2009). 
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6.5.1. Social pressure through the press 
 
The source of horizontal pressure derives primarily from two interconnected areas: the 
first relates to the internalized perceived threats within the society (as mentioned above) 
and the second to the press; the latter could increase the social pressure by amplifying the 
internalized threats. Below is further evaluation of the Greek Cypriot press and how it 
contributes to the social pressure that feeds the horizontal securitization process. 
Specifically the focus is on issues that either emphasize the social impact of the ongoing 
occupation or on those that are used to apply pressure to Greek Cypriots who fail to 
conform to the existing conflict-based norms.  
 
In the first category one frequently finds economy-related issues, which however have an 
impact on the society – i.e. they are not limited to the economy per se. The press in these 
cases links economic-related issues to the Problem. Indicative examples of such headline 
news are: ‘The market is full of Turkish products’162 and ‘Gambling (from Greek 
Cypriots) funds the pseudo-state’.163 Such approaches emphasize how the occupation also 
has an economic impact, which however is up to Greek Cypriots to minimize. Such 
economic-related references do not argue for the support of Cypriot or Greek products, 
but rather for not supporting Turkish products. The connotation behind such news is that 
some Greek Cypriots essentially fund the ‘enemy’. This is unique to Turkish products; 
hence there is no reference for the market being full of products from the Philippines, 
China or Greece, since it is not considered harmful or an ‘act of treason’ to buy anything 
from those states. The impact such references have is real, as the products and the 
vendors who trade them are frequently named. There is thus direct pressure to the 
business people involved as they are indirectly portrayed as traitors who ‘trade with the 
enemy’ for the sake of profit. There is also pressure to potential buyers who knowingly 
support the ‘occupation force’, as Turkey is frequently described in the press. In other 
words, if it becomes public knowledge that ‘X’ product is Turkish, then it is the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  162	  Simerini, November 7, 2003	  163	  Simerini, December 18, 2003	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consumers’ responsibility to behave ‘patriotically’ and boycott those specific products 
and vendors; The alternative is frequently equated with a mild form of treason. 
 
Similarly, reference to gambling in the areas not controlled by the Republic does not have 
a moral epicenter (e.g. it is bad or dangerous to gamble), but an ethnic one; i.e. your 
gambling funds the pseudo-state and essentially the ‘enemy’. The publicity such issues 
receive in the press applies direct pressure on the individuals who are involved in such 
activities, but it also allows for other Greek Cypriots to securitize their peers’ activities, 
arguing that such actions (e.g. funding the ‘enemy’) is catastrophic for ‘our’ side and an 
act of treason and subsequently a source of shame for families and friends. In these cases, 
securitization that links threats and shame could be much more effective when it comes 
from peers and family members (i.e. horizontally) than from political elites (i.e. top-
down). This is because it is more difficult for individuals involved in such ‘threatening’ 
social activities (e.g. gambling, or buying Turkish products) to ignore their peers than 
their elites.  
 
To emphasize the severe impact the enemy has on the society the press does not hesitate 
to dramatize social issues and connect them to the Greek Cypriot’s biggest fears. This is 
done by using ‘loaded’ words and phrases, such as ‘Attila’, which is one of the most 
sensitive words for Greek Cypriots as the two Turkish military operations in 1974 had a 
code name ‘Attila’; hence Greek Cypriots talk about ‘the Attila’ when they refer to the 
Turkish occupation forces. Indicative of this over-dramatization is a 2005 case when – 
amidst the bird flu period – it was made public that chickens were transferred to the 
Greek Cypriot side from the Turkish Cypriot one. The issue became instantly a threat in 
the media with headlines titles such as ‘Flying Attila: chickens are transferred from the 
occupied areas’.164 Even chickens could be equated to the ‘Attila’ if they come from the 
northern part, reminding the public that anything related to Turkey or the ‘Turkish side’ 
is an existential threat; even chickens. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  164	  Simerini, October 13, 2005	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Similarly, over-dramatization and personalized attacks are used to explicitly remind 
Greek Cypriots of the norms that should not be violated. There is no hesitation to publish 
names in the press to apply psychological and social pressure to individuals who ‘violate’ 
the norms, forcing them to conform and preemptively stop any other potential ‘violators’ 
from engaging in any ‘inappropriate’ and ‘unpatriotic’ actions, which are always 
portrayed as existential threats for the community as a whole. Any personal or 
professional activities with Turkish Cypriots or Turkey are frequently exposed in the 
media and are securitized. Indicative headline news are: ‘Greek Cypriot tourist agents 
organize trips to the occupied areas’ (Phileleftheros, February 27, 2007)165 and ‘Greek 
Cypriot lawyers function as agents for [Mehmet Ali] Talat’.166 There are also more 
‘personalized’ references where individuals are presented as ‘traitors’ or ‘unpatriotic’ 
even though the specific words may not be used explicitly. For instance, individuals who 
went to the Compensation Commission,167 were placed in a ‘list of shame’ – see e.g. ‘List 
of shame: those who applied to the Compensation Commission’.168 Others found their 
names in the press because they were buying Turkish Cypriot property (or did other 
business activities with Turkish Cypriots) – see e.g. ‘Give and take with property: Greek 
Cypriot businessmen are buying Turkish Cypriot properties’;169 ‘Who invests in the 
occupied areas’.170  
 
The figure below shows a Greek Cypriot throwing his head over the barbed wire (i.e. 
cease-fire line) with a ‘for sale’ ticket on it. The background is the gigantic Turkish flag, 
which Turkish Cypriots constructed on the mountains of Pentadaktylos / Beşparmak 
Dağları. There is a double connotation here: the first is that some Greek Cypriots are 
willing to sell anything to the enemy and the second that selling ‘our’ property to the 
enemy is as bad as selling ourselves (i.e. our identity). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  165	  Phileleftheros, February 27, 2007	  166	  Simerini May 25, 2007	  167	  The	   specific	   Commission	   was	   created	   by	   Turkish	   Cypriot	   authorities	   for	   Greek	   Cypriots	   who	  would	   like	   to	   sell	   their	   properties	   in	   the	   areas	   not	   controlled	   by	   the	   Republic.	   As	   expected	   it	   has	  become	  a	  big	  area	  of	  contention	  among	  the	  Greek	  Cypriot	  community	  as	  any	  individuals	  who	  apply	  for	  compensation	  are	  seen	  as	  non-­‐patriots	  who	  sell	  out	  ‘our	  occupied	  lands	  to	  the	  enemy’.	  168	  Simerini, July 6, 2007	  169	  Phileleftheros, September 26, 2007	  170	  Politis, September 21, 2008	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Figure 6.7. For Sale 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: philenews.com (November 23, 2009) and http://pincartoons.com.cy/bAnnanes/index.html 
 
This personalization in the press promotes both institutionalized and horizontal 
securitization. Specifically, maintaining certain issues such as the economy or loss of 
property securitized and into the realm of existential threats in a routine manner is not 
easy. This goal is achievable through the creation of public pressure and the perpetuation 
of securitization albeit through horizontal mechanisms rather than top-down. The media 
thus incorporate social pressure and shame into their mechanisms to maintain the norms 
around issues that cannot be easily securitized in perpetuity from elite. The exposure 
these issues receive in the press creates significant pressure not only to the people 
involved, but also to other people who might be considering acting in a similar manner, 
thus maintaining a deeply securitized environment and preventing the violation of the 
conflict-related norms that dominate the society and perpetuate the zero-sum mentalities.  
 
6.5.2. Social pressure in the academic community 
 
The existence of multiple audiences, as discussed in chapter 3, allows for ‘targeted’ 
securitization. It also makes it easier for analyzing empirically whether or not 
securitization has been successful and more importantly for this thesis whether it has 
been institutionalized and whether there are indeed horizontal processes. With these goals 
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in mind, this section examines the conflict-induced social pressure and the subsequent 
horizontal securitization within the Greek Cypriot academic community. The reasoning 
behind this analysis is twofold: the first is that academia is a specific audience that can be 
reasonably easily analyzed due to its relatively small size; the second is that it is the most 
educated group of the population, meaning that if they too are influenced by horizontal 
securitization and social pressures, then we can assume that other less educated (and 
knowledgeable) parts of the population will also do so.  
 
The survey, which was distributed to the entire Greek Cypriot academic community, 
aimed to examine the degree of cooperation between academics on both sides of the 
Green Line, the problems they may have faced if they cooperated with Turkish Cypriots 
and the reasons why they chose not engage in any cooperation if they did not.171 One of 
the overall findings is that three out of five (59%) academics in the Greek Cypriot side 
never cooperated with any colleagues on the Turkish Cypriot side, while the other 41% 
did so side at least once, with the nature of their cooperation revolving primarily around 
research projects and conference and seminar organizations. Another interesting 
observation is the area in which cooperation occurred: of those who have cooperated, 
approximately one in three (30%) did so only in neutral ground (neither Greek nor 
Turkish Cypriot controlled areas), namely abroad or the buffer zone.  
 
The issue of recognition and social pressure are the two primary factors leading to the 
low level of cooperation and the venue choices. The statistical findings on this issue (see 
more below) are corroborated by the focus group and interviews conducted with 
academics. The explanation they gave during our meetings is twofold: On the one hand 
the Greek Cypriot academic institutions are often unwilling to organize events with 
Turkish Cypriots, leaving them thus no option to engage in any cooperation in Cyprus.172 
Thus their choices are limited to the events organized by neutral organizations (e.g. 
PRIO), that usually take place in the Buffer Zone or abroad. Others, such as Dr. ‘E’, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 For the survey details see chapter 4 and appendix III for the survey as was distributed to the academic 
community. 
172 Academic institutions are frequently skeptical for hosting bi-communal events out of fear of being 
accused of recognizing the TRNC. 
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pointed out that cooperation abroad is socially easier because he does not need to explain 
to anyone his actions or face any criticism from colleagues. What is interesting is that 
academics feel that any cooperation with the ‘other’ must be ‘justified’. As Prof. 
Constantinou emphasized the burden falls on the academics to prove to colleagues and 
family that their activities do not pose a threat for the Greek Cypriot community.173 This 
burden and perceived obligation Prof. Constantinou mentions is to a degree quantifiable 
and evident from the survey. Of those who have collaborated, 16% of them noted that 
they would consciously not inform their colleagues of their activities and 14% would not 
inform their family members. This skeptical reaction is not unjustifiable. The survey 
revealed that 35% of academics who have cooperated with the ‘other’ faced moderate or 
strong opposition from their families.  
 
The burden to ignore the securitized perceptions may be too heavy for a significant 
number of the academic population. These individuals therefore choose not to collaborate 
with the other and thus not deviate from the ‘norms’. Of those who do collaborate may 
choose to keep it a secret from colleagues or family members, at least at the beginning. 
As Dr. Charalambous noted, at the beginning she would not talk to family members about 
her research – that involved the teaching of Turkish language in Greek Cypriot schools –  
as she ‘knew how they would react and [she] did not want to deal with it’. Similarly Dr. 
‘A’ said that his Head of the Department would not be very pleased if he found out about 
his work with Turkish Cypriots, and noted that ‘I choose not to tell him anything. He [the 
Head] says that it is bad publicity for the department, the university and bad for our side 
[i.e. Greek Cypriot] as a whole. I don’t agree with him of course, but he is the Head…’, 
connoting that he is in a position of power. The concern of departmental, peer and family 
opposition is not unsubstantiated or limited to some individuals. The survey shows that 
approximately one in four (24%) of those who have cooperated with Turkish Cypriots 
faced moderate or strong opposition from their administration (e.g. Head of Department, 
Dean, etc.) and colleagues.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  173	  Personal interview [March 14, 2011]	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Academics who have faced moderate or strong opposition noted that the administration – 
primarily their immediate superior (e.g. Head of Department) – as well as their 
colleagues were trying to present their cooperation as hazardous to their institutions, 
thereby presenting individual choices as a threat for the ‘collective’, namely the entire 
department. Their cooperation was also presented as being hazardous to the country as 
there was always the risk of indirectly recognizing the TRNC. On the other side there 
were academics, such as Prof. Constantinou, who directly responded to this criticism 
pointing out that ‘even if we [academics] wanted to, it is not possible for individuals to 
recognize a state or an entity such as the TRNC’, arguing that there are many 
misperceptions on the dangers behind bi-communal cooperation. These clarifications 
however did not mitigate the pressure he faced when he cooperated with the ‘other’; 
instead he was labeled as a ‘Turkophile’ [τουρκόφιλος] and ‘nenekis’ [one that said ‘yes’ 
to the Annan Plan] by several colleagues.  
 
What is particularly interesting are the responses of academics who did not cooperate 
with Turkish Cypriots, when asked the hypothetical question of ‘how do you think your i) 
administration, ii) colleagues and iii) family would react if you cooperated with Turkish 
Cypriots’. The response for moderate or strong opposition was 24%, 36%, 44% 
respectively. In follow-up questions to determine the reasoning behind these concerns, it 
became obvious that the fear of recognition was at the top. Specifically, the fear of 
recognizing the TRNC was rated (by far) the most important reason for not cooperating 
with academics north of the Buffer Zone: 70% said that the potential recognition of 
TRNC is a significant (6%) or very significant (64%) reason for not cooperating with the 
‘other’. Second to this on the ‘important factors scale’ came the options ‘the opportunity 
did not arise’ followed by ‘I am ideologically opposed’ and ‘I do not want to be 
associated with specific funding agencies’. It must be noted that of those who said that 
the opportunity did not arise, only 26% would be willing to cross over the Green Line for 
any form of cooperation if given the opportunity. The rest would only do it in the areas 
controlled by the Republic, in the Buffer Zone or abroad, indicating again ‘fear of 
recognition’. Approximately 15% of the respondents also rated the opposition they will 
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face from family, peers and administration as a significant or very significant reason for 
not cooperating.  
 
What comes to the surface from these responses is that i) even among the academic 
community the institutionalized securitization led to the internalization of specific threats 
(i.e. TRNC recognition) which were incorporated into the audience’s routines (i.e. work-
related activities such as research cooperation); and ii) this institutionalization created 
both actual and expected (hypothetical) horizontal securitization from peers and family.  
 
The argument above is corroborated by additional data from the survey, which also 
examined the horizontal pressure from a securitizing actor perspective. Specifically, it 
examined the responses of academics that were willing to engage in horizontal 
securitization in an attempt to influence their peers. Of those academics who did not 
cooperate with Turkish Cypriots, 30% noted that they themselves moderately or strongly 
opposed colleagues who did so. This opposition ranged from simply making their 
dissatisfaction and disappointment known, to direct and explicit disapproval of their 
colleagues’ activities. These views were also evident in follow-up interviews. Dr. 
Ioannou for instance said that she frequently told fellow academics that she ‘would rather 
not see her friends and colleagues cooperate with the Turks’, even though she would not 
try to stop them. She would also not participate in events if she were invited as that is 
against her ideology, but also dangerous for Cyprus [Greek Cypriots]. Others such as 
Prof. ‘T’, stated that he does not engage in such activities and does not approve of such 
cooperation unless they follow strict guidelines, 174  while he also actively tries to 
influence his colleagues not to participate either. What is interesting to note is that the 
individuals who oppose cooperation with the ‘other’ use the same discourse as the elite 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  174	  While	   there	   is	   usually	   no	   problem	   with	   the	   Turkish	   Cypriot	   academics	   as	   individuals,	   their	  institutions	   are	   not	   recognized	   by	   the	   RoC.	   This	   means	   that	   in	   collaborative	   events	   sometimes	  affiliation	  cannot	  be	  displayed.	  In	  any	  meeting,	  such	  as	  the	  focus	  groups	  conducted	  for	  this	  thesis	  (at	  the	  University	   of	  Nicosia	  premises),	   it	  was	   acceptable	   to	   indicate	   the	  name	  and	   rank	  of	   academics	  involved,	  e.g.	  Prof.	  Erol	  Kaymak,	  but	  his	  institution,	  the	  Eastern	  Mediterranean	  University,	  could	  not.	  It	  must	  be	  noted	  that	  to	  eliminate	  any	  biases	  and	  misunderstandings	  the	  same	  principle	  was	  applied	  to	  all	  participants,	  both	  Greek	  and	  Turkish	  Cypriots:	  their	  affiliations	  were	  not	  displayed.	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and media to justify their positions, indicating again an ‘automated’ response to 
perceived threats. 
 
The pressure towards academics that ‘deviate’ from the norms is not limited within the 
boundaries of the academic world. The media not only securitizes such cooperation, but 
also occasionally increases the ‘cost’ for individuals who engage in such activities by 
publishing the names and/or pictures of those who collaborate with the ‘enemy’. 
Indicative of such cases is the article below entitled, ‘which academics (teachers) do most 
harm to our land’. The specific article provided a list of academics that were involved in 
bi-communal activities, making the argument that any cooperation is harmful to ‘our 
country’ and thus the public should know who the people generating this ‘threat’ are.  
 
Picture 6.4. Who are the most harmful academics? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: www.philenews.com (December 3, 2010) 
 
Similarly, during the Annan period newspapers opposing the Plan generated a list of 
research institutions and academics involved in projects funded by specific agencies such 
as UNDP, PRIO, USAID, etc. and made the argument that these are people who are paid 
by the Anglo-Americans. What they failed to mention is that most of those projects had 
nothing to do with the Annan Plan, or indeed with the Cyprus Problem. Despite that, a 
simple association with those agencies was sufficient to create pressure for the 
individuals involved. As Ms. Eftychiou noted ‘our names and institutions were published 
in the newspaper because of a project dealing with the bi-diversity of Cyprus (and was 
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funded by USAID). Our Director told us that it was shameful for our institution and 
would create numerous problems for us’.175  
 
The aforementioned examples provide evidence of how effective is the institutionalized 
securitization of specific agents such as the US and the UK. The origin of the funding 
agency (e.g. from the US) is sufficient to automatically generate perceptions of threats 
regardless if the actual activities associated with those agencies revolved around the 
Problem. This argument is corroborated by the findings from the  academic survey as 
well which showed that of those academics who did not cooperate with Turkish Cypriots, 
22% of them argued that ‘not being associated with specific funding agencies’ was an 
important and very important reason for not cooperating.  
 
6.5.3. Social pressure among students and artists 
 
This section deals with two particular sets of audiences, namely students and artists, and 
examines how they experience horizontal pressure and securitization. All artists 
participating in the focus groups pointed out that they did not face any particular societal 
pressures and attributed this primarily to the nature of their work. As they argued, they 
are generally viewed in neutral terms and the rest of the society mostly ignores them. 
Their bi-communal activities are mostly perceived as neither beneficial nor threatening as 
long as they are not funded by Turkish Cypriot agencies or other specific ‘suspicious’ (as 
they characterize them) sources such as USAID funds. In those cases they are 
immediately perceived as ‘dangerous’ and their activities draw a lot of attention in the 
media; the press focuses on the threats deriving from such cooperation, while the 
integrity of their character is frequently questioned. As Ms Skordi (a painter) pointed out 
‘it is very interesting that no one cares about our work and our rapprochement efforts, 
unless they see something as a threat’. She then added that when they receive attention, it 
is always in ‘negative terms’, highlighting potential dangers. Other participants too 
argued that their efforts are at best ignored and at worst they are securitized (presented as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  175	  Personal interview [March 15, 2011].	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a huge threat to the Greek Cypriot community), but they are never portrayed by the media 
or other agents as positive. ‘It is as if no one cares to say that it is nice that Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots work together’ Skordi noted. Perhaps a more accurate observation 
would be that no media or political elite is willing to take the risk of saying that such 
collaborations are positive, given that (as noted earlier) this could lead to high costs.  
 
Participants also highlighted the impact of securitization by pointing out that when there 
is negative publicity the public participation decreases dramatically. 176 Their explanation 
for the decreasing participation is that Greek Cypriots do not want to be associated with 
any activities that could jeopardize the political efforts of the government or taint their 
personal image as ‘patriots’. The social pressure therefore once again is not only aimed at 
the individuals who do engage in any bi-communal activities, but also to the broader 
audience that might be willing to show tolerance or respect towards such actions.  
 
Lastly, when asked whether they faced pressure from family and friends not to engage in 
such activities, the response was that they did, especially if the event was securitized in 
the press. Evidently, the horizontal securitization takes place even in the most neutral 
sector of the society (i.e. artists) if the right conditions are present (e.g. negative reference 
in the press). This also provides an indication of how securitized some issues are; the 
‘neutrality’ of artists disappears with the slightest hint of a perceived threat. For instance, 
a simple reference to the TRNC in any event is sufficient to have such an impact. 
Indicatively, Ms. Hadjiandreou – a Greek Cypriot pianist who cooperated with fellow 
Turkish Cypriot musicians in a bi-communal event funded by neutral agencies (i.e. 
neither Greek or Turkish Cypriot) – noted that she refused to get paid for her services 
when during the last day of the recitals she realized that on the event Program it was 
written (in Turkish only) that the event was under the auspices of the TRNC Ministry of 
Education.177 When asked why she refused to receive a payment she said that ‘I never 
agreed that the event would be under the auspices of an illegal entity. I was tricked and if 
I do not get paid no one will be able to say that I did this for the money’.  It is clear that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 They did not use this terminology (i.e. securitization). They talked about the impact of constant threat-
discourses in the media.  177	  Private interview [March 22, 2011].	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artists, just like the academics, are concerned about how their actions will be perceived 
and more importantly portrayed in the press and elsewhere. Similarly, they are concerned 
of the horizontal pressures they might face from colleagues, family or the society in 
general. 
 
The focus groups discussions with the high school students – ages 15 to 17 years old –  
yielded even more interesting results. The majority of the students in the group 
participated in bi-communal events, thus the focus of the discussion revolved around the 
peers and teachers reactions. The focus was on how the latter perceived the specific 
students’ activities as ‘shameful’ and ‘dangerous’, and on the impact this had on the 
latter’s future activities.  
  
All participants commented that they faced significant social pressure from their peers 
and their actions were heavily securitized. Among other things, they were called ‘traitors’, 
accused of ‘“sleeping” with the enemy’ and of bringing the ‘enemy into our community’. 
More importantly however they mentioned that they were ostracized by their classmates 
and often by their teachers. This was especially the case during national holiday 
celebrations (e.g. April 1st, the commencement of the EOKA struggle), when some of 
their classmates asked them to leave the celebration and go ‘play with their brothers, the 
Turks’.  
 
Some of their ‘nationalists’ classmates, as the participants called them, even created very 
insulting video films which were uploaded on YouTube and then disseminated the links 
to as many students as possible. In the video spots, besides the occasional 
characterizations mentioned above, they were also accused of being the ‘force’ that will 
destroy Cyprus and the Greek identity. These students, just like academics mentioned 
earlier, were frequently called ‘nenekie’ (those who voted ‘yes’ in the Annan Plan). 
When asked about family reactions (for their bi-communal activities), some students 
indicated that their relatives too called them ‘nenekie’, but did not go as far as calling 
them ‘traitors’. 
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What is interesting is that during the 2004 referenda those students who were called 
‘nenekie’ were anywhere from 9 to 11 years old and could not, obviously, vote or have 
any profound understanding of the Plan. It is worth noting that the political incorrect 
phrases, such as ‘nenekie’, ‘traitors’, tourkosporie’ (one that is from Turkish seed) are not 
found in the media or the official political discourses, but only in personal and ‘unofficial’ 
environments (e.g. homes, coffee shops, school yards, etc.). Thus, the fact that the 
younger generation uses such expressions, coupled with the fact that these expressions 
were not used in the media (at least not frequently) leads to two major conclusions: 
 
i. The Annan Plan was indeed a very pivotal event that penetrated the social environment 
and not just the political one.  
ii. The family environment has a very significant role to play in the perpetuation of 
threats and the institutionalized securitization. 
 
It must be noted that the impact of education is not discounted. Indeed, the education 
systems on both sides contribute to the zero-sum mentality of the younger generation and 
the maintenance of the perceptions about friends and enemies (see e.g. Hadjipavlou-
Trigeorgis 2000; Spyrou 2006; Kizilyurek and Gautier-Kizilyurek 2004; Killoran 1998). 
What is argued here is that certain politically incorrect expressions and positions held by 
the younger generation are more likely to derive from the family environment and peers 
rather than the education system or other official narratives.  
 
Follow-up interviews with researchers on the Problem and the education system 
corroborate the findings from the focus groups. Indeed, evidently horizontal 
securitization could take place among students even without any involvement in bi-
communal activities. Specifically, Dr. Charalambous, who has examined the teaching of 
Turkish language in Greek Cypriot public schools, when asked about peer reactions 
towards students who followed the specific course, emphasized that all 30 students in the 
Turkish language class were called ‘traitors’ by their peers. In addition they were 
frequently called ‘communists’ as they were associated with the leftist AKEL that is a 
pro-reconciliation political party. If learning the Turkish language is considered an act of 
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treason, then it is not surprising that bi-communal cooperation is perceived as much more 
dangerous.  
 
The examples mentioned above do not just demonstrate the existence of social pressure, 
on horizontal (i.e. peer to peer) and top-down (i.e. media to public) levels. They also 
provide clear indications of horizontal securitization. The referent object is usually the 
Greek Cypriot identity, but the threat does not derive directly from the enemy, but rather 
from the actions of individuals within the Greek Cypriot community; actions that make 
the enemy-threat more probable. This is of particular importance because the threats and 
the ontological insecurity is not the outcome of ‘enemy’ actions as is usually the case 
with the mainstream reading of the theory. Securitization aiming to maintain the people’s 
ontological security is institutionalized therefore regardless of the actions of the ‘other’. 
Indeed, that actors and audiences alike are more concerned by the actions of people from 
their ‘own’ community than of those by the ‘other’. This is not surprising however given 
that any action from the ‘other’ will be automatically perceived as a threat, whereas acts 
from our ‘own people’ requires more effort. The most efficient and effective to maintain 
certain issues and acts as existential is through institutionalized and horizontal 
securitization that frequently preempts individuals (as demonstrated above) from 
engaging in any ‘dangerous’ activities.  
 
In addition, the examples above also provide very clear indications of institutionalization. 
We observe the same perceived threats, discourses and even specific phrasing from elite 
and public alike. The fact that the younger generation too uses the same phrases and 
discourses – even though they have never themselves experienced those potential threats 
from the pivotal events – is indicative of the institutionalized securitization impact. It is 
clear that institutionalized securitization more easily leads to horizontal securitization, 
which in turn promotes the perpetuation of ‘conflict norms’ and discourages any 
deviation. This is particularly evident from the student focus group. When the students 
were asked whether they would continue to participate in bi-communal events only very 
few responded positively. Some said they might do so in the future, but others were more 
explicit indicating that while they do not agree with the ‘fascist classmates’ (as they 
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called them) they do not want to be isolated or have to deal with the pressure from peers 
and teachers alike. Horizontal securitization and psychological bullying therefore, has a 
major impact: it ‘forces’ individuals to conform to the established norms (e.g. maintain 
no relationships with the ‘enemy’) and leads to the continuation of conflict-perpetuating 
routines. 
 
6.6. Social context, bottom-up and involuntary securitization 
 
Two of the main hypotheses of the thesis claim that under certain conditions 
securitization could occur in a bottom-up manner (HII) and that the process, when taking 
place in an institutionalized framework with horizontal and bottom-up forces, could lead 
to involuntary securitization (HIII). As already discussed, these conditions are found in 
environments that foster the perpetuation of conflict-related routines as is the case for 
instance in protracted ethnic conflicts.  
 
Chapter 3 explained how bottom-up securitization could occur in direct and indirect ways. 
The former refers to cases of full ‘role-reversal’ where a specific audience becomes the 
actor and the decision-makers become the recipient (and thus the audience). The latter 
refers to cases where a specific audience influences the actors into securitizing an issue 
and the former do not therefore become actors per se, but they are the driving force 
behind the top-down securitization. The latter case also refers to pressure at the bottom, 
which is what leads to involuntary securitization thereby linking closely the two 
hypotheses (bottom-up and involuntary). Indeed, it is the forces at the ‘bottom’ that lead 
to involuntary acts on an ‘actor’ level and the horizontal forces that lead to involuntary 
acts on an ‘audience’ level. 
 
The direct form of bottom-up securitization is particularly difficult to demonstrate and 
prove given the absence of a single voice by the audience and the presence of official 
(written or oral) discourse. This is especially the case when the audience is the entire 
population. However, it becomes a more feasible task when examining smaller sets of 
audiences such as the academic community or members of a specific political party. 
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Using again the Annan period as an example, there were cases where supporters of a 
political party would gather together (forming thus a significant enough audience) to 
securitize the Plan, aiming to influence their respective decision-makers who could make 
the official party decisions regarding the Plan. This was particularly the case with AKEL, 
a party that did not formulate an official position until the very end (either in favor or 
against it). AKEL was in a particularly difficult position as the leftists and AKEL are 
traditionally the ones closer to Turkish Cypriots and the force behind most 
rapprochement efforts. The difficulty arose because DISY, the right-wing party, already 
endorsed the Plan and urged its voters to vote ‘yes’ even though the vast majority of the 
(Greek Cypriot) population indicated well in advance that it would reject the proposed 
settlement. The ‘natural’ or ‘expected’ AKEL’s decision would be to support the Plan as 
well; however it faced a twofold dilemma: on one hand it would be particularly difficult 
to justify why the pro-settlement party would not support a proposed settlement, 
especially when the so-called nationalists (i.e. DISY) supported it. On the other hand 
AKEL knew that the Plan would be rejected and that a vast majority of its voters were 
against it, so it did not want to support a ‘lost case’ that could potentially create 
instability within the ‘base’ of the party.  
 
Trying to weigh these two options, AKEL did not formulate an official position until a 
few days before the referenda. It was this delay that led to bottom-up securitization 
within the party. Members of AKEL from several villages formed groups and demanded 
that their leadership acknowledge the dangers deriving from the Plan and take an official 
stance of rejection. These groups went to the Party’s premises and their local 
representatives to express their views and explain their positions vis-à-vis the Plan.178 
The decision-makers thus became the audience who needed to accept or reject the 
people’s securitizing acts. The bottom-up securitization was successful as officially the 
Party eventually rejected the Plan even though it clearly stated that it was not against it.179  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 There were cases where these groups would take with them their voting booklets and threatened to burn 
them, should their Party not take an official position that would acknowledge the dangers of the Plan 
(interview with AKEL MP, May 3, 2011). The connotation was that they would not be able to vote and 
thus the Party would suffer political loses. 179	  Indicative of the impact of such pressures is the AKEL official position a few days prior to the referenda, 
which stated that ‘we say “no” to solidify the “yes”’ (λέµε «όχι» για να τσιµεντώσουµε το «ναι»), arguing 
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A similar situation took place within the right-wing party, albeit the bottom-up 
securitizing acts were unsuccessful. A significant percentage of the party’s voters – and 
some members of the party – warned that they considered the Plan an existential threat 
and that they would reject it and would not vote for the Party should it choose to support 
it. The Party ignored them and openly supported the Plan. This led to the withdrawal of 
several members of the Party and the formation of a new party (EVROKO) with more 
hardline positions. Similarly, in the next elections DISY percentages dropped from the 
usual (over) 34% to 28% in the 2004 elections for MEPs, indicating clearly that a 
significant number of its voters ‘abandoned’ the party (at least temporarily).180  
 
What is also worth noting from the evidence above is the idea of ‘cost’ for actors who 
choose to deviate from the established norms. In some cases the cost is objective and real 
(as was the case with DISY above). This may not always be the case though. This seems 
to be however irrelevant as people, especially (most) political elites, are risk averse and 
choose the least risky path. Even the possibility of cost therefore may be enough for them 
to choose the safe path which could be the perpetuation of the status quo (i.e. what AKEL 
did in the example above). 
 
Indirect bottom-up securitization, which also leads to elite involuntary securitization, is 
easier to observe and demonstrate. This form of securitization occurs because of the 
audiences’ expectations regarding the issues that must be treated as a threat. The 
expectations are evident from opinion polls demonstrating what the public considers to be 
important. The impact of these expectations are seen from how elites react to the public 
demands and more specifically from the elite’s positions during their political campaigns. 
As already noted, the handling of the Cyprus problem is the primary deciding factor for 
Greek Cypriots when it comes to choosing their political representatives. This means that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that the Party did not have sufficient time to convince the public for the Plan and mitigate the people’s fears. 
They thus chose to reject it temporarily so that they can promote it at a later time in an efficient way that 
would guarantee acceptance.  	  
180 Past DISY percentages in elections previous to the 2004 referenda were as followed: i. 1996 – 
Parliamentary elections 34.5%; ii) 1998 – Presidential elections 40%; iii) 2001 – Parliamentary elections 
34%;  iv) 2003 – Presidential elections 39%.  
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elites, whether they want to or not, must treat the Problem as a priority and in a way that 
meets the public’s fears and concerns. More than half of Greek Cypriot voters (55%) 
would vote for a political party based on its positions on the conflict (Ant1 March 
2010).181 When this is juxtaposed to the aforementioned polls that clearly indicate that 
security-related issues (e.g. Turkish guarantees, army, settlers, etc.) is the most important 
concern (see e.g. Cyprus2015, 2011), it becomes evident that Greek Cypriots are 
primarily interested in how their potential political leaders will handle these aspects of 
the Problem. The audience, using the public opinions as a ‘voice’, lucidly advocates what 
it considers to be a threat and essentially asks the elite and media to treat them as such. 
The cost of neglecting these concerns or attempting to desecuritize them (or even 
decrease the level of securitization) might therefore be particularly costly for elites. The 
most rational approach for elites and the media is thus to respond to public demand and 
maintain the securitization routines so as to indicate that they take into consideration their 
concerns and fears. In this case therefore the ‘involuntary’ aspect is not in the strict sense, 
namely that these elites do not have the option, but rather that the option is very costly 
and thus ‘irrational’ to the degree that it becomes an unrealistic alternative.  
 
This environment inevitably leads to institutionalized securitization as the process 
become part of the elite and media routines and the same discourse is reiterated 
constantly. More importantly however is that this institutionalization develops into a 
weapon with which elites attempt to benefit by distinguishing themselves from other 
elites and parties. The elite efforts, as mentioned earlier, is not so much to convince the 
audience of a threat but rather to convince them or remind them that they are the best 
agents to handle it. This ‘actor-benefiting’ securitization is therefore the outcome of 
indirect bottom-up forces. The fact that actors benefit from this institutionalized 
environment however eliminates incentives to either desecuritize the environment, which 
means that once the processes become part of the routines they cannot be easily changed 
or be interrupted. Instead they are more likely to be perpetuated. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  181	  The	  other	  45%	  is	  distributed	  as	  follows:	  21%	  consider	  the	  economy	  as	  the	  most	  important	  factor,	  13%	   the	  party’s	  MPs,	   6%	  other	   governance	   issues,	   2.5%	   the	  party’s	   leader,	   3%	  did	  not	   answer	  or	  respond.	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Before proceeding to further analysis it is worth noting that I do not argue that these 
audiences’ demands develop by themselves without the contribution of securitizing actors. 
Indeed the deeply securitized environment could be the outcome of top-down 
securitization processes that took place in the past. What is argued is that once the 
process is institutionalized, bottom-up processes could take place without the 
contribution of the elite at the top because the threats are internalized and the (expected) 
securitizing acts are part of the audiences’ conflict perpetuating routines. 
 
All securitizing acts are done in order to benefit the actor. However, in environments 
where securitization is institutionalized and ongoing and the aim is not to convince but 
rather to remind of one’s ability to handle a threat, the processes tend to become more 
strategic (rather than ad hoc) aiming not only to create short-term benefits (e.g. access to 
extraordinary measures) but also long-term such as the development of a social context 
dominated by perceptions that link specific threats with specific actors. Strategic and 
routinized acts could more easily create sustainable mental links of how specific actors 
are more suited to handle specific threats. Political elite and media agents therefore 
strategically choose the areas and issues in which they have comparative advantage over 
their opponents and institutionalize securitization processes with the aim to appear as 
‘specialists’ in the handling of specific threats.   
 
In the case of Cyprus each party struggles to maintain an explicit image vis-à-vis the 
Problem. For instance the socialist party, EDEK, promotes the image that it is ‘fighting 
hard’ (harder than the rest) for the Cyprus problem as opposed to other parties that might 
be perceived as ‘softer’.   
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Picture  6.5. EDEK - Struggling for the future 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Picture taken by the author 
 
The picture above of a billboard advertisement for the EDEK says ‘For the fights, for 
consistency, for the future. NOW EDEK’. The connotation is that the two most powerful 
parties (AKEL and DISY) do not fight hard enough for Greek Cypriots; unlike EDEK, 
they make too many concessions and they are inconsistent with their positions during the 
negotiations. EDEK frequently attempts to securitize the two major parties’ approach to 
the Problem. Indicatively, the EDEK honorary President, Dr. Lyssarides, emphasized that 
‘the current government (i.e. AKEL) as well as the opposition (i.e. DISY) will bring the 
country at the ‘edge of destruction’ if they do not change their approach’.182 When Dr. 
Lyssarides was asked what more they should do, his response was that they should make 
far fewer concessions and fight for what is ‘right and just’, referring to issues such as the 
withdrawal of troops and settlers, abolition of intervention guarantees, freedom of 
movement, etc.  
 
‘Tailored’ securitization does not just revolve around the broad ideology on how the 
problem should be handled (see e.g. EDEK above), but also around specific issues that 
are of particular importance for the people. One such issue is the rotating presidency, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  182	  This	  position	  has	  been	  reiterated	  in	  the	  press	  but	  also	  noted	  in	  a	  private	  interview	  with	  author	  (May	  12,	  2011).	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which is not accepted by 72.6% of Greek Cypriots (Ant1, March 2010).183 This issue 
came to the surface when President Christofias reached an agreement with the Turkish 
Cypriot leader Talat, generating the immediate response from Greek Cypriot parties, the 
media and the public. The Greek Cypriot population after decades of being a politically 
homogeneous state cannot easily accept that every few months or years its leader will be 
a non-Greek Cypriot. This concern is exacerbated further by the fact that the non-Cypriot 
leader will be from the ‘enemy camp’ who will most likely (it is perceived) will serve 
Turkey’s interests and not those of the Cypriots. 
 
What is interesting is not so much the reaction (which was expected), but rather how 
AKEL and DISY reacted. The government party (AKEL) instead of justifying its 
decision based on political arguments, it focused on its opponent’s (DISY) similar actions, 
arguing that DISY accepted it as well in the past. 184  DISY, under the public pressure, 
reacted saying that it does not agree with this specific form of rotating presidency as 
proposed by Christofias. On the contrary, to be in line with the public views it securitized 
the issue arguing that it is a ‘huge error’ (µέγα σφάλµα).185 AKEL’s reaction to focus on 
its opponent rather than the argument per se can be explained by, and demonstrates the 
presence of, institutionalized securitization and the severe bottom-up pressures. While the 
leftist President and his supporting party (AKEL) do not oppose the concept of rotating 
presidency they knew that it was a deviation from the mainstream positions and a 
disregard of a deeply securitized issue. Given that it was impossible even for the bigger 
party to desecuritize an issue that is so routinely securitized, its strategy was to ‘take 
along’ the major opponent (DISY) so as not to be the only deviating party. It was for this 
reason that DISY reacted; it did not want to be perceived as a ‘deviating party’ too. 
 
Other parties reacted more aggressively and used the public view to strengthen their 
positions. For instance, EDEK President, Yiannakis Omirou, suggested that there is a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  183	  Rotating presidency refers to scenario where the presidency will be rotated between Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots.	  184	  See	  e.g.	  Mr.	  Evagorou	  (AKEL	  spokesman)	  position	  http://www.sigmalive.com/news/politics/383937	  [accessed	  June	  10	  2011]	  185	  See	  e.g.	  Mr.	  Pourgourides	  (DISY	  spokesman)	  position	  (http://www.sigmalive.com/news/politics/242793)	  [accessed	  June	  10	  2011]	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referendum among the Greek Cypriot community to let the public decide whether they 
want or not a rotating presidency or not.186 EDEK also launched a direct attack on DISY, 
arguing that the latter portrayed the rotating presidency as a threat only after they realized 
what the public wanted (i.e. gave in to bottom-up pressures).187  
 
The fact that elite are unwilling to negotiate without the approval of the public first 
demonstrates the impact any deviation from the internalized views (e.g. perceived 
threats) could have on the elite. The decades-long institutionalized securitization 
regarding specific issues such as the rotating presidency may be beneficial for some 
actors (and even the outcome of their actions), but at the same time it also creates social 
contexts were elite are unable to move towards desecuritizing and conflict-diminishing 
positions, at least not without huge political costs.  
 
Picture  6.6. Withdraw the rotating presidency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s photograph 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  186	  See	  http://www.sigmalive.com/news/politics/381137	  [accessed	  June	  10	  2011]	  187	  Specifically, the EDEK Press office issued an announcement on 26/2/2010 saying: It is very belatedly 
that DISY realized that the rotating presidency and the weighted voting system will never be accepted by 
the Greek Cypriots. Once Christos Pourgourides and the DISY spokesman realized that the overwhelming 
majority of Greek Cypriots will never accept the violent violation of Democracy and the heavy insults 
towards every Greek Cypriot citizen deriving from the anti-democratic proposition of the President 
Christofias, they run ‘all sweaty’ to align themselves with the public demand for the withdrawal of the 
rotating presidency and the weighted voting system (my translation, my emphasis). 	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Capitalizing on its diachronic position EDEK ‘advertised’ its routinely-held positions. 
The billboard above says: ‘To withdraw the rotating presidency. NOW EDEK’, 
reminding the public which party is best suited to deal with this threat. 
 
The fourth major political agent, the Democratic Party (DIKO), also reacted 
demonstrating again the impact of bottom-up securitization.  Specifically, Photis Photiou, 
a senior member of DIKO, in a radio interview explicitly said that if the public considers 
the rotating presidency to be a threat, then the political elite have no choice but to follow 
the people’s demand and thus withdraw it from the negotiations table (Ant1 radio, July 
30, 2011). The emphasis was on the public demands and not necessarily on whether or 
not he, or his party, believe that rotating presidency is a threat for the community. Such 
reactions also demonstrate that elite follow the opinion polls and arrange their agenda 
accordingly to meet the public demands.  
 
It must be emphasized that the rotating presidency is not a unique issue. On the contrary 
it is just an indicative (albeit important) example of one of the many issues that is deeply 
securitized that also force elite to maintain a routinized behavior vis-à-vis perceived 
threats.  
 
As demonstrated with the cases of AKEL, DIKO, DYSH and EDEK,188 bottom-up and 
‘involuntary’ securitization is indeed possible. The securitizing acts on elite level, 
involuntary or not, is just half the process. The other half is the audience reaction, namely 
to accept or reject the act. As argued in chapter 3 and as demonstrated above with the 
students and the academic community, the public may have to involuntarily accept some 
acts, even if they do not necessarily agree with the actors’ assessments. As was the case 
the with the securitizing actors, the cost of not accepting or attempting to oppose 
established securitized issues could lead to significant social costs, such as social 
exclusion or penalties at work. It is precisely this ‘involuntary’ acceptance of acts that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 It is worth noting that by examining the positions and reactions of the four aforementioned parties 
(DISY, AKEL, DIKO and EDEK) one explores the entire spectrum of elite positions on the Problem. 
Indicatively the ‘big four’ received, in the 2011 parliamentary elections, 92% of the votes out of the 97% 
valid votes (http://www.kyproekloges.com/).	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allows for the perpetuation of an institutionalized environment. The constant 
securitization conditions on one hand the audiences to easily accept some acts, but at the 
same time it is this ‘automatic’ acceptance that allows for such frequent securitization of 
the same issues and the repetition of the same discourse (even with very similar phrasing 
by all elites and media).  
 
It is worth reiterating that there are two forms of ‘involuntary’ securitization: the first 
deals the conditioning of people to the degree that they cannot contemplate the 
alternatives of non-securitization; the second deals with the lack of realistic options for 
either elite or audience. The focus was primarily on the latter. The first kind is 
particularly difficult to separate from the overall social context because one is part of and 
influences the other. The social context in Cyprus for instance – that is dominated by 
internalized threats – is what decreases the chances that actors and audiences alike will 
even consider the possibility that something that is already securitized is no longer a 
threat. Precisely because they cannot even contemplate any alternatives to the existing 
(institutionalized) securitization framework, the threats and discourses become even more 
internalized, shaping subsequently the social context into an environment that supports 
this form of ‘involuntary’ securitization. It is for this reason that some elites, such as Dr. 
Lyssarides and religious leaders mentioned earlier that they consider any desecuritization 
or less securitization activities as a threat and a potentially ‘fatal’ mistake for Greek 
Cypriots. Similarly, for the same reason parts of the audience consider individuals who 
cooperate with the ‘other’ or they do not support the established norms as ‘traitors’. 
These audiences do not have dilemmas for accepting or rejecting a securitizing act; for 
them there is only one path, namely the one that supports the established and 
institutionalized securitization framework. In these cases therefore it is not as if ‘volition’ 
is actually taken away from these individuals; the argument is rather that they are 
conditioned in a way that they do not face any dilemmas to accept or reject acts as they 
only see one available path.  
 
227	  	  
6.7. Conclusion 
 
The empirical evidence from the case of Cyprus provided evidence on how the variables 
found in ethnic conflict environments could relatively easily lead to the 
institutionalization of the securitization process. It also demonstrated how the media 
contributes towards maintaining issues related to the conflict constantly securitized. This 
constant securitization leads, as demonstrated through opinion polls and surveys, to 
internalized perceptions about threats, which in their turn create an environment with 
significant social pressures among the different audiences and at the elite level. It is 
precisely these pressures that allow for the creation of different modes of securitization, 
namely horizontal, bottom-up and involuntary.   
 
The empirical support provided here also helps link the theory of securitization with other 
fields of security studies, such as that of protracted ethnic conflicts. It was argued that the 
variables found in protracted ethnic conflicts open the door for routine securitization. It is 
also evident however that the reverse is also true. One of the reasons ethnic conflicts are 
often protracted is precisely because they cannot be desecuritized because of the 
institutionalized processes that dominate the environment. This could help us understand 
better why some conflicts are protracted and why external agents such as the EU and the 
UN are unable to effectively intervene and resolve them. These thoughts are examined 
further in the final chapter of the thesis.  
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Chapter	  7:	  Concluding	  remarks	  and	  prospects	  for	  further	  
research	  
 
There is little disagreement that securitization theory has been receiving growing 
attention in the security studies literature. This thesis contributes to the literature by 
exploring on one hand two under-examined areas – the importance of the audiences in the 
process and that of social context – and on the other by introducing the idea of 
institutionalized and the subsequent forms of horizontal and bottom-up securitization. 
More specifically, the thesis focused on how a particular social context, namely that of 
protracted ethnic conflicts, creates fertile ground for the process of securitization to 
become part of the political and social routines and eventually institutionalized. How and 
why protracted ethnic conflicts create suitable conditions for institutionalization to occur 
was demonstrated with several examples from the case of the Cyprus conflict. Using the 
same case study the thesis also demonstrated how once institutionalized, securitization is 
no longer limited to a top-down process (i.e. elite to audience), as it could also take place 
in a horizontal (i.e. audience to audience) and bottom-up (i.e. audience to elite) manner. 
These horizontal and bottom-up processes in turn help maintain the institutionalized 
environment by frequently limiting the options of securitizing actors and audiences alike 
creating thus a form of ‘involuntary’ securitization. These processes inevitably also 
contribute to the preservation of conflict-perpetuating routines that are frequently the 
causes for negotiations deadlocks and subsequently the prolongation of conflicts. The 
protractedness of some conflicts and institutionalized securitization are therefore closely 
linked. Indeed, the latter seems to be a prerequisite for the former.  This is not to say that 
protracted ethnic conflicts are what cause institutionalized securitization or the reverse. 
What is argued is that each one contributes to the reproduction and continuation of the 
other.  
 
This thesis makes a threefold contribution: i) it offers a refinement of the theory of 
securitization by introducing how successful securitization could become institutionalized 
and also develop in different forms (horizontal and bottom-up); ii) it links further the 
theory of securitization with the literature on protracted ethnic conflicts and more 
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specifically on the impact securitization has on conflict resolution efforts; and iii) it 
profoundly links securitization with the case of the Cyprus conflict, offering a more 
elaborate view on why the conflict remains unresolved despite the benefits that would 
derive from a reunification of the island.  
 
The introduction of bottom-up and horizontal securitization is a theoretical contribution 
that is not however limited to securitization theory, but rather extends to the broader 
security literature and more specifically to that of ethnic conflicts. For instance, the 
concept of horizontal securitization and the idea that any person can be a ‘securitizing 
actor’ allows for further exploration of the concept of ‘political entrepreneurs’ (Lake and 
Rothchild 1996), namely that on a micro-level every person can either be, or support, a 
political entrepreneur by engaging in horizontal peer-to-peer pressure and influencing his 
immediate periphery, if not the masses.  
 
Similarly, the idea of bottom-up and involuntary securitization could also contribute to 
our understanding of why political entrepreneurs act the way they do. The current 
approaches argue that these individuals may adopt extreme positions to perpetuate the 
conflict so as to personally benefit (Lake and Rothchild 1996; Kaufman 1996). The 
assumption is that elites, belligerent or not, consciously aim to maintain an environment 
of hostility because it would be beneficial for them, meaning that they would choose to 
maintain such environments, even if they had the option to do the opposite. These 
approaches however do not explore the possibility of ‘involuntary’ behavior, which, as 
demonstrated in chapter 6, in some environments may be a real possibility. It is worth 
recalling that the term involuntary does not connote the absence of choice per se, but 
rather the fact that some (elite and public) are conditioned not to see the alternative 
options or they can see them, but given the social context, some choices become unviable 
options due to the extremely high cost the entail and are thus abandoned.  
 
Another relatively under-examined area is that of the public’s preferences and more 
specifically how it is usually assumed that people would choose conflict resolution over 
conflict perpetuation. Thus, the possibility that the public may consciously or 
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subconsciously choose the perpetuation of a conflict is largely ignored, with some 
notable exceptions such as Mitzen (2006). As demonstrated in chapter 6, in protracted 
ethnic conflicts institutionalized securitization contributes to the development of specific 
public preferences that make the latter more likely to accept and even need a securitized 
environment and subsequently the presence of extreme and conflict-perpetuating elite 
positions. Political entrepreneurs therefore in such environments may not really be 
‘entrepreneurs’ that manipulate the public, but rather agents who follow the public 
demands regarding the handling of the conflict. The existence of extreme positions, 
therefore, may indeed derive from political elites, but the driving force behind such 
behavior may be the bottom-up forces and the need for the continuation of specific 
routines, even the ones that perpetuate the conflict.  
 
With this in mind we should also consider the possibility that elite actions may be 
restricted, meaning that they may be ‘unable’ to create a conflict-resolution discourse or 
even alter the existing conflict narrative, even if they wanted to. In cases where the public 
expects the perpetuation of the conflict, the choice of not being an active participant 
towards that goal (i.e. be part of conflict-diminishing processes) may have significant 
political costs, even if the alternative (i.e. be part of the conflict-perpetuating processes) 
does not necessarily guarantee significant benefits given that all elite will act in a similar 
way. The elite dilemma, therefore, may not be whether they want to promote an 
environment of either enmity or amity, but rather whether they will support the only 
available option, namely that of enmity. They do not therefore necessarily need to create 
the environment as argued by Lake and Rothchild (1996), but rather choose if they will 
actively be part of it or not and subsequently have a role in its reproduction.  
 
The concepts of institutionalized, horizontal and involuntary securitization also contribute 
to our understanding of why desecuritization becomes less likely in protracted ethnic 
conflicts despite the absence of violence and the presence of potential benefits from a 
resolution. While Mitzen’s (2006) argument about the need for ontological security 
through conflict-perpetuating routines is valid, it does not explore how those routines are 
maintained for prolonged periods, especially in cases when there is no violence or other 
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reasons for the conflict to persist. Deeply securitized environments ‘condition’ the vast 
majority, elites and non-elite, not to see the non-conflict alternatives – i.e. 
desecuritization – and maintain the routines that people are most comfortable with, 
namely those that revolve around the securitization of internalized threats regarding the 
enemy ‘other’. In such environments strategies of desecuritization, such as the objectivist, 
constructivist and deconstructivist ways (Huysmans 1995) are particularly difficult to be 
implemented given that securitizing actors and audiences alike may be unable to see 
either the possibility or the benefit of such alternatives.   
 
While the abovementioned argument may be valid for the majority of the people it does 
not mean that all individuals are conditioned into not seeing conflict-diminishing 
alternatives. There are individuals, elite and parts of the audiences, who do ‘escape’ from 
the social construction of conflict-identities and the securitized habitus and could thus 
seek change and the development of desecuritization processes. The reason why in 
protracted conflicts – such as the one in Cyprus – they remain unsuccessful is largely due 
to horizontal and bottom-up securitization. As demonstrated by the surveys and focus 
groups in chapter 6 the bottom-up and peer-to-peer pressures do not allow for deviations 
from the established norms and routines either on an elite or on a public level. 
Subsequently, conflict-perpetuating routines may persist even in cases where some 
individuals or groups desire and seek change. In particular the horizontal pressures make 
it extremely difficult for the few who want change to disrupt the routines that are 
expected by the majority, not least because they cannot find a sufficient audience to 
follow them.  
 
As demonstrated with the case of Cyprus, the concepts of institutionalized, bottom-up 
and horizontal securitization, contribute therefore to our understanding of why intractable 
conflicts remain unresolved, despite the absence of violence, the ripe conditions for a 
settlement, or even the obvious and quantifiable potential benefits from a resolution. 
Specifically, in Cyprus the conditions were very ripe: the country became an EU member 
(decreasing thus the security concerns for both sides), there has been no violence since 
1974 (with some very minor exceptions) and studies have shown that the potential 
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economic benefits of a unified Cyprus would be significant enough to tempt even the 
relatively well-off Greek Cypriots (Oslen, Antoniadou and Mullen 2008; 2009; 2010). 
Yet, as demonstrated in chapter 6 desecuritization attempts that could contribute towards 
the reunification were constantly securitized. Indeed, the data indicates that the public 
and elite are conditioned into focusing only on the threats, failing to see the potential 
benefits of desecuritization. Those who do see the benefits and were willing to deviate 
from the norms frequently ‘succumbed’ to the horizontal and bottom-up pressures.  
 
Understanding these horizontal and bottom-up securitization processes may also be of 
use for conflict resolution analysts dealing with conflict resolution of protracted conflicts. 
These different forms of securitization proposed in this thesis are useful for such analyses 
not least because they take into consideration the public’s behavior (towards the conflict) 
within each community and not the public’s behavior towards the local ‘enemy-other’ or 
foreign agents. The literature frequently focuses on mechanisms on how to bring two 
conflict sides together, usually assuming that the major obstacle is finding willing 
members of each side to engage in rapprochement and conflict resolution activities with 
the ‘other’. These approaches however rarely focus on the intra-community struggles and 
more specifically on the horizontal securitization that prevents ‘willing members’ either 
from commencing such activities or from having a wider impact on the society.  
Similarly, bottom-up, horizontal and ‘involuntary’ securitization is also useful for 
examining spoilers’ behavior in such conflicts. As the argument goes, their behavior may 
actually be the outcome of either ‘conditioned mentalities’ or ‘involuntary’ acts. There is, 
therefore, a need to consider the ‘tools’ used by conflict resolution analysts and 
negotiators to overcome the obstacles that are many times systemic (i.e. the outcome of 
the social context) and not individual-based (i.e. the outcome of one specific elite’s 
behavior).  
 
Horizontal and bottom-up securitization activities are also therefore a form of resistance 
mechanisms for either domestic or foreign interventions aiming to change the status quo, 
even if that change could lead to conflict resolution. This is especially applicable to 
foreign interventions – mainly if they derive from particular agents (in the case of Cyprus, 
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the UK and the US) – even if the foreign actors follow liberal peacebuilding intervention 
approaches. 189  As Richmond and Mitchel (2012) point out the impact of liberal 
peacebuilding interventions are influenced by the everyday practices and agencies of 
local actors. What is argued in this thesis is that in environments with institutionalized, 
horizontal and bottom-up securitization the every-day practices (vis-à-vis the conflict and 
the relevant interventions) could be to a certain degree ‘fixed’ and predictable. More 
importantly however they are particularly resilient to change and contribute to the 
perpetuation of the established resistance mechanisms towards any form of foreign 
intervention (liberal or not). 
 
While the aim of the thesis was not to make propositions on how to resolve the Cyprus 
conflict or indeed any other protracted ethnic conflict, the detailed analysis of the case 
study allows for some broad recommendations, especially on issues related to 
securitization. In chapter 6 there was particular emphasis on the centrality of the conflict 
for elite, media and public; centrality which does not allow for desecuritization prospects 
and subsequently for a conflict settlement. One of the most interesting characteristics of 
environments where securitization is institutionalized is that efforts for desecuritization 
may be perceived as threats and thus be securitized (usually in a horizontal and bottom-
up way). With this in mind, mechanisms that can be useful for desecuritization – such as 
constructivist strategies, namely the objective change of perceptions about who or what is 
a threat, or deconstructivist strategies, namely attempts to ‘humanize’ an ‘enemy other’ 
by linking it to additional identities that may be more acceptable (Huysmans 1995) – may 
raise reactions and lead to further securitization instead of desecuritization.  
 
What is recommended, therefore, is not to focus on desecuritizing activities, as is usually 
the case with confidence building measures in protracted conflict environments, but 
rather to aim towards less securitization until a state of a-securitization is reached, 
meaning there are no efforts of either securitization or desecuritization. Not securitizing 
something raises far less reactions than attempts to actively desecuritize it through 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  189	  Such interventions may commence with a conservative (mostly top-down) approach but they aspire to 
move to the orthodox and more bottom-up position and if possible even have an emancipatory graduation – 
albeit the latter has proved to be particularly difficult (Richmond 2008).	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specific actions such as bi-communal activities. Clearly, and as argued in this thesis, a-
securitization is not an easy target either, especially for issues that are deeply 
institutionalized, given that the public may actually expect certain issues to remain 
securitized. The focus at the beginning should be on issues that are not linked to pivotal 
events and are somewhat low in the hierarchy of security concerns for each side. For 
instance, environmental issues could relatively easily remain desecuritized or a-
securitized and could under some circumstances even enjoy positive securitization – that 
is present the lack of cooperation on environment issues as a threat. To a lesser degree 
some economic issues could enjoy similar treatment as long as they are not linked 
directly to the Problem – for instance, selling Greek Cypriot property to Turkish Cypriots 
would generate reactions, whereas economic activities through the Green Line and under 
the Green Line Regulation would not. The problem with the latter however is that they 
may not generate reactions but at the same time they seem to be ineffective. The dilemma 
therefore is whether each side should attempt to engage in activities that would be 
practically effective (e.g. create closer links between the two communities) but could 
potentially lead to securitization, or maintain less effective but also less securitized 
activities. What is required therefore are elites who are less risk averse and would be 
willing to promote and support positions that would have an impact on the resolution 
efforts. These are elites who must be willing to withstand the securitization forces that 
will occur on a horizontal and bottom-up level. More importantly there is a need to 
attempt to interrupt the institutionalized processes that maintain the internalized threat-
perceptions. 
 
The latter argument is particularly important to eliminate or reduce the bottom-up forces 
that help maintain securitization in an institutionalized form. The goal therefore is to start 
re-conditioning Cypriots to the idea that not everything related to the ‘other’ is a threat. 
Efforts to change the Cypriots’ identities altogether so as to accept the ‘other’ as a friend 
instead of an enemy will face severe reactions and securitization. What is recommended 
therefore is something along the liberal-functionalist approaches, where at the beginning 
to have a series of desecuritization activities for only some less sensitive issues (e.g. 
environment) that will allow Cypriots to see that under some circumstances the ‘other’ 
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may not be a threat. Once these perceptions become widely accepted desecuritization in 
other areas might become easier. This is clearly a very long-term process that may 
require even a generation change to have spillover impact into other sectors such as the 
political and the societal. As argued below even this option is particularly difficult to 
achieve for as long as securitization remains institutionalized.  
 
Such ‘functionalist’ approaches form the idea behind Confidence Building Measures 
(CBMs), which aim to create spillover effects from low-level activities into issues of high 
politics. Such low-level activities include common projects such as the Nicosia Master 
Plan – which dealt with the sewage system in Nicosia and required the collaboration 
between the two municipalities of the city – to smaller in scale bi-communal activities 
such as art-related events and research and environmental projects. In theory it is possible 
to have spillover effects. In this thesis a claim is made that such functionalists approaches 
do not work in environments where securitization is deeply internalized and 
institutionalized. The environment is such that it does not allow the effects of such 
activities to enter the realm of high politics. The severe bottom-up and horizontal forces 
‘block’ the path towards the top-level elites who are responsible for the conflict 
resolution negotiations. Similarly, horizontal securitization reduces the chances for a 
continuous presence of even the small-scale low-level desecuritizing activities and almost 
eliminates any possibility of accepting any such activities on a high politics level. Such 
conflict resolution mechanisms, is argued in this thesis, are therefore highly unlikely to 
work for as long as securitization remains institutionalized and the horizontal forces are 
strong. Such goals become even harder to achieve if the elites are unwilling to take risks 
that could however potentially lead to political cost. With this in mind small scale 
desecuritization activities can have an impact (through spillover) only if they are 
combined with the support of elites and media who will be willing to withstand the 
horizontal and bottom-up forces. The first step however should be a-securitization 
behavior from elite before they even attempt to engage in small desecuritization 
cooperative activities with the ‘other’. 
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In regards to Cyprus specifically, analysts and negotiators should also take into 
consideration the centrality of the Problem and how it revolves around specific pivotal 
events. The fact that the Cyprus problem is heavily linked to the pivotal event of 1974 
(for Greek Cypriots) and 1963-67 (for Turkish Cypriots) is not necessarily negative, in 
the sense that the conflict does not ‘grow’ from aggressive and existential ongoing 
developments, as is the case for instance with the Arab-Israeli conflict. Thus, the further 
we move from the pivotal events, the lesser the impact of that event may be on the 
securitization processes. Maintaining therefore an a-securitized environment will become 
easier in time especially considering that the younger generations will have no personal 
experiences regarding those events and less attachment to them. That said, by the same 
token the fact that there is no hurting stalemate and/or developments reduces the 
incentives for a settlement, at least in the form that is currently being negotiated (i.e. bi-
zonal, bi-communal federation). 
 
Further research 
 
There is little doubt that the theoretical arguments and the empirical evidence presented 
in this thesis could be improved and elaborated with further research, which could focus 
either on an empirical level – i.e. examination of more case studies – or on a theoretical 
one – i.e. by using the ideas of institutionalized, horizontal and bottom-up securitization 
for other aspects of the theory that have not been examined in profoundly in this thesis, 
namely desecuritization processes (and not just securitization). I have already discussed 
how the goal should be first to maintain an a-securitized environment before proceeding 
to desecuritizing acts, so as to reduce reactions and further re-securitization. Attention in 
this regard could be given to the role of the media, which as demonstrated in chapter 6, 
has an integral role to play in the institutionalization of the securitization processes. 
Indeed, the close relationship between media and securitization and the impact they have 
on each other (Vultee 2011) deserves more attention. Specifically, more research is 
required to determine the interplay between the media and elite activities and how they 
influence each other into maintaining such resistant-to-desecuritization environments. 
The focus, however, should not be limited to ad hoc one-time securitization incidences 
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but also to the perpetuation of the same securitization processes. With this in mind, 
constructivist strategies that focus on understanding how something becomes part of the 
‘drama’ and the threat (Huysmans 1995) must also focus on how to de-link political 
discourses in the media from the pivotal events that are connected to deeply securitized 
issues that are non-negotiable. Similarly, further research is required to examine whether 
and how media agents could potentially contribute to routinized desecuritization.  
 
The empirical data for this thesis derived solely from the Greek-Cypriot community, 
meaning that there is no comparison either between the two communities, or between 
Cyprus and other similar conflicts. Thus, additional data from other cases either in 
Cyprus (i.e. the Turkish Cypriot side) or from other areas – such as Kosovo, Sri Lanka, 
Israel-Palestine, etc. – would certainly add more validity to the theoretical claims of this 
thesis and clarify the impact the social context has on the securitization processes. 
Similarly, but for different empirical outcomes, it would be interesting to examine in a 
comparative manner cases such as Northern Ireland and how elites and the public 
managed to overcome problems of institutionalized securitization and promoted 
desecuritization. Furthermore, but along the same idea, the concept of horizontal 
securitization could be further explored to identify more clearly the forces behind such 
processes. This requires targeted questionnaires on the entire population (and not just a 
specific audience as was done for this work) to quantify the most influential factors.  
 
Lastly, some of the ideas presented here could be extended to other types of conflict. It 
would be particularly interesting to see whether the same securitization processes could 
develop in non-ethnic or protracted conflict cases without internalized perceptions about 
enemy ‘others’ and without historical animosities. Such cases for instance could be the 
institutionalized securitization of terrorism in the US after the pivotal event of September 
11 2001. Similarly, immigration and economic-related issues are likely to continue to 
dominate many states’ discourses and occupy an elevated position in the security 
concerns of the populations. How these threats that have no specific ‘enemy-other’ and 
are not linked to historical experiences could become part of routinized securitization 
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discourse will also be a challenge. 190 Despite any potential challenges this thesis, with 
the concepts of horizontal and bottom-up securitization, can provide a good starting point 
for understanding how securitization processes can persist to the degree that they become 
institutionalized.  
   
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 It is worth recalling that the so-called Paris School deals with the issue of immigration and routinized 
securitization, albeit not in a way portrayed in this thesis. 
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Appendix	  I:	  Interviews	  	  
 
 
- Dr. Vasos Lyssarides (Former President of the Parliament – EDEK Honorary 
 President) [July 23, 2010 and May 12, 2011] 
- Mr. Demetris Eliades (Minster of Defense) [February 3, 2010] 
- Prof. Andreas Theophanous (Academic) [February 9 and 11, 2011] 
- Dr. Erol Kaymak (Academic) [February 10, 2011] 
- Dr. Constadina Charalambous (Academic) [March 14, 2011] 
- Ms. Evi Eftychiou (Sociologist) [March 15, 2011] 
- Ms. Andri Hadjiandreou (Musician) [March 22, 2011] 
- Prof. Costas Constantinou (Academic) [February 18, 2011] 
- Mr. Andreas Christofides (United Nations-backed Technical Committee on Crime 
and Criminal Matters (TCCCM) [June 18, 2010] 
- Mr. Panayiotis Loizides (President of the Greek Cypriot Chamber of Commerce) [June 
16, 2010] 
- Mr. Kemal Baykali (Deputy Secretary General External Relations – Turkish Cypriot  
 Chamber of Commerce) [June 17, 2010] 
- Andreas Nicolaou (Chief of Fire Department) [June 23, 2010] 
- Dr. Achilles Emilianides (Lawyer / Academic) [February 18, 2011] 
- Mr. Michalis Kontos (Researcher / author) [February 16, 2011] 
- Dr. Christina Ioannou (Academic) [February 16, 2011] 
- Mr. Michalakis Adamides (Director, Kronos Press Agency) 
- Mr. Marios Hadjistylis (Journalist – Politis newspaper) [June 25, 2010] 
- Ms. Maria Patsalidou (civil servant) [June 26, 2010] 
 
 
Anonymous:  
- Dr. “T.” (Academic) [February 17, 2011] 
- Mr. “M” (Journalist) [June 26, 2010] 
- Mr. “S” (Journalist) [June 26, 2010] 
- Dr. “A” – (Academic) [February 18, 2011] 
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- AKEL MP (politician)* [May 3, 2011] 
- DISY MP (politician)* [May 4, 2011] 
- DIKO MP (politician)* [May 10, 2011] 
- EVROKO official (politician)* [May 12, 2011] 
 
* The MPs for each of the aforementioned political party range from 1 to 6. This means 
that indicating even the first letter of their names will ‘give away’ the identity of the 
interviewee.  
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Appendix	  II	  –	  Focus	  Groups	  
 
 
Roundtable 1: Artists. There were a total of 10 participants, five Greek and five Turkish 
Cypriots. The group included painters, composers, musicians, dancers and designers. 
[June 17, 2009] 
 
Roundtable 2: NGOs. There were a total of 11 participants, six Greek Cypriots and five 
Turkish Cypriots, who either created or were members of NGOs. Some of the NGOs 
were bi-communal while others were Greek or Turkish Cypriots, which, however, 
engaged in bi-communal activities. [October 14, 2009] 
 
Roundtable 3: Academics. This roundtable was comprised of 8 academics, four from 
each side. All participants came under their personal capacity and did not represent their 
academic institutions. [November 4, 2009] 
 
Roundtable 4: Students. Twenty high school students from both sides of the Green Line 
participated in this roundtable. Some of them participated in a US-sponsored program 
that sent Greek and Turkish Cypriots to the US for a month. With them were two teachers 
that “supervised” the entire meeting. [December 2, 2009] 
 
Roundtable 5: Civil servants. In this roundtable there were only 4 participants, two 
from each side, who were involved in the Master Plan. The Master Plan was the only pre-
2003 cooperation between the two sides and was in regards to the sewage system in the 
old city of Nicosia. [January 20, 2010] 
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Appendix	  III	  -­‐	  Academic	  Survey	  	  
Cooperation	  Across	  the	  Divide	  
 
Introduction	  
	  Dear	  Colleague,	  	  	  Thank	  you	  for	  taking	  the	  time	  to	  complete	  this	  short	  survey	  (approximately	  10	  minutes).	  	  	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  survey	  is	  primarily	  to:	  	  (i)	  examine	  the	  degree	  of	  cooperation	  between	  academics	  working	  in	  the	  (Republic	  of	  Cyprus)	  government-­‐controlled	  areas	  and	  Turkish	  Cypriots	  (and/or	  other	  non-­‐Turkish	  Cypriot)	  academics	  across	  the	  Green	  Line	  -­‐	  i.e.	  academics	  who	  work	  in	  the	  areas	  not	  controlled	  by	  the	  Republic	  of	  Cyprus	  (ii)	  examine	  any	  potential	  problems	  and	  concerns	  academics	  in	  the	  government-­‐controlled	  areas	  may	  have	  in	  regards	  to	  such	  collaborations.	  	  The	  term	  “academics”	  refers	  to	  both	  teaching	  faculty	  and	  researchers	  (the	  term	  does	  
not	  refer	  to	  administration	  personnel).	  The	  term	  'Greek	  Cypriot	  side'	  refers	  to	  the	  Greek	  Cypriot	  community	  (as	  a	  whole)	  in	  Cyprus	  The	  term	  'government	  controlled	  areas'	  refers	  to	  the	  areas	  controlled	  by	  the	  Republic	  of	  Cyprus	  -­‐	  i.e.	  south	  of	  the	  Buffer	  Zone.	  	  The	  survey	  is	  anonymous	  and	  confidential	  and	  will	  be	  used	  only	  for	  research	  purposes,	  including	  a	  PhD	  dissertation.	  	  Thank	  you	  in	  advance	  for	  your	  help	  	  Constantinos	  Adamides,	  MA,	  MBA,	  PhD	  (c.)	  	  	  *	  How	  risky	  do	  you	  believe	  the	  PROCESS	  of	  cooperating	  with	  Turkish	  Cypriot	  academics	  is	  for	  the	  Greek	  Cypriot	  side?	  (1	  being	  not	  risky	  at	  all,	  and	  5	  very	  risky)	  	  	  	  1 	  	  2 	  	  3 	  	  4 	  	  5 	  	  Do	  not	  Know 
Reset 
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*	  How	  risky	  do	  you	  believe	  the	  OUTCOME	  of	  a	  cooperating	  (of	  any	  form)	  with	  Turkish	  Cypriot	  academics	  is	  for	  the	  Greek	  Cypriot	  side?	  (1	  being	  not	  risky	  at	  all,	  and	  5	  very	  risky)	  	  	  	  1 	  	  2 	  	  3 	  	  4 	  	  5 	  	  Do	  not	  Know 
Reset *	  Have	  you	  ever	  cooperated	  with	  Turkish	  Cypriot	  academics	  for	  any	  academic	  activities?	  (e.g.	  for	  a	  conference	  or	  seminar	  organization,	  lecture,	  publication,	  research	  project,	  etc.).	  NOTE:	  Collaboration	  could	  have	  taken	  place	  anywhere	  in	  Cyprus	  (either	  side)	  or	  abroad.	  	  	  	  Yes 	  	  No 
Reset *	  Your	  cooperation	  was	  with	  Turkish	  Cypriot	  academics	  who	  worked	  at	  (please	  choose	  all	  that	  apply):	  	  	  	  Academic	  Institution(s) 	  	  Research	  Center(s) 	  	  NGO(s)	  (but	  not	  a	  Research	  Center) 	  	  Local	  authorities	  (e.g.	  municipalities,	  community	  centers,	  etc.) 	  	  Other	  (e.g.	  professional	  associations) 
Reset The	  cooperation	  was	  mostly	  an	  initiative	  of:	  	  	  	  Either	  Greek	  or	  Turkish	  Cypriots 	  	  Other	  (e.g.	  PRIO,	  British	  Commission,	  Fulbright,	  etc) 
Reset 
	  	  *	  Who	  initiated	  the	  cooperation(s)?	  	  	  	  Always	  Greek	  Cypriots 	  	  Mostly	  Greek	  Cypriots 	  	  (Approximately)	  half	  the	  times	  were	  Greek	  Cypriots	  and	  half	  the	  times	  Turkish	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Cypriots 	  	  Mostly	  Turkish	  Cypriots 	  	  Always	  Turkish	  Cypriots 
Reset What	  was	  the	  nature	  of	  your	  cooperation?	  (please	  choose	  all	  that	  apply)	  	  	  	  Partnership	  in	  a	  research	  project 	  	  Conference	  organization 	  	  Seminar	  organization 	  	  Training	  (e.g.	  for	  an	  EU-­‐funded	  project) 	  	  Co-­‐authorship	  of	  article/book 	  	  Teaching	  (e.g.	  guest	  lecture	  in	  his/her	  class) 
Reset Other	  
	  	  *	  Where	  has	  this	  cooperation	  taken	  place?	  (please	  choose	  all	  that	  apply)	  	  	  	  In	  the	  areas	  not	  controlled	  by	  the	  government 	  	  In	  the	  government	  controlled	  areas 	  	  In	  the	  Buffer	  Zone	  (e.g.	  Ledra	  Palace) 	  	  Abroad 
Reset *	  Would	  you	  cooperate	  with	  Turkish	  Cypriot	  academics	  if	  you	  were	  asked	  to	  hold	  the	  meetings	  in	  the	  areas	  NOT	  controlled	  by	  the	  RoC	  government?	  	  	  	  Yes 	  	  Yes,	  but	  only	  in	  the	  Buffer	  Zone 	  	  No 
Reset 
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*	  During	  the	  last	  decade,	  how	  many	  times	  have	  you	  cooperated	  with	  Turkish	  Cypriot	  academics?	  	  	  	  1 	  	  2 	  	  3 	  	  4 	  	  5 	  	  More	  than	  5 
Reset *	  When	  you	  cooperate	  with	  Turkish	  Cypriot	  academics,	  do	  you	  consciously	  choose	  
NOT	  to	  inform	  some	  of	  your	  colleagues	  about	  your	  collaboration?	  	  	  	  Yes 	  	  No 
Reset *	  When	  you	  cooperate	  with	  Turkish	  Cypriot	  academics,	  do	  you	  consciously	  choose	  
NOT	  to	  inform	  some	  of	  your	  family	  members	  about	  your	  cooperation	  	  	  	  Yes 	  	  No 
Reset *	  How	  does	  the	  academic	  administration	  (e.g.	  Rector,	  Dean,	  Head	  of	  Department)	  of	  your	  institution	  react	  to	  your	  cooperation(s)	  with	  Turkish	  Cypriot	  academics?	  	  	  	  Strongly	  opposed 	  	  Moderately	  opposed 	  	  Neutral 	  	  Moderately	  supported 	  	  Strongly	  supported 
Reset *	  How	  does	  the	  majority	  of	  your	  colleagues	  with	  whom	  you	  frequently	  interact	  –	  e.g.	  from	  your	  department	  -­‐	  react	  to	  your	  cooperation	  with	  Turkish	  Cypriot	  academics?	  	  	  	  Strongly	  opposed 	  	  Moderately	  opposed 	  	  Neutral 	  	  Moderately	  supported 	  	  Strongly	  supported 
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Reset *	  How	  does	  your	  family	  and/or	  close	  friends	  react	  to	  your	  cooperation	  with	  Turkish	  Cypriot	  academics?	  	  	  	  Strongly	  opposed 	  	  Moderately	  opposed 	  	  Mildly	  opposed 	  	  Neutral 	  	  Mildly	  supported 	  	  Moderately	  supported 	  	  Strongly	  supported 
Reset *	  Your	  cooperation(s)	  was	  (were)	  funded	  by	  (Please	  choose	  all	  that	  apply):	  	  	  	  It	  was	  not	  a	  collaboration	  that	  required	  any	  funding 	  	  Research	  Promotion	  Foundation 	  	  USAID 	  	  UNDP 	  	  The	  EU	  (e.g.	  LLP,	  Commission,	  FP7,	  etc.) 
Reset Other	  (please	  specify)	  
	  	  *	  How	  would	  you	  characterize	  the	  overall	  perception	  of	  the	  following	  funding	  agencies	  within	  the	  Greek-­‐Cypriot	  academic	  community	  (1	  being	  very	  negative	  and	  5	  being	  very	  positive)	  
 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
RPF	  (Research	  Promotion	  Foundation) 	   	   	   	   	   	   
EU 	   	   	   	   	   	   
UNDP 	   	   	   	   	   	   
USAID 	   	   	   	   	   	   
Bi-­‐communal	  NGOs	  (e.g.	  PRIO) 	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Reset *	  If	  there	  were	  an	  agreed	  settlement	  to	  the	  Cyprus	  Problem,	  would	  you	  be	  willing	  to	  cooperate	  more	  frequently	  with	  Turkish	  Cypriot	  academics?	  	  	  	  No,	  it	  will	  not	  change	  my	  current	  approach	  towards	  this	  issue	  (i.e.	  neither	  increase	  nor	  decrease) 	  	  Yes,	  but	  only	  if	  other	  colleagues	  do	  the	  same 	  	  Yes,	  I	  will	  certainly	  increase	  the	  frequency	  (regardless	  of	  what	  others	  do) 	  	  It	  will	  decrease	  the	  frequency 
Reset *	  How	  significant	  are	  the	  following	  reasons	  for	  not	  cooperating	  with	  Turkish	  Cypriot	  academics?	  (1	  being	  insignificant	  and	  5	  being	  very	  significant)	  
 1 2 3 4 5 
The	  opportunity	  did	  not	  arise 	   	   	   	   	   
I	  am	  ideologically	  opposed	  to	  such	  collaborations 	   	   	   	   	   
It	  might	  cause	  me	  problems	  at	  my	  working	  environment 	   	   	   	   	   
It	  could	  upset	  my	  colleagues 	   	   	   	   	   
It	  could	  upset	  my	  family 	   	   	   	   	   
It	  could	  upset	  my	  friends 	   	   	   	   	   
I	  do	  not	  want	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  specific	  funding	  agencies 	   	   	   	   	   
I	  do	  not	  want	  to	  recognize	  the	  "Turkish	  Republic	  of	  Northern	  
Cyprus" 	   	   	   	   	   
Reset Other	  (please	  specify)	   	  	  	  *	  Would	  you	  consider	  cooperating	  with	  Turkish	  Cypriot	  academics	  in	  the	  future?	  	  	  	  No 	  	  Yes,	  even	  if	  there	  is	  no	  agreed	  settlement	  to	  the	  Cyprus	  problem 	  	  Yes,	  but	  only	  if	  there	  is	  an	  agreed	  settlement	  to	  the	  Cyprus	  Problem 
Reset 	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*	  If	  there	  was	  an	  opportunity	  for	  cooperation,	  would	  you	  be	  willing	  to	  participate	  if	  the	  meetings	  were	  held	  (please	  choose	  all	  that	  apply):	  	  	  	  In	  the	  RoC	  government	  controlled	  areas? 	  	  In	  the	  areas	  not	  controlled	  by	  the	  RoC? 	  	  In	  the	  Buffer	  Zone 	  	  Abroad 
Reset Other	  (please	  specify)	   	  	  	  Which	  of	  the	  following	  would	  be	  possible	  reasons	  for	  which	  you	  would	  refuse	  to	  hold	  academic	  cooperation	  meetings	  in	  the	  areas	  NOT	  controlled	  by	  the	  RoC	  government?	  (please	  choose	  all	  that	  apply)	  	  	   	  	  Ideological	  reasons	  (e.g.	  I	  do	  not	  want	  show	  my	  passport	  or	  ID	  at	  the	  crossing	  points) 	  	  I	  do	  not	  want	  to	  recognize	  (directly	  or	  indirectly)	  the	  "TRNC" 	  	  I	  am	  concerned	  about	  my	  safety 	  	  I	  do	  not	  want	  to	  be	  the	  cause	  of	  any	  problems	  at	  my	  working	  environment 	  	  I	  do	  not	  want	  to	  upset	  my	  colleagues	  and/or	  my	  institution 	  	  I	  do	  not	  want	  to	  upset	  my	  family	  and/or	  friends 
Reset Other	  reason	  (please	  specify)	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It	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  the	  consequences	  of	  academic	  collaboration	  are	  different	  across	  fields	  or	  disciplines.	  In	  your	  understanding,	  what	  is	  the	  degree	  of	  risk	  associated	  with	  academic	  cooperation	  between	  GC	  and	  TC	  academics	  and	  researchers	  in	  the	  following	  fields	  or	  disciplines?	  	  	  *	  How	  do	  you	  think	  the	  academic	  administration	  (e.g.	  Rector,	  Dean,	  Head	  of	  Department)	  of	  your	  institution	  would	  react	  if	  you	  cooperated	  with	  Turkish	  Cypriots	  academics?	  	  	  	  Strongly	  oppose 	  	  Moderately	  oppose 	  	  Neutral 	  	  Moderately	  support 	  	  Strongly	  support 
Reset *	  How	  do	  you	  think	  the	  majority	  of	  your	  colleagues	  with	  whom	  you	  frequently	  interact	  –	  e.g.	  from	  your	  department	  –	  would	  react	  to	  your	  cooperation	  with	  Turkish	  Cypriot	  academics?	  	  	  	  Strongly	  oppose 	  	  Moderately	  oppose 	  	  Neutral 	  	  Moderately	  support 	  	  Strongly	  support 
Reset *	  How	  do	  you	  think	  your	  family	  and/or	  close	  friends	  would	  react	  to	  your	  cooperation	  with	  Turkish	  Cypriot	  academics?	  	  	  	  Strongly	  oppose 	  	  Moderately	  oppose 	  	  Neutral 	  	  Moderately	  support 	  	  Strongly	  support 
Reset 
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How	  do	  you	  react	  to	  colleagues’	  cooperation	  with	  Turkish	  Cypriot	  academics?	  	  	  	  Strongly	  oppose 	  	  Moderately	  oppose 	  	  Neutral 	  	  Moderately	  support 	  	  Strongly	  support 
Reset In	  which	  of	  the	  following	  fields	  (if	  any)	  do	  you	  believe	  a	  cooperation	  could	  pose	  more	  risk	  for	  the	  Greek	  Cypriot	  side?	  (1	  being	  no	  risk	  and	  5	  being	  very	  risky)	  
 1 2 3 4 5 
Political	  Science 	   	   	   	   	   
Economics	  and	  Business	  Studies 	   	   	   	   	   
Natural	  Sciences	  (e.g.	  physics,	  chemistry,	  etc.) 	   	   	   	   	   
Arts	  (e.g.	  Music,	  art,	  dance,	  etc.) 	   	   	   	   	   
Environmental	  Studies 	   	   	   	   	   
Social	  Sciences	  (e.g.	  sociology,	  anthropology,	  etc.) 	   	   	   	   	   
Humanities	  (e.g.	  Languages,	  Literature,	  etc.) 	   	   	   	   	   
Engineering 	   	   	   	   	   
Reset 	  *	  How	  do	  you	  think	  the	  perpetuation	  of	  the	  Cyprus	  problem	  influences	  academic	  cooperation	  between	  Greek	  and	  Turkish	  Cypriots?	  (1	  being	  very	  negatively	  and	  5	  being	  very	  positively)	  	  	  	  1 	  	  2 	  	  3 	  	  4 	  	  5 
Reset 
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*	  How	  often	  do	  you	  discuss	  with	  colleagues	  from	  your	  institution	  the	  possibility	  of	  working	  with	  Turkish	  Cypriot	  academics?	  	  	  	  Never 	  	  Rarely 	  	  Sometimes 	  	  Often 	  	  Always 
Reset *	  Would	  you	  publish	  academic	  research	  outcomes	  that	  could	  potentially	  have	  negative	  political	  consequences	  for	  the	  Greek	  Cypriot	  side?	  	  	  	  No 	  	  No,	  at	  least	  not	  until	  there	  is	  an	  agreed	  settlement	  to	  the	  Cyprus	  Problem 	  	  Yes,	  academic	  research	  should	  be	  distinct	  from	  politics 
Reset *	  Would	  you	  publish	  academic	  research	  outcomes	  that	  could	  potentially	  have	  benefits	  for	  the	  Turkish	  Cypriots?	  	  	  	  No 	  	  No,	  at	  least	  not	  until	  there	  is	  an	  agreed	  settlement	  to	  the	  Cyprus	  Problem 	  	  Yes,	  regardless	  if	  there	  is	  an	  agreed	  settlement	  or	  not 
Reset 
Demographics	  *	  What	  is	  your	  gender?	  	  	  	  Male 	  	  Female 
Reset *	  What	  is	  your	  age?	  	  	  	  18-­‐24 	  	  25-­‐34 	  	  35-­‐44 	  	  45-­‐54 	  	  55-­‐64 	  	  65+ 
Reset 
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*	  Where	  do	  you	  work?	  	  	  	  State	  University 	  	  Private	  University	  /	  College 	  	  Research	  Center	  /	  NGO 
Reset *	  What	  is	  your	  area	  of	  expertise?	  	  	  	  i.	  Finance,	  Accounting,	  Management,	  Marketing 	  	  ii.	  Other	  Business	  School	  Department 	  	  iii.	  Economics 	  	  iv.	  Political	  science,	  International	  Relations 	  	  v.	  European	  Studies 	  	  vi.	  Sociology,	  Anthropology 	  	  vii.	  Other	  Social	  Science	  Department 	  	  viii.	  Engineering	  (e.g.	  mechanical,	  computer,	  electrical,	  etc.) 	  	  ix.	  Science	  Department	  (e.g.	  physics,	  chemistry,	  etc.) 	  	  x.	  Humanities	  (languages,	  literature,	  etc.) 	  	  xi.	  Education 	  	  xii.	  Music,	  Dance,	  Art 	  	  xiii.	  Communications,	  Media 	  	  xiv.	  Law 	  	  xv.	  Architecture 	  	  xvi.	  Environmental	  Studies 	  	  xvii.	  Other	  (please	  specify) 
Reset 
	  	   	  
 
 
Thank you for completing the survey 
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Appendix	  IV	  –	  Settler	  population	  calculations	  	  
 
The population north of the Buffer Zone has changed significantly since 1974. The 
extraordinary increase, as argued here, cannot be attributed to a natural population growth 
but rather to the arrival of Turkish settlers.  
 
The number of settlers is highly contested, ranging from 50,000 to 180,000 depending on 
the sources. The RoC statistical service placed the number of settlers in 2009 between 
160,000 and 170,000. Turkish Cypriot official sources placed their number in 2006 at 
70,500. Other scholars argue that the number is even lower: Dodd (2004) and Hatay 
(2005), for instance, argue that their number does not exceed 50,000; a figure which is 
even lower than the official Turkish Cypriot estimations. The Turkish Ministry of Interior 
announced that there are 146,000 Turkish citizens working and living in TRNC (Vasiliou 
20.3.2007, Politis newspaper), a number that is much closer to the RoC’s estimations. 
International reports (e.g. Laakso 2003) argue that the figure, at least until 2001, was 
close to 114,000. It is clear that there is no agreement on the number of settlers. There 
seems to be however an agreement on the TRNC population, which means that the 
number of settlers, as discussed in Chapter 5, is simply a question of definition – i.e. who 
is a settler.  
 
The tables below show the different population estimates in the areas not controlled by 
the RoC.  
Table 1: TRNC census-based population (TRNC sources) 
 
Period 1974 1996 2006 2011 
TRNC population 120,200 200,587 256,644 294,906 
Percentage Increase 
from 1974   67% 114% 145% 
Source: http://www.trncinfo.com/tanitma/en/index.asp?sayfa=haberdetay&newsid=1115 
 
Table 1 above indicates the TRNC population after censuses conducted by the Turkish 
Cypriot authorities. The increase from 1974 to 2011 was 145%. What is particularly 
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interesting to note are the huge increases between 1996-2006 (28% increase) and 2006-
2011 (15%).  This increase, for the period 1996-2006 is equated to 2.7% per year and for 
the period 2006-2011 3% per year. These are extraordinary growth rates which, as argued 
below, are unlikely to be attributed to natural population growth. 
 
Table 2: Turkish Cypriot Population (Greek Cypriot sources) 
Year 1974 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 
Turkish Cypriot 
population 120.2 108.3 102.4 106.2 101.2 91 87.9 88 89.2 
% change from 1974 100 88% 82% 86% 81% 71% 68% 68% 69% 
 
Source: Statistical Abstract 2009 (Cyprus Statistical Service) 
 
Table 2 above shows the estimated figure of just Turkish Cypriots (i.e. not TRNC 
population), which is close to 90,000. Given that Greek Cypriots accept the overall 
TRNC population figures as described in Table 1 above, it means that according to these 
sources, the number of settlers is estimated at slightly less than 200,000. The reasoning 
behind the Turkish Cypriot population decrease is that many Turkish Cypriots migrated 
and gap has been filled with the Turks, mainly from Anatolia (Besim and Jenkins 2006). 
 
Table 3: Turkey’s Population Growth Rate 
 
Source: http://www.indexmundi.com/turkey/population_growth_rate.html 
 
 
Table 3 above shows Turkey’s population growth over the past 11 years. Turkey is 
considered to be one of the fastest growing states in the world and yet the average 
population growth rate is only 1.22%. This means that if the TRNC had a similar growth 
rate its population should be today around 188,000 (Table 4 below), a figure significantly 
lower than 295,000. With these calculations the number of settlers could be estimated to 
be slightly over 100,000, which is basically somewhere between the official Greek and 
Turkish Cypriot figures.  
Period 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Avg 
Growth 
rate 
(%) 
1.27
% 
1.24
% 
1.20
% 
1.60
% 
1.30
% 
1.09
% 
1.06
% 
1.04
% 
1.01
% 
1.31
% 
1.27
% 
1.24
% 1.22% 
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Table 4: TRNC Expected Population Growth * 
 
Period 1974 1996 2006 2011 
TRNC population 120,200 156,951 177,185 188,260 
Percentage Increase 
from previous period   31% 47% 57% 
 
 
* These are NOT actual population numbers. These are numbers calculated based on 
Turkey’s average population growth rate for the 11-year period 2000-2011 (1.22%). The 
assumption is that Turkish Cypriots would have over this period a similar population 
growth rate as Turkey. Thus, if the population since 1974 kept increasing at a rate of 
1.22% per year, the TRNC population would have been in 1996 approximately 156,000, 
in 2006, 177,000 and in 2011, 188,000. These numbers are significantly lower compared 
to the actual population numbers as shown in Table 1. The actual annual population 
growth rate for the TRNC is close to 2.5%, which is twice as much as that of Turkey 
(over the past 11 years at least) and almost 2.5 times that of the Republic of Cyprus. 
Given that it is highly unlikely that the TRNC experienced such extraordinary natural 
growth rate, the difference between the assumed numbers and the actual numbers must be 
foreigners. 
 
 	  	  	  
